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 1 
Chapter One 
Do the Different Ways that Banks Are Legally 
Organized Matter for Financial Regulation? – 
An Overview of the Thesis 
 
‘The burgeoning study of the “economics of organization” turns on two propositions – 
organizations matter and organizations are susceptible to analysis’.1 
Oliver Williamson  
 
 
What do people exactly mean when they refer to banks? Do they have a production 
function in mind? Or rather a place where deposits are received and loans are granted? It 
is possible that the term evokes a brick-and-mortar institution or maybe an office space, 
with tellers, relationship managers, cash machines and a large vault stocked with piles of 
cash.   
 
Certainly, banks are not monoliths. They are legal entities constituted as networks of 
contracts undertaken between their different organizational constituents and stakeholders. 
However, aside from notable exceptions, limited academic and policy attention has been 
placed on the legal organization of banks in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 global 
financial crisis. This leads to the overarching questions that underpin this research 
project: if and how the legal structure of commercial banks is important for the design of 
financial regulation?  
 
                                                
1 Oliver E Williamson, ‘Why Law, Economics and Organization’ (2005) 1 Annual Review of 
Law and Social Science 369. 
  2 
This dissertation analyzes the legal configuration of banks in the aftermath of the latest 
financial crisis. The following case studies and anecdotes aim to provide some context 
into the discussion that this thesis undertakes.   
 
On 15 September 2008, investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy protection in the United States (US). Lehman Brothers’ failure marked one of 
the crucial moments of the 2007-08 financial crisis. The US government announced a set 
of measures designed for providing up to USD $700 billion as part of the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP). A few days after Lehman’s collapse, the two remaining US 
investment banks announced that they were changing their legal structure and converting 
into bank holding companies (BHCs). The move was largely seen as a way to access 
federal funding – and even though their main business lines did not change – it marked a 
significant paradigm shift in the way that investment banks in the US are structured.   
 
In February 2012, while the effects of the financial crisis were still being felt in many 
jurisdictions, the European Commission setup a high-level expert group with the 
objective of examining potential reforms to the European Union’s (EU) banking sector. 
The group became known as the ‘Liikanen Group’, because Commissioner Michel 
Barnier appointed Bank of Finland Governor, Mr. Erki Liikanen, to chair the group. In a 
certain sense, the Liikanen Group was convened as a response to a comparable group of 
wise men assembled in the United Kingdom, led by Sir John Vickers, who had been 
given a similar mandate in June 2010, and rendered their final report in September 2011.2 
After the onslaught of the 2008 financial crisis, examining the structure of banking 
seemed to have become a very important item in the agenda for revamping international 
financial regulation.   
 
                                                
2 Officially called the ‘Independent Commission on Banking’ (ICB), but colloquially referred to 
as the ‘Vickers Commission’. See Independent Commission on Banking, ‘Final Report: 
Recommendations’ (September 2011) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131003105424/https:/hmt-
sanctions.s3.amazonaws.com/ICB%20final%20report/ICB%2520Final%2520Report%5B1%5D.
pdf> accessed 6 December 2016.  
  3 
On 2 October 2012, the Liikanen Group presented its final report. Amongst other key 
points, the Liikanen Report concluded the need: ‘[…] to require the legal separation of 
certain particularly risky financial activities from deposit-taking banks within a banking 
group’. The Report added that the: ‘[s]eparation of these [risky] activities into separate 
legal entities within a group is the most direct way of tackling banks’ complexity and 
interconnectedness’.3 
 
In December 2012, a few months after the Liikanen Report was published, some of the 
leaders of the European co-operative, mutual and banking sectors met in Brussels for the 
5th Convention of European Co-operative banks. The meeting was a platform for 
discussing the challenges that some post crisis regulations posed to non-joint stock banks. 
In this meeting, Arnold Kuijpers, the Director of Corporate Affairs of Rabobank Group – 
a Dutch network of 123 local co-operative banks – expressed his concerns over the 
challenges that the most recent global capital and liquidity rules (commonly known as 
‘Basel III’) implied for co-operative and other types of non-joint stock banks.4    
 
The preceding anecdotes share a common unifying thread. It is apparent that they are all 
related to the banking sector and the consequences of the latest financial crisis. But at a 
more granular level, they also highlight the connection between financial regulation 
(institutions) and the different ways that commercial banks are legally structured 
(organizations). Put in broader terms, they directly relate to the interaction between law, 
economics and organization.  
 
But what does analyzing the structure of banking exactly entail? Does it merely relate to 
the economic functions that banks undertake? Or does it have to do with a particular 
business model or rather a set of activities that banks provide to society and to the general 
                                                
3 High-level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector (‘Liikanen 
Group’), ‘Final Report’ (‘Liikanen Report’) (October 2012) i-iv. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-level_expert_group/report_en.pdf> accessed 
6 December 2016.  
4 ‘Leaders Discuss New Regulations at European Co-operative Banks Convention’ International 
Co-operative Alliance (December 2012) <http://ica.coop/en/media/news/leaders-discuss-new-
regulations-european-co-operative-banks-convention> accessed 6 December 2016. 
  4 
public? Or could a better understanding of the legal structure of commercial banks also 
be relevant for making banking safer? 
 
When the most recent global financial crisis reached its nadir in the year 2008, many 
financial institutions entered into distress or outright failed. In many instances, banks and 
other types of financial institutions required recapitalization or liquidity lifelines from 
States, which in turn relied on the use of public finances in order to bail out the banks.5 In 
the words of US Senator Christopher Dodd: ‘[m]any [banks] were saved because the 
Government resorted to an array of loans, guarantees, and capital injections to keep these 
large, complex financial firms afloat’.6  
 
While academic and public policy discussions focused on the types of banks in question 
(eg whether they were commercial or rather investment banks, or whether they provided 
universal or narrow services), inquiries into the underpinning legal structure of those 
banks have been limited. Thus, one can argue that – aside from the structural reforms 
discussed and implemented in leading jurisdictions – questions regarding banks’ legal 
organization and its relation to the design of financial regulation have been generally 
under-attended to.7   
 
This thesis focuses on the relationship between the ways that commercial banks are 
legally organized and financial regulation. The project mainly focuses on commercial 
                                                
5 See Randall D Guynn, ‘Are Bailouts Inevitable?’ (2012) 29 Yale Journal on Regulation 121, 
123-129 (on the economics of bank bailouts). 
6 United States Senator Christopher Dodd’s Opening Statement at the ‘Regulation and Resolving 
Institutions Considered Too Big to Fail’ Hearing before the United States Congress Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (6 May 2009). 
7 For example, a recent study by the European Association of Co-Operative Banks (EACB) and 
the TIAS School for Business and Society states that in the publications of important standard 
setting bodies and regulators like the IMF, the ECB and the BIS: ‘the effects of different 
organisational forms and/or business models on banking market structures remain relatively 
underexposed’. See Hans Groeneveld ‘A Snapshot of European Co-operative Banking’ (April 
2016) 3  
<http://www.globalcube.net/clients/eacb/content/medias/publications/annual_reports/20160411_
HG_EACB_FINAL_Snapshot.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016.  
  5 
banks as opposed to other types of financial institutions, like investment banks (securities 
brokers), insurance companies, or investment funds.8  
 
The book’s central idea discusses whether and how the way that banks are legally 
organized matters for the design of financial regulation. Any firm can be legally 
configured using a plethora of organizational forms.9 Commonplace organizational forms 
include, but are not limited to: public and close corporations, limited liability companies, 
co-operatives, mutual associations, nonprofit entities, and other forms of unincorporated 
types of commercial exchange.  
 
The main objective of the thesis is to integrate some of the legal and economic insights 
drawn from the study of existing bank organizational forms to the design of financial 
regulation. Using the words of Prof. Oliver Williamson, Nobel laureate and economist, 
cited at the beginning of this chapter, the book purports to show that banks – as 
organizations – matter and that they are susceptible to analysis. In this sense, the law 
plays a role in the way that organizations are structured. As such, the legal aspects of 
bank organization also matter and merit scholarly examination.  
 
1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES  
 
Can a better understanding of bank legal forms provide some insights for revamping 
financial regulation after the onslaught of the 2007-08 global financial crisis? Can 
                                                
8 Throughout the thesis, unless otherwise stated, all references to banks should be construed as 
referring to commercial banks (also called ‘clearing banks’, in the United Kingdom). This 
includes institutions that conduct deposit-taking activities with the objective of on-lending the 
monies to third parties and perform the functions of regulated financial intermediation and 
payments services. Consequently, the organizational forms used to setup investment banks 
(securities brokers or merchant banks, as they are known in the UK) and other types of financial 
institutions, like hedge funds, investment funds, insurance companies, etc. fall outside the scope 
of this analysis. However, some wider implications of the analysis in relation to non-bank 
financial institutions are briefly discussed as part of the conclusions presented in chapter seven. 
9 ‘Legal’ or ‘organizational forms’ is the label used throughout the rest of the book. It refers to the 
different types of legal entities or structures available for organizing economic activities. In legal 
doctrinal analysis it is often called: tipo societario or forma jurídica, in Spanish; forme ed enti 
giuridici – in Italian; forme juridique in French; and Rechtsformen, in German.  
  6 
organizational law – understood as a broad set of different laws that govern economic 
enterprise, contracts and property rights – prove to be a suitable policy lever for 
designing more effective financial regulation? Why haven’t questions regarding legal 
structure played a greater role in the ongoing agenda for revamping international 
financial regulation? Is it because they are completely irrelevant or simply 
underestimated? These are some of the central research questions that this thesis purports 
to answer.  
 
Each chapter asks secondary and equally important related questions, such as: what are 
the predominant legal forms used for organizing commercial banking activities in major 
jurisdictions today? What economic features make a co-operative bank different to a 
corporate bank, or different to a mutual bank? What is the relationship between bank 
capital, liquidity and leverage standards, and organizational forms? Do international 
standard setting bodies, like the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB), take into account non-joint stock banks when they 
design, propose and implement capital and liquidity standards? Do the inherent features 
of some bank organizational forms enhance their resolvability?  
 
The central idea that this thesis purports to show is that questions regarding legal forms 
are not trivial for the design of financial regulation. After all, banks and financial 
conglomerates are either standalone entities or groups of legal entities. While larger 
cross-border banks are often organized as corporations, many local banks are 
incorporated using other legal forms, such as co-operative associations, mutual societies, 
trusts and non-profit entities. Thus, when designing and implementing new rules, 
financial regulators, supervisors and international standard setting bodies should take 
heed to the fact that – across different countries – commercial banks are set-up using a 
variety of legal structures. Moreover, the rules governing these legal structures vary from 
country to country.  
 
The thesis argues and concludes that bank legal forms matter for financial regulation. The 
book studies three specific instances were the interplay between legal forms and financial 
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regulation is thought to be significantly important. These are: (1) capital, liquidity and 
leverage standards (chapter four), (2) bank resolution and crisis management (chapter 
five) and (3) for ongoing banking structural reforms (chapter six).10 Figure 1 purports to 
depict the linkage between organizational law and financial regulation.    
 
More specifically, the thesis argues that the legal structure of banks is important because 
each type of organizational form entails a ‘package’ of economic attributes and a 
hierarchy of both creditors’ and owners’ rights (property rights). The economic features 
inherent to different legal forms interact with the incentives created by financial 
regulations, such as capital and liquidity requirements, deposit protection insurance 
schemes and bank resolution regimes. In order for financial regulation to be effective, it 
should acknowledge the incentives and the rules that the law allocates to different bank 
stakeholders through organizational laws.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 Other equally important aspects have not been directly analyzed. These include:  taxation rules, 
labor laws, securities regulation and competition policy.  
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Figure 1 
Linkage between Legal Form and Financial Regulation 
 
 
2. MOTIVATION  
 
After the onslaught of the 2007-08 global crisis, international financial regulation remains 
in state of flux. In response to the latest crisis, academics and policymakers have placed 
significant attention to changing the domestic institutional financial supervisory 
architecture.11 Essentially, the focus has been on re-designing how financial regulators 
                                                
11 For a general overview see Eilis Ferran, ‘Institutional Design: the Choices for National 
Systems’ in Niamh Moloney, Eilis Ferran, Jennifer Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Financial Regulation (OUP 2015). 
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and supervisors are institutionally set-up.12 Parting from the classical legal doctrinal 
taxonomy, such institutional reforms would fall within the domain of what is traditionally 
associated with public law.  
 
Notwithstanding, questions related to the different ways that commercial banks are 
legally organized seem to continually receive less academic and policy attention. These 
matters would be the mirror image of the aforementioned institutional reforms – but 
within the sphere of the private law of finance.13 That is, asking whether and how the 
legal forms that banks adopt interact with financial regulation, such as deposit protection 
insurance schemes, bank resolution and bail-in tools, and capital and liquidity rules. 
Consequently, making the financial sector more robust could require policies that address 
both the supervisory structure and the legal organization of banks. This means the 
interplay between the private and the public law of finance. A combination of both public 
and private law reforms could be needed in order to promote a sustainable financial 
architecture.  
 
The structure of banks and banking groups has received some attention with the advent of 
so-called ‘banking structural reforms’.14 Bank structural reforms remain patchy, 
uncoordinated and do not always tackle legal structure and its consequences at the same 
level of detail that this study purports to undertake. The distinctive approach of this 
                                                
12 Notable examples include: France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States of 
America, Belgium, Ireland and also in the Eurozone. See Ferran, ‘Institutional Design: the 
Choices for National Systems’ (n 11). See also E Fernandez-Bollo, ‘Structural Reform and 
Supervision of the Banking Sector in France’ [2013] OECD Journal Financial Market Trends 
<http://www.oecd.org/finance/Bank-reform-supervision-France.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016; 
IMF, ‘France: Financial System Stability Assessment’ (2012); J Sanio, ‘The New Single 
Regulator in Germany’ in T Kuppens et al. (eds), Banking Supervision at the Crossroads 
(Edward Elgar 2003); Luca Enriques and Gerard Hertig, ‘Improving the Governance of Financial 
Supervisors’ (2011) 12 European Business Organization Law Review 357. 
13 John Armour et al. acknowledge that with regards to financial regulation: ‘(…) outcomes may 
doubtless be shaped by private law — in particular, the degree to which property law facilitates 
the partitioning of assets’. See John Armour, Daniel Awrey, Paul Davies, Jeffrey Gordon, Colin 
Mayer and Jennifer Payne, Principles of Financial Regulation (OUP 2016) 12.  
14 The thesis argues that banking structural reforms focus on functional aspects rather than on 
legal organization per se. In other words, more attention is placed on what banks do rather than 
on how they are legally structured to carry out their activities. A broader discussion of banking 
structural reforms is included as part of chapter six.  
  10 
research project is that it tries to delve deeper into the intricacies of the most salient legal 
and economic attributes that comprise different organizational forms used for structuring 
commercial banking. The study also attempts to go further than the traditional ‘branch 
versus subsidiary’ analysis that is commonplace in the banking literature, by examining – 
aside from the business corporation – the different ways in which banks can be 
organized.  
 
The main contribution of this thesis is attempting to provide an explanation of exactly 
how legal forms matter for the design financial regulation. Financial regulation warrants 
an analysis of legal forms for several reasons. First of all, banks and banking groups are 
either stand-alone entities or clusters of legal entities. That is, they are incorporated as 
subjects of law according to pre-established existing organizational structures.15 Each 
type of organizational form is a nexus of and for multiple contractual relations between a 
firm’s stakeholders. This means that they allow for transactions and contracts to occur. 
Thus, the law determines different patterns of ownership (property rights) and incentives 
for each type of business organization. Financial regulation interacts with and sometimes 
changes or rearranges these ownership patterns.  
 
One example of this is the subrogation of deposit insurers (and ultimately, taxpayers) in 
the creditor hierarchy of a bailed out bank. Thus, a better understanding of the way that 
financial regulation interacts with legal forms could provide some guidance for designing 
more effective rules that create the right incentives for different bank stakeholders to act 
according to the risks that they take. In other words, a better understanding of legal forms  
– and not just of the corporate legal form – could provide some insights for tackling 
moral hazard and fostering market discipline amongst bank stakeholders and 
constituencies.  
 
Another reason why financial regulation warrants an analysis of legal forms is that banks 
are not always corporations (joint-stock companies). It is often the case that many 
                                                
15 This holds true for both bank subsidiaries, which are independent legal entities, and branches 
(that share the legal personality of their parent entity).  
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academic studies assume that most banks are corporations that issue stocks and have 
shareholders as their main type of monitoring agents and residual risk-bearers. This study 
tries to add value by including an analysis of the different ways that banks are legally 
organized across some jurisdictions. The variety in existing legal forms means that they 
have different incentive structures. Failing to include non-corporate banks into the 
discussion and the design of financial regulation can lead to implementation gaps and 
legal uncertainty when the rules are applied across the board to all legal forms.  
 
What is more, assuming that all banks are corporations leaves out an important 
‘institutional’ detail of how banks are organized in different countries. Failure to include 
banks’ legal and institutional setting could lead to mistakes in the rule making process. 
As Ronald Coase brilliantly put it, it can leave one studying: ‘(…) consumers without 
humanity, firms without organization, and even exchange without markets’.16  
 
3. PLACING THE THESIS WITHIN THE LITERATURE 
 
This research project fits within the confines of several strands of recent academic 
literature and policy debate. Foremost, it can be interpreted as a contribution related to 
the ongoing discussions on banking structural reforms in the wake of the 2007-08 global 
financial crisis.17 Structural reforms are a salient item on the ongoing agenda for 
revamping international financial regulation. Banking structural reforms have been 
discussed and implemented in many leading jurisdictions, including: the United States of 
America (US), the United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, and in the European Union 
(EU). These reforms acknowledge that legal structure could be a policy lever for making 
banks more resolvable, better capitalized and for reducing the social costs and negative 
spillovers of bank failure.  
                                                
16 (Emphasis added) see Ronald H Coase, The Firm, The Market and the Law (University of 
Chicago Press 1988) 3.  
17 For a general overview of structural banking reforms see Financial Stability Board, ‘Structural 
Banking Reforms – Cross-border Consistencies and Global Financial Stability Implications’ 
(2014) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141027.pdf> accessed 6 
December 2016.  See also Rosa M Lastra, International Financial and Monetary Law (2nd edn, 
OUP 2015) 142-146. 
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Before bank structural reforms entered into the spotlight, several authors had already 
raised interesting questions – either studying the diversity of bank legal forms, or further 
analyzing the linkage between the legal organization of banks and financial regulation. 
Henry Hansmann described and categorized the legal and institutional structures 
observed for arranging banking activities in the US.18 Moreover, there is a longstanding 
theoretical and empirical academic discussion regarding the organizational choice of 
banking through the establishment of subsidiaries, affiliates or branches.19  
 
After the latest financial crisis, at least two notable economists have championed 
proposals for the organizational revamping of banking activities. Firstly, British 
economist John Kay has presented his proposal for what he calls ‘narrow banking’.20 In 
addition, US economist Laurence Kotlikoff has proposed his limited purpose-banking 
model, which consists in the reshuffling of commercial banks (and all financial 
institutions) as mutual funds.21 Both proposals are considered to be notable structural 
models presented with the objective of legally organizing commercial banks in a different 
                                                
18 Henry Hansmann gives an account of the legal and organizational evolution of the savings bank 
industry in the United States. In later work regarding the ownership of enterprise, Professor 
Hansmann discusses the historical progression of the legal organizational structure for financial 
firms with more detail – including banks and insurance companies. See Henry Hansmann, ‘The 
Economic Role of Commercial Nonprofits: The Evolution of the Savings Bank Industry’ in H 
Anheier and W Seibel (eds) The Third Sector: Comparative Studies of Nonprofit Organizations, 
(de Gruyter 1989); Henry Hansmann, ‘Ownership of the Firm’ (1988) 4 Journal Of Law, 
Economics and Organization 267; Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press 1996). See also Henry Hansmann, ‘The Organization of 
Insurance Companies: Mutual Versus Stock’ (1985) 1 Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization 125. 
19 See Almudena de la Mata Muñoz, ‘The Future of Cross-Border Banking after the Crisis: 
Facing the Challenges through Regulation and Supervision’ (2010) 11 European Business 
Organization Law Review 575; Tobias H Tröger, ‘Organizational Choices of Banks and the 
Effective Supervision of Transnational Banking Institutions’ (2013) 48 Texas International Law 
Journal 177.  
20 John Kay, ‘Narrow Banking: The Reform of Banking Regulation’ [2009] Centre for the Study 
of Financial Innovation <http://www.johnkay.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/JK-Narrow-
Banking.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016. 
21 Laurence Kotlikoff et al., ‘Limited Purpose Banking: Moving from Trust me to Show me 
Banking’ (2012) 102 American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 113. See also 
Laurence Kotlikoff, Jimmy Stewart is Dead: Ending the World's Ongoing Financial Plague with 
Limited Purpose Banking (John Wiley and Sons 2010). 
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way. Neither proposal delves with great detail into matters of legal organization. Both 
proposals have also been considered to be radical in their nature.22 Even though they have 
received noteworthy recognition in some academic circles, they have not yet been 
influential in policymaking and financial reforms. 
 
Post crisis studies related to bank organizational forms or banks’ institutional details 
include Eva Hüpkes’ examination of the relationship between bank legal structure and 
resolution.23 Gustaf Sjoberg credits Prof. Rosa M. Lastra with having originally proposed 
harmonizing European banks’ organizational structure using the Societas Europaea.24 
Moreover, in the latest edition of her treatise on ‘International Financial and Monetary 
Law’, Prof. Lastra acknowledges that: ‘[t]he legal form of banks and the advent of 
limited liability (considering also the history of double liability shares in the USA and 
partly paid shares in the UK) should be reviewed further’.25  
 
In a recent paper, David Bholat and Joanna Gray have also argued that organizational 
form could be a source of systemic risk.26 Their view challenges the so-called ‘(legal) 
reductionist view’ of associating banks solely with the corporate form.27 Some of theses 
ideas can also be linked to Eric W Orts’ proposal of returning to a ‘legal theory of the 
firm’. Orts argues that: ‘business firms are created and governed through legal 
institutions’ – adding that: ‘without law, business firms cannot exist’.28 
 
                                                
22 Martin Wolf, ‘Why and How Should We Regulate Pay in the Financial Sector?’ in The Future 
of Finance: The LSE Report (London School of Economics 2010). 
23 Eva Hüpkes, ‘“Form Follows Function” – A New Architecture for Regulating and Resolving 
Global Financial institutions’ (2009) 10 European Business Organization Law Review 369, 371. 
24 Gustaf Sjoberg, ‘Handling Systemically Important Banks in Distress-Some Thoughts from a 
Swedish Perspective’ (2011) 12 European Business Organization Law Review 227, fn 96.  
25 Rosa Lastra, International Financial and Monetary Law (n 17) 142, fn 121. Prof. Lastra adds 
that: ‘(…) an in-depth study of whether other forms of corporate organization, such as a mutual or 
a cooperative, might more effectively curb excessive bank risk-taking’ was beyond the scope of 
her treatise. This thesis attempts to address this particular gap in the academic literature.  
26 David Bholat and Joanna Gray, ‘Organizational Form as a Source of Systemic Risk’ [2013] 
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 1. 
27 ibid. 
28 Eric W Orts, Business Persons – A Legal Theory of the Firm (OUP 2013) x-xi.  
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Moreover, the central idea of the thesis – that law and legal forms are important for 
finance and economic exchange – can be traced back to Ronald Coase, who in his Nobel 
Prize Lecture stated that the ‘legal system’ has ‘a profound effect on the working of the 
economic system and may in certain respects be said to control it’.29 This is also a 
common theme found in the law and finance literature (widely known as the ‘legal 
origins theory’ or simply ‘LLSV’) as well as the more recent legal theory of finance 
(‘LTF’).  
 
The legal origins literature construes legal systems as bundles of information transmitted 
across human populations.30 These bundles – including basic legal infrastructure such as 
organizational forms – were simply transplanted from some countries to others. Part of 
the LLSV literature concludes that for their examined variables, countries grouped under 
the common law label outperform countries belonging to the French, German and 
Scandinavian clusters. LLSV provides some empirical evidence that legal origins gave 
way to particular economic rules that in turn resulted in better economic outcomes for 
common law countries. The variable most closely related to legal forms under this 
literature would be the development of company and securities laws, that in turn offered 
the best stock market development, greater investor protection and particular corporate 
ownership structures.31 However, corporate law is only a subset32 of organizational law – 
which also includes the law related to partnerships, co-operatives, mutual associations 
and nonprofit organizations.  
                                                
29 R H Coase, ‘The Institutional Structure of Production’ (1992) 82 American Economic Review 
713, 717-718.  
30 For a general overview of the LLSV literature see Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes 
and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Law and Finance After a Decade of Research’ in Handbook of the 
Economics of Finance, vol 2 (Elsevier 2013); Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes and 
Andrei Shleifer, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’ (2008) 46 Journal of Economic 
Literature 285. See also Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and RW 
Vishny, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113; Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio López-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, ‘What Works in Securities Laws?’ (2006) 61 
Journal of Finance 1; Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, 
‘Corporate Ownership Around the World’ (2006) 54 Journal of Finance 47. 
31 La Porta et al., ‘Law and Finance After a Decade of Research’ (n 30) 433.  
32 Borrowing the terminology used by Easterbrook and Fischel who have stated that ‘corporations 
are subsets of firms’. See Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law (Harvard University Press 1996) 10.  
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On the other hand, the LTF proposed by Katharina Pistor and others considers law as a 
constitutive part of finance – which in turn is formed by a complex cobweb of contractual 
rapports and obligations.33 Thus, Pistor proposes an examination of the law in finance.34 
It could be argued that legal forms are a significant part of this complex network of 
rapports, since the creation of different types of banks (as legal persons) provides benefits 
to their stakeholders and to society as whole.   
 
Some of the ideas discussed throughout the book could also be framed in terms of the 
New Institutional Economics (‘NIE’) framework. In particular, the book hinges upon the 
so-called conceptual ‘golden triangle’ of NIE, made up of ‘transaction costs, property 
rights and contracts’.35 The interaction between legal forms and financial regulation is 
reminiscent of Douglass North’s distinction between organizations and institutions. 
North has argued that: ‘institutions, together with the standard constraints of economic 
theory, determine the opportunities in a society’. On the other hand, according to North, 
‘organizations are created to take advantage of those opportunities’.36 In this study, 
organizations include different types of bank legal forms, like corporations, co-operatives 
and mutual societies. Some of the institutions or rules of the game that are analyzed 
include: deposit protection insurance schemes, bank resolution regimes and capital and 
liquidity rules.  
 
The analysis of legal forms and capital requirements included in chapter four of the thesis 
can also be placed within the literature related to the most recent set of capital, liquidity 
and leverage standards (Basel III rules and CRR/CRD IV in the European Union). 
Chapter 5, which covers the relationship between bank legal form, creditor rank and 
resolution, can be linked to still ongoing academic and policy discussions on bank 
resolution and crisis management tools.  
                                                
33 See Katharina Pistor, ‘A Legal Theory of Finance’ (2013) 41 Journal of Comparative 
Economics 315.  
34 Katarina Pistor, ‘Law in Finance’ (2013) 41 Journal of Comparative Economics 311, 311-314. 
35 Claude Menard and Mary M Shirley, ‘The Future of New Institutional Economics: From Early 
Institutions to a New Paradigm’ (2014) Journal of Institutional Economics 541, 544.  
36 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (CUP 1990).  
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The thesis’ main topic also intersects with other areas of academic interest, including 
comparative studies of the law of co-operatives and mutual associations37, and the 
literature of alternative banking, asset partitioning and more generally, ideas related to the 
economic analysis of legal organizational forms.  
 
In sum, many of the ideas discussed in this book are inspired by, related to and also 
build-on recent and ongoing academic and policy debates. Thus, the central topic of this 
thesis is worthy of further examination. 
 
4. METHODS  
 
This thesis combines legal research methods with some tools, insights and frameworks 
from the economic analysis of law and NIE. Each core chapter of the thesis applies one 
or more methods. Chapter 3 relies on a functional comparative analysis of the main types 
of legal forms used to organize banking activities in six jurisdictions. The functional 
method, which is ubiquitous in comparative legal studies, mainly focuses on the 
similarities or equivalences between analogous institutions in order to draw some 
insights.38  
 
Part of the methodological added value of this thesis is the attempt to apply some insights 
from organizational law and economics to study the relationship between legal forms and 
financial regulation. From the economic analysis of law, several chapters of the thesis 
apply Hansmann’s ownership structure39, as well as the ‘asset partitioning’ framework 
                                                
37 See Antonio Fici, ‘An Introduction to Cooperative Law’ in Dante Cracogna et al. (eds) 
International Handbook of Cooperative Law (Springer 2013) 10. 
38 See Konrad Zweigert, ‘Methodological Problems in Comparative Law’ [1972] Israel Law 
Review 465. It is useful to note that this method differs from the functional method of Law and 
Economics, associated with the Virginia School of economic analysis as discussed by F Parisi 
and J Klick. See Francesco Parisi and Jonathan Klick, ‘Functional Law and Economics: The 
Search for Value-Neutral Principles of Lawmaking’ (2004) 79 Chicago-Kent Law Review 431.  
39 Hansmann, ‘Ownership of the Firm’ and Hansmann, Ownership of Enterprise (n 18).  
  17 
proposed by H. Hansmann, R. Kraakman and R. Squire40 to the economic structure of 
commercial bank legal forms (chapter three), to bank resolution and creditor rank 
(chapter five) and to ring-fenced bodies in the UK (chapter six).  
 
The aforementioned frameworks have certainly not been selected because they are the 
only methods that can be applied to the questions tackled. However, in the case at hand 
they are useful in providing a systematic starting point for analysis because they add 
clarity regarding the ownership structure and identity of different bank stakeholders 
(including: owners, creditors, depositors – a special group of creditors – and potentially, 
even taxpayers). In sum, the aforementioned frameworks help to see banks less as 
monoliths or anthropomorphized entities, and more as different groups of economic 
agents with often-conflicting interests. As such, the selected frameworks offer an 
alternative perspective to unravel some of the problems tackled, including a view of how 
the partitioning of assets interacts with other rules promoted by financial regulation.   
 
5. THESIS STRUCTURE  
 
The rest of this book consists of six additional chapters. Each core chapter is preceded by 
a summary and a list of keywords that signpost its content.   
 
The second chapter introduces the concept of legal forms and explains how they fit into 
the wider agenda for revamping financial regulation after the last global economic crisis. 
More concretely, it purports to show how the discussion on legal forms presented in this 
                                                
40 See generally Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational 
Law’ (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 387; Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, 
‘Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning’ (2000) 44 European Economic Review 807; Henry 
Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman and Richard Squire, ‘Law and the Rise of the Firm’ (2006) 119 
Harvard Law Review 1333; Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman and Richard Squire, ‘The New 
Business Entities in Evolutionary Perspective’ (2007) 8 European Business Organization Law 
Review 59. See also H Hansmann and U Mattei, ‘The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative 
Legal and Economic Analysis’ (1998) 73 New York University Law Review 434. See also: 
Henry Hansmann and Richard Squire, ‘External and Internal Asset Partitioning: Corporations and 
Their Subsidiaries’ in Jeffrey N Gordon and Wolf-Georg Ringe (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Corporate Law and Governance (forthcoming OUP 2017). 
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thesis is different to other contemporary concepts, such as the ongoing banking structural 
reforms, calls to ‘break up big banks41’ or to regulate banks’ business models.  
 
Chapter three focuses on the economic structure of existing types of organizational 
forms. It applies a framework originally set forth by Prof. Henry Hansmann, in order to 
identify some of the most salient ownership features that commercial banks exhibit. The 
chapter applies said framework with the objective of providing an overview of and 
compare the main categories of legal forms used to organize commercial banks in several 
of the leading jurisdictions examined. These jurisdictions include: the United States of 
America, the United Kingdom, Spain, France and Italy. The chapter also covers the pan-
European legal forms promoted by the EU’s legal framework. Once the main categories 
of legal forms are identified, their main attributes and features are then analyzed against 
the foil of the business corporation (ie joint stock companies or companies limited by 
shares).  
 
Chapter four studies the connection between regulatory capital, liquidity and leverage 
standards, and bank legal forms. This chapter asserts that the existing international capital 
standards – namely, Basel III – are mainly directed to large corporate banks. Non-
corporate banks, like mutual societies and co-operative banks, are treated in a footnote of 
the latest version of such standards. Basel III’s definition of the highest quality form of 
capital, called Common Equity Tier 1 (‘CET1’), supports this claim. Many legal forms, 
such as mutual banks (eg British building societies) and some nonprofit banks (like the 
Spanish Cajas), do not issue common or ordinary shares. Consequently, the chapter 
concludes that international financial standard setting bodies, such as the BCBS and the 
FSB, should pay greater attention to divergences in existing organizational structures in 
order to prevent certain unintended consequences, such as legal uncertainty and 
                                                
41 See for example: Douglas J Elliott, ‘Ten Arguments Against Breaking Up the Big Banks’ in 
Andreas Dombret and Patrick S Kenadjian (eds), Too Big to Fail III: Structural Reform 
Proposals – Should We Break up the Banks? (De Gruyter 2015) 119; Andreas Dombret, ‘Cutting 
the Gordian Knot or Splitting Hairs – The Debate About Breaking Up the Banks’ in Andreas 
Dombret and Patrick S Kenadjian (eds), Too Big to Fail III: Structural Reform Proposals – 
Should We Break up the Banks? (De Gruyter 2015) 5. See also: David Shirreff, Break Up the 
Banks! (Melville House Printing 2016).  
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implementation gaps in the application of capital standards to different types of banks 
across jurisdictions.   
 
Chapter five aims to describe how legal forms matter for special bank insolvency 
procedures – widely known as resolution regimes. The relationship between 
organizational forms and resolvability has not been extensively explored in the current 
literature. The main question that this chapter seeks to answer is if a better understanding 
of bank legal forms and creditor ranks could help overcome challenges for cross-border 
resolution across the European Union. The chapter answers this question in the 
affirmative, arguing that since organizational forms can be construed as patterns or 
hierarchies of creditors’ and owners’ property rights – during bank resolution – such 
patterns matter for the apportionment of losses through some of the different tools 
developed for crisis management. Because creditor rank (loss apportionment) is directly 
linked to organizational form, the latter is bound to be important during bank resolution.  
 
The sixth chapter examines some of the most important bank structural reforms that have 
been discussed and implemented in leading jurisdictions as a response to the latest 
financial crisis. In particular, the study focuses on the case of bank ring-fencing and ring-
fenced bodies (RFBs) that is currently being put into practice in the UK. The chapter 
purports to show how the ‘asset partitioning’ framework developed in the field of 
organizational law and economics can be applied to gain some insights for better 
understanding British type bank ring-fencing. The chapter also uses positive economic 
analysis of law in order to describe some of the unintended consequences that ring-
fencing could have outside of the UK – particularly, in light of conflicting structural 
reforms carried out in other jurisdictions – and most recently in the aftermath of the 
referendum held in the UK on 23 June 2016, where a majority of voters decided for the 
UK to leave the EU. 
 
The final chapter summarizes and presents the thesis’ main findings. This conclusive 
chapter also raises some additional concerns and discusses some wider implications not 
directly covered throughout the book – either because such concerns fall outside of the 
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scope of the project, or because they respond to different methodological frameworks. 
Shortcomings and limitations are also identified and acknowledged. The concluding 
chapter closes pointing out some potential areas for future research.   
 
A final caveat is in order from the outset. This book argues that legal forms are an 
important – but not the only – variable that should be considered when reforming 
financial regulation after the latest global economic crisis. The ongoing agenda for 
revamping international financial regulation consists of a multipronged set of reforms. In 
this sense, the project focuses on one, albeit very specific factor, without the intention of 
neither losing sight of nor underplaying the importance of a much bigger – and more 
complex – panorama. The objective of this thesis is to raise awareness regarding the 
importance of existing legal and organizational structures for designing financial 
regulation. The thesis does not purport to measure the magnitude or to overstate the 
importance of legal forms. Nor does it claim that legal organization is the predominant 
variable that needs to be taken into account for calibrating financial regulatory reforms 
and addressing the major economic problems experienced during the latest crisis. 
However, a good understanding of such legal issues could prove to be an insightful 
policy tool for tackling some of banks’ underlying economic problems or at least for 
designing more effective regulation to address such problems in the future.  
 
The following chapter introduces the concept of organizational forms that is used 
throughout the thesis and purports to explain its relationship to commercial banks and 
overall structural reforms in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. The 
chapter also aims to distinguish how legal forms are different to other variables of recent 
policy interest, such as structural or functional separation of certain activities, chartering 
or regulatory licensing and banks’ business models. 
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Chapter Two 
The (Banking) Firm, the Market and the Flaws: 
Organizational Forms and Why They Matter 
 
SUMMARY 
What are legal organizational forms and how do they relate to the economic problems 
experienced during the 2007-2008 global financial crisis? This chapter sets out to define 
the concept of legal forms as used throughout the rest of the thesis. In particular, the 
chapter contrasts legal forms from other distinct but related variables, such as: bank 
licensing, bank business models and banking structural reforms. In addition, the chapter 
also purports to explain how legal forms relate to the broader context of the financial 
crisis and some of the main items included in the ongoing agenda for revamping global 
financial regulation. The reform agenda for revamping the global financial framework is 
still unsettled. The costs and fiscal exposures of the recent economic downturn have been 
cumbersome. Several years past the pinnacle of the credit crunch, worldwide economic 
recovery is still sluggish. The negative externalities and spillovers generated by the crisis 
spread internationally. The slump also challenged many preconceptions regarding the 
regulation and supervision of financial institutions. This chapter provides a brief 
overview of the current state of affairs regarding global financial regulation.  
 
KEYWORDS: Bank organizational forms, financial crisis, financial regulation. 
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‘To look at investor-owned firms in isolation, as the existing literature has largely done, 
is often misleading. We learn much more about them by comparing them with other 
forms of enterprise’.  
 
Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (1996). 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The economic meltdown that resulted from the 2007-2009 financial crisis has been 
socially costly on a global dimension. The crisis has taken a toll on growth and financial 
stability in many jurisdictions.42 The economic slump also spread to the public coffers of 
some countries.43 The results have been pervasive sovereign debt difficulties and delays 
in the implementation of the necessary reforms, all of which have dampened worldwide 
economic recovery.44   
 
This chapter purports to provide a general overview of what commercial bank 
organizational forms are and how they relate to other concepts, such as bank chartering, 
business models and banking structural reforms. Moreover, the chapter also purports to 
discuss how organizational forms fit within the wider framework for revamping global 
financial regulation in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  
 
The rest of the chapter is comprised of three additional sections. The second section 
describes some of the most salient economic problems experienced during the 2007-08 
financial crisis. Tackling these problems is a major part of the ongoing financial 
                                                
42 International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘World Economic Outlook Report’ (October 2013). 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/pdf/text.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016. 
43 Marco Committeri and Francesco Spadafora, ‘You Never Give Me Your Money? Sovereign 
Debt Crises, Collective Action Problems, and IMF Lending’ (2013) IMF Working Paper 
WP/13/20, 35. 
44 See International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘Global Financial Stability Report Restoring 
Confidence and Progressing on Reforms’ (October 2012) 75, 108.    
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regulatory reforms. The third section discusses what organizational forms are and 
describes how they are different to other concepts, like business models, functional 
separation and bank chartering. A final section concludes.  
 
2. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND REGULATORY REFORMS 
 
The current overhaul of the international architecture of financial regulation consists of a 
series of reforms promoted by a group of influential jurisdictions and standard setting 
bodies. These reforms aim to address the identified root economic problems highlighted 
by the latest crisis. Although there is growing consensus regarding some topics within the 
response agenda, its implementation is unconcluded. This has been attributed, amongst 
other things, to a ‘lack of agreement on specific issues, where a coherent global 
consensus has yet to emerge and the pull of national interests remains strong’.45 
 
2.1. Revamping Global Finance 
 
The economic crisis exposed many of the fragilities of the international monetary and 
financial system. Financial market integration and cross border interconnection have 
accentuated the need to preserve so-called ‘global public goods’, such as the worldwide 
payments system, economic growth and financial stability.46 The transnational nature of 
these global public goods comes from the fact that their enjoyment and upholding is no 
longer confined within national borders.  
 
As Charles Goodhart and Rosa Lastra point out:  
                                                
45 David Lipton, ‘Speech on Financial Sector Regulatory Reform’ (2013) Chartered Financial 
Analyst (CFA) Society of Washington Annual Dinner, Hall of the Americas Ballroom, 
Organization of American States, Washington 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2013/031213.htm> accessed 6 December 2016. 
46 Joel P Trachtman, ‘The International Law of Financial Crisis: Spillovers, Subsidiarity, 
Fragmentation and Cooperation’ (2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 719, 721. See 
also Martin Wolf, ‘The World’s Hunger for Public Goods’ Financial Times (24 January 2012) 
<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/517e31c8-45bd-11e1-93f1-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2XbooyGiL> accessed 6 December 2016. 
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[t]he cross-border expansion of banks (via mergers and acquisitions, joint 
ventures or the establishment of branches and subsidiaries) and the effective 
supervision of institutions operating in various jurisdictions present numerous 
challenges for financial regulators and supervisors.47   
 
Financial instability in any jurisdiction can – and has proven to – quickly spillover into 
other countries through the contagion transmission conduits.48  
 
As a result of the internationalization of banking activities, financial regulation and 
supervision have become a transnational concern. As with other public goods, 
coordination problems arise. The development of universal financial rules has been called 
a ‘slow and patchy phenomenon’ afflicted by: ‘(1) the lack of a clear legal mandate; (2) a 
reactive rather than a proactive character; and (3) the vested interests national 
governments still have in the supervision of their financial sectors’.49 The resulting 
institutional an legal arrangements for international financial regulation are characterized 
by three aspects: (1) high levels of interconnectedness of financial systems, (2) soft law 
rules, principles and standards, which are (3) developed by a small group of countries 
through transnational organizations and forums that are responsible for setting the agenda 
of financial regulatory trends. Thus, it is important to introduce some of the main actors 
involved in the design and implementation of global financial regulation.  
 
 
                                                
47 Charles Goodhart and Rosa M Lastra, ‘Border Problems’ (2010) 13 Journal of International 
Economic Law 3. 
48 Rolf Weber considers that: ‘[t]he channels of contagion – whether on the domestic, regional or 
global level– are multifaceted, with the interbank market, payment and settlement systems and 
capital markets being the most obvious’. See Rolf Weber, ‘Multi-layered Governance in 
International Financial Regulation and Supervision’ (2010) 13 Journal of International Economic 
Law 683. 
49 Rosa M Lastra, ‘Principles of Financial Regulation’ in Liber Amicorum for Gaspar Ariño Ortiz 
– Derecho Administrativo y Regulación Económica (Wolturs Kluwer España 2011). 
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2.2. Banking Regulation Trendsetters 
 
The ongoing financial reform process is being led by a group of supervisory institutions 
from a few developed countries, which interact through agenda-setting forums and 
organizations. These jurisdictions include the home countries and regions that host the 
most important and vibrant global financial markets and participants. Namely: the Group 
of Twenty (‘G20’) countries, led by the United States (‘USA’), the United Kingdom 
(‘UK’) and the leading jurisdictions that constitute the European Union (‘EU’).  
 
The USA, the UK and the EU are in the process of implementing their influential 
domestic institutional and legal reform proposals. The USA undertook widespread 
statutory reforms through its Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 (the ‘Dodd-Frank Act 2010’ or ‘DFA’). The UK set up the Independent 
Commission on Banking (‘ICB’ or ‘Vickers Commission’), chaired by renowned 
economist John Vickers. The ICB was commissioned to resolve the so-called ‘British 
dilemma of banking’ consisting of how to maintain the UK as a competitive financial 
center without recurring to taxpayer fuelled bank bailouts in the future. The ICB issued 
its report in 2012, recommending amongst many other things to ring-fence the core 
activities of British commercial banks in order to segregate deposit taking from riskier 
trading activities.50  
 
As a response to the domestic initiatives undertaken by the USA and the UK, the 
European Commission set-up its own High Level Expert Group on Reforming the 
Structure of the EU’s banking sector. The team was dubbed the ‘Liikanen Group’ 
because the Governor of the Bank of Finland, Erkki Liikanen, chaired it. The Liikanen 
Group’s Report was presented in October 2012 and contained noteworthy proposals for 
reforms, in order to tackle the current challenges that affect financial activities in the 
aftermath of the crisis.51 
                                                
50 Independent Commission on Banking (ICB), ‘Final Report’ (September 2012).  
51 High-level Expert Group on Reforming the Structure of the EU Banking Sector, ‘Final Report’ 
(‘Liikanen Report’) (October 2012) <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-
level_expert_group/report_en.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016. 
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The aforementioned economic powerhouses also lead in the worldwide financial reform 
process through some established forums and standard-setting bodies. The key standard 
setting bodies for commercial banking are the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(hereinafter, ‘BCBS’ or the ‘Basel Committee’), and the Financial Stability Board 
(‘FSB’). The IMF and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) also play important 
roles as full-fledged international organizations, often working alongside the FSB and the 
BCBS in financial policy design and discussions.   
 
The FSB is one of the most recent and lesser-known financial forums.52 It is the successor 
of the G-7’s Financial Stability Forum that was created in order to provide a regulatory 
response to the Latin American, Asian and Russian financial crises of the 1990s. 53 The 
FSB is currently backed by the G20, while the BIS in Basel, serves as it secretariat. The 
FSB was established to: ‘coordinate at the international level the work of national 
financial authorities and international standard setting bodies and to develop and promote 
the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies 
in the interest of financial stability’.54 Its main purpose is to promote international 
financial stability.55  
 
One of the distinctive features of the FSB as a multilateral standard setting forum is that 
its membership includes both domestic monetary and supervisory institutions as well as 
other international financial organizations – including other standard setting bodies, like 
the BCBS. Other notable FSB members include: the IMF, The World Bank, the European 
                                                
52 Lawrence Schembri, ‘Born of Necessity and Built to Succeed: Why Canada and the World 
Need the Financial Stability Board’. Remarks by Lawrence Schembri, Deputy Governor of the 
Bank of Canada, CFA Society (Ottawa), Ottawa, Ontario (24 September 2013).  
53 ibid.  
54 Financial Stability Board <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/overview.htm> 
accessed on 6 December 2016. 
55 FSB’s Articles of Association art 2. See Financial Stability Board (FSB), ‘Articles of 
Association of the Financial Stability Board’ (28 January 2013) 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130128aoa.pdf> accessed 6 December 
2016.  
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Central Bank (ECB), the BIS, the OECD, amongst many other international 
organizations.  
 
The decisions of the FSB are taken by consensus. 56 The Plenary is the highest decision 
making body. According to the FSB Charter, seat assignments within the Plenary reflect 
‘the size of the national economy, financial market activity and national financial stability 
arrangements of the corresponding Member jurisdiction’.57  
 
On the other hand, the BCBS58 defines itself as: ‘the primary global standard-setter for 
the prudential regulation of banks and provides a forum for cooperation on banking 
supervisory matters’. 59 The BCBS is headquartered in Basel. The BIS serves as its 
secretariat. Its mandate is to: ‘strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of 
banks worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability’.60 The Basel 
Committee does not enjoy a legal personality of its own. Its decisions lack binding 
authority, and according to its constitutive Charter, it ‘relies on its members’ 
commitments’ in order to achieve its mandate.61 
 
                                                
56 FSB Charter art 9. See Financial Stability Board (FSB), ‘Charter of the Financial Stability 
Board’ (June 2012) <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-Charter-with-revised-Annex-
FINAL.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016. 
57 ibid art 11. 
58 Professor Charles Goodhart provides a detailed account on the history and development of the 
BCBS, since its inception as one of the permanent committees established by the central banks of 
the G10.  See Charles Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision A History of the 
Early Years: 1974–1997 (Cambridge University Press 2011). For an official account by the 
BSBC, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘A Brief History of the Basel Committee’ 
(July 2013) <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016.  
59 Charter of the BCBS art 1. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) ‘Charter of 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’ (January 2013) 
<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.pdf > accessed 6 December 2016.  
60 ibid art 1.  
61 ibid art 3, s 5.  
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The Basel Committee is better known than the FSB. This may be as a result of the media 
exposure that the Basel Committee gets. Since 1988, the Basel Committee develops and 
updates its ‘Basel Principles on Banking Supervision’.62 
 
The BCBS’s current membership comprises bank supervisors and central banks from 27 
jurisdictions. The main criterion for accession to BCBS membership is: ‘the importance 
of national banking sectors to international financial stability’.63 Like the FSB, decisions 
within the Committee are taken by consensus among its members. The BCBS’s 
constitutive Charter establishes various structures in order to consult and collaborate with 
the regulators and the central banks of non-member countries. Some of the important 
consultation structures within the BCBS are: the Basel Consultative Group (BCG), the 
Financial Stability Institute (FSI) and the International Conferences of Banking 
Supervisors (ICBS). 
 
2.3. Sources of Market Failure Underpinning the 2007-08 Financial 
Crisis 
 
In turn, some of the market failures that were exposed during the latest global crisis are 
described. These issues relate to the main items that makeup the ongoing response 
agenda. Rosa Lastra and Geoffrey Wood have divided the possible causes of the financial 
crisis described in the literature into ten non-exclusive categories:  
 
(a) macro-economic imbalances; (b) lax monetary policy; (c) regulatory and 
supervisory failures; (d) too-big-to-fail (‘TBTF’) doctrine and distorted 
incentives; (e) excesses of securitization; (f) unregulated firms, lightly regulated 
firms, and the shadow banking system; (g) corporate governance failures; (h) 
risk-management failures, excessive leverage, and excessive complexity; (i) the 
                                                
62 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision’ (September 2012) <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf> accessed 6 December 
2016.  
63 BIS Charter art 4.  
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usual suspects: greed, euphoria, and others; and (j) faulty economic theories.64  
 
The following subsection further narrows down the focus of attention, concentrating on 
the following economic problems: (i) moral hazard and other information problems, (ii) 
global public goods, and (iii) negative externalities. 
 
2.3.1. Moral Hazard: Too-big-to-fail and Systemically Important Banks 
 
For some years before the 2007-08 financial crisis, bank supervisors and regulators were 
well aware of the existence of banks considered too-big-to-fail (or ‘TBTF’).65 Banks 
became TBTF because of the general perception that their failure or financial troubles 
could provoke significant economic disruptions for a country. These considerations were 
mostly due to the size, overall interconnectedness or financial importance of TBTF 
banks. Because of the assumption that governments would bail them out in case of 
failure, TBTF banks could engage in excessive risk-taking and careless lending at the 
taxpayers’ expense. Thus, TBTF banks were wrought with moral hazard.66 The prospect 
of an expected governmental rescue ultimately meant that bank supervisors were tacitly 
underwriting their risky activities. This risk was underpriced.   
 
When the crisis unraveled, new magnitudes and related dimensions of TBTF surfaced. 
There were some large, complex financial institutions that could not be orderly wound-
                                                
64 Rosa M Lastra and Geoffrey Wood, ‘The Crisis of 2007-09: Nature, Causes and Reactions’ 
(2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 531, 537-538. 
65 The US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s (FCIC) Final Report credits the phrase to then 
US Representative Stewart McKinney of the State of Connecticut. During a hearing related to the 
proposed bailout of the distressed bank Continental Illinois (circa 1984), Mr. McKinney 
responded: ‘We have a new kind of bank. It is called “too-big-to-fail”– TBTF – and it is a 
wonderful bank’. See US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s (FCIC), ‘The Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and 
Economic Crisis in the United States’ (January 2011) <http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf> accessed 6 December 
2016.   
66 Gary Gorton considers that: ‘[t]he problem of moral hazard arises in several ways, when there 
is an implicit promise of insurance (…), and when there is the expectation that the government 
will act’. Gary B Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See them Coming 
(OUP 2012). 
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down (‘too complex to resolve’). Other institutions were ‘too complex’ or ‘too 
interconnected’ to fail or to prosecute. In addition, many countries found that the 
combined assets of some of the banks operating under their jurisdiction surpassed their 
national GDPs. This made any bailout prospect prohibitively expensive, or even 
unaffordable, giving rise to the ‘too-big-to-save’ (‘TBTS’) related problematic. By 
growing too big, TBTF banks exposed that some treasuries had become too frail. 
 
The bankruptcy of investment bank Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008 had adverse 
economic consequences. When Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, the Dow Jones 
industrial average fell 504.48 points.67 T. Hoshi recounts that an important money market 
fund also announced that it would not be able to redeem its securities at par value.68 
These ill-fated occurrences prompted US regulators to rescue international insurer AIG. 
A few months before, the US authorities had also provided liquidity assistance and had 
orchestrated a convoy rescue for Bear Stearns, another investment bank.69 These events 
revealed that commercial banks were not the only entities that had become systemically 
important. The moral hazard of implicit governmental guarantees had spread to non-bank 
market participants, like insurance companies and securities dealers.70   
 
Even though it was not a deposit-taking institution, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy 
became one of the largest in US History.71 The proceedings exposed that some of these 
TBTF non-banking institutions had also become cross-border, highly interconnected and 
complex to wind-down. This gave way to a new set of problems: the rise of Large and 
Complex Financial Institutions (‘LCFI’), also known as Systemically Important Financial 
                                                
67 Alex Berenson, ‘Wall St.’s Turmoil Sends Stocks Reeling’ New York Times (New York City, 
15 September 2008) < 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/16/business/worldbusiness/16markets.html?_r=0> accessed 6 
December 2016.  
68 T Hoshi, ‘Financial Regulation: Lessons from the Recent Financial Crises’ (2011) 49 Journal of 
Economic Literature 120. 
69 JPMorgan subsequently purchased Bear Stearns.  
70 Rosa M Lastra, ‘Systemic Risk, SIFIs and Financial Stability’ (2011) 6 Capital Markets Law 
Journal 197, 199. 
71 See Sam Mamudi, ‘Lehman Folds with Record 613 Billion Debt’ Wall Street Journal (New 
York, 15 September 2008) <http://www.marketwatch.com/story/lehman-folds-with-record-613-
billion-debt?siteid=rss> accessed 6 December 2016.   
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Institutions (‘SIFIs’) or whenever strictly referring to banks: Systemically Important 
Banks (‘SIBs’). 
 
International standard setting bodies set out to tackle the moral hazard and TBTF/TBTS 
problems that can affect large financial institutions. The FSB defined SIFIs as ‘financial 
institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and 
systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to the wider financial 
system and economic activity’.72 When SIFIs pose a threat to worldwide financial 
stability and economic activity, they are referred to as global or ‘G-SIFIs’. The FSB 
disclosed an initial list of 29 G-SIFIs. On July 2013, the FSB also published a list of 
Global Systemically Important Insurers (‘G-SIIs’).73 Since then the lists are updated on a 
yearly basis. Table 1 presents the most recent list of G-SIBs (at the time of writing). 
 
Other standard setting bodies have also taken steps directed at addressing the threats 
posed by SIFIs. The BCBS, which is a standard setting body mainly concerned with 
commercial banks, issued its framework for dealing with global systemically important 
banks (‘G-SIBs’). G-SIBs are essentially commercial banks of systemic dimensions.74 In 
order to deal with the threats that domestic systemically important banks pose to some 
jurisdictions, the BCBS issued its ‘Framework for Dealing with Domestic Systemically 
Important Banks (‘D-SIBs’).75 The FSB also published a complementary report with the 
aim of extending the G-SIFI framework to domestic SIBs.76  
 
                                                
72 See Financial Stability Board (FSB), ‘Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions’ (4 November 2011) 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf> accessed 6 December 
2016. 
73 Financial Stability Board (FSB), ‘Global systemically important insurers (G-SIIs) and the 
policy measures that will apply to them’ (18 July 2013) 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130718.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016.  
74 Because SIFIs can also included non-bank financial entities.  
75 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘A Framework for Dealing With Systemically 
Important Banks’ (11 October 2012) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs233.htm> accessed 6 
December 2016 
76 Financial Stability Board (FSB), ‘G-SIFI Framework to Domestic Systemically Important 
Banks: Progress Report to G-20 Ministers and Governors’ (16 April 2012) 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120420b.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016. 
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Table 1  
2016 List of Global Systemically Important Banks 
 
Agricultural 
Bank of China 
 
 
BNP Paribas 
 
 
Goldman 
Sachs 
 
Mitsubishi 
UFJ FG 
 
Société 
Générale 
 
Bank of 
America 
 
Industrial and 
Commercial 
Bank of China 
Limited  
 
Group Crédit 
Agricole 
 
Mizuho FG 
 
State Street 
 
Bank of China 
 
 
Citigroup 
 
HSBC 
 
Morgan 
Stanley 
 
Sumitomo 
Mitsui FG 
 
Bank of New 
York Mellon 
 
 
Standard 
Chartered  
 
 
ING Bank 
 
Nordea 
 
UBS 
 
Barclays 
 
 
Credit Suisse 
 
JP Morgan 
Chase 
 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
 
Unicredit 
Group 
 
China 
Construction 
Bank 
 
 
Group BPCE  
 
 
Deutsche Bank 
 
Santander 
 
Wells Fargo 
 
 
(Source: FSB) 
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The FSB’s multipronged approach to the threats that G-SIFIs pose to international 
financial instability include:  
 
(i) a methodology for assessing the global systemic importance of banks 
based on five broad sets of indicators (size, interconnectedness, lack of 
substitutes, cross-jurisdictional activity and complexity); (ii) additional 
loss absorbency capacity for banks that is in line with the degree of 
global systemic importance; (iii) a new international standard for 
resolution regimes and additional measures to improve the authorities’ 
capacity to resolve SIFIs; and (iv) measures for more intensive and 
effective supervision.77  
 
2.3.2. Global Public Goods: Financial Stability and International Payment Systems  
 
Many commentators and policy reports conclude that one of the main lessons from the 
recent crisis was a change in the understanding of systemic risk and its effect on financial 
stability.78 The IMF defines systemic risk as ‘the risk of disruptions to the provision of 
financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system, 
and can cause serious negative consequences for the real economy’.79 Systemic risk can 
be a significant source of financial instability. Systemic risk has been categorized into 
two dimensions: a cross-sectional dimension, which is a snapshot of the existing 
                                                
77 Financial Stability Board (FSB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), ‘Macroprudential Policy Tools and Frameworks: Progress Report to G20’ (27 
October 2011) 13.  
78 Gabriele Galati and Richhild Moessner, ‘Macroprudential Policy – A Literature Review’ Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) Working Papers n 337 (February 2011). See also International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy’ (10 June 2013) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013b.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016.  
79 IMF, ‘Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy’ (n 78) 6.   
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vulnerabilities in any given point in time; and a time dimension, which refers to how 
systemic risk changes with the economic cycle.80   
 
The recent experience with systemically important banks spawned developments in the 
way that financial supervisors understand and confront systemic risk. The main shift was 
towards a ‘stronger emphasis on mitigating risks in the financial system as a whole’81 
instead of focusing on the safety and soundness of individual institutions. This approach 
has been labeled macroprudential supervision.  
 
Before the onslaught of the financial crisis, the main emphasis of financial regulation and 
supervision was largely focused on: (i) prudential regulation and (ii) conduct of business 
rules. These sets of rules focused on consumer protection and the safety, soundness and 
practices of individual institutions (or a consolidated financial group). The (micro) 
prudential approach proved to misguided. The logic behind this was the so-called ‘fallacy 
of composition’: if individual institutions were sound, the aggregate financial system 
would be robust and stable.82 By concentrating excessively on individual entities 
supervisors lost track of a broader perspective that included non-bank SIFIs, the shadow-
banking sector and the cross-border aspects of systemic risk. 
 
This experience shifted the systemic risk management paradigm towards macroprudential 
supervision. It can be quite difficult to precisely define what constitutes macroprudential 
supervision. This can be due to the fact that (at the time of writing) the concept is still 
being developed. Moreover, most of the tools that have been identified as part of the 
emerging macroprudential toolkit have long been associated with other areas of economic 
                                                
80 FSB, IMF and BIS, ‘Macroprudential Policy Tools and Frameworks: Progress Report to G20’ 
(n 77) 6.  
81 Bank of England, ‘Instruments of Macroprudential Policy: A discussion Paper’ (December 
2011) 5.  
82 Osinki et al. define the fallacy of composition as: ‘the concept that the whole is not the simple 
sum of its parts and therefore what is true for an individual bank will hold true for the banking 
and financial system as a whole. The outcome is that micro reasoning may lead to wrong 
conclusions at the macro level, even while that reasoning appears suitable for objectives at the 
micro level’. See Jacek Osiski, Katharine Seal, and Lex Hoogduin, ‘Macroprudential and 
Microprudential Policies: Toward Cohabitation’ IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department 
(21 June 2013) 6.  
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policy, such as monetary, competition, fiscal policies and traditional prudential 
supervision.83 According to some commentators, in spite of the macroprudential concept 
being a recent trend, monetary and supervisory authorities had long been using many of 
its tools.84  
 
Macroprudential policy aims to tackle systemic risks. Its main objective is the 
preservation of financial stability, which is considered a global public good. The 
European Systemic Risk Board (‘ESRB’) states that: ‘[t]he ultimate objective of macro-
prudential policy is to contribute to the safeguard of the stability of the financial system 
as a whole, including by strengthening the resilience of the financial system and 
decreasing the build-up of systemic risks, thereby ensuring a sustainable contribution of 
the financial sector to economic growth’.85  
  
Hanson et al. distinguish between microprudential and macroprudential supervision. 
They argue that while the former aims to make banks internalize losses on their assets in 
order to protect insured depositors and mitigate moral hazard, macroprudential 
supervision focuses on controlling the social cost of an aggregate reduction in asset prices 
in a financial system.86 
  
In order to provide some additional clarity regarding the concept, Rosa Lastra has 
described the differences between microprudential and macroprudential supervision using 
the analogy of a forest and its trees.87 A systemic-wide or macroprudential approach 
focuses on the whole forest, instead of the safety and soundness of individual trees. 
Paradoxically, the regulations and guidelines that the main regulatory trend-setters have 
developed for G-SIFIs and D-SIBs reveal that in some ways macroprudential supervision 
                                                
83 IMF, ‘Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy’ (n 78) 8. 
84 Douglas Elliott et al., ‘The History of Cyclical Macroprudential Policy in the United States’ 
(2013) Finance and Economics Discussion Series – Federal Reserve Board WP 2013-29, 3.  
85 European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk 
Board of 4 April 2013 on intermediate objectives and instruments of macro-prudential policy 
(ESRB/2013/1) (2013/C170/01). 
86 Samuel G Hanson, Anil K Kashyap, and Jeremy C Stein, ‘A Macroprudential Approach to 
Financial Regulation’ (2011) 25 Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, 4-6.  
87 Lastra, ‘Systemic Risk, SIFIs and Financial Stability’ (n 70) 198. 
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can be construed as more intensive prudential supervision for domestic and globally 
important financial behemoths. This paradox is consistent with (one of) the IMF’s 
definition(s) of macroprudential policy as: ‘the use of primarily prudential tools to limit 
systemic risk’.88 
 
Another important aspect of the macroprudential approach is the need for regulators to 
mind the so-called shadow-banking sector. The FSB has defined the ‘shadow banking’ or 
‘market-based’ financing system as: ‘credit intermediation involving entities and 
activities (fully or partially) outside the regular banking system or non-bank credit 
intermediation in short’.89 In other words, market participants and transactions that fall 
outside of the traditional regulatory radar and achieved systemic importance.  
 
The ongoing turn towards macroprudential supervision has also prompted changes in the 
domestic and international institutional arrangements for the preservation of financial 
stability. Foremost, the FSB has emerged as the main international agenda setting forum 
for the preservation of global financial stability. In addition to this, the IMF and other 
influential forums, have called on jurisdictions to adopt the necessary institutional and 
normative framework required in order to implement macroprudential supervision.     
 
Many countries and regions have already taken important steps towards the configuration 
of their macroprudential supervisors. In the USA, the Dodd Frank Act 2010 created the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). The FSOC has the threefold mandate of: 
(i) systemic risk identification, (ii) promotion of market discipline geared at combating 
moral hazard; and (iii) responding against threats of financial instability.90  
 
In the UK, the Financial Policy Committee (FCO) was created at the Bank of England 
(‘BOE’), with the objective of performing systemic-wide supervision. In the EU, The 
                                                
88 IMF, ‘Key aspects of Macroprudential Policy’ (n 78) 6. 
89 See Financial Stability Board (FSB), ‘Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow 
Banking Policy Framework for Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking 
Entities’ (29 August 2013) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130829c.pdf> 
accessed 6 December 2016.  
90 Dodd Frank Act s 112. 
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European Systemic Risk Board (‘ESRB’) was created upon the recommendations of the 
High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (the ‘De Larosière group’).91  
Other countries like: Chile, Mexico92, Brazil, South Africa, Korea and New Zealand93 
have also instituted their macroprudential supervisors.  
 
2.3.3. Negative Externalities 
 
As already was discussed in the introduction to this chapter, financial crises can be costly. 
The potential negative externalities of bank failure can spillover to other sectors of the 
economy – and also across jurisdictions. The latest financial crisis also proved to be 
particularly cumbersome for some taxpayers across the globe. The International 
Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) considers that while some of these costs are not completely 
sunk—and could even turnout to be modest— the fiscal exposures experienced during the 
height of the crisis were towering.94 According to the IMF’s estimates, the countries that 
were worst affected by the downturn lost between 4-6% of their GDP.95 On average, 
countries committed up to 25% of their GDPs on the provision of governmental 
guarantees, pledges and other forms of State aid.96 These costs and potential liabilities 
spurred the need to overhaul financial regulation in order to prevent future crises that 
could turn out to be fiscally cumbersome, or even prohibitively expensive for taxpayers.97  
                                                
91 The High-level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (de Larosière Group). ‘Final Report’ 
(2009). 
92 Rosa Lastra and Enmanuel Cedeno-Brea, ‘Latin American Financial Reforms’ (2013) working 
paper presented at the 92nd MOCOMILA – Committee on International Monetary Law of the 
International Law Association.  
93 IMF, ‘Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy’ (n 78) 46. 
94 International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial 
Sector – Final Report for the G-20’ (June 2010) 4. 
95 ibid 4. 
96 ibid 4.  
97 Some scholars like Prof. Charles Goodhart argue that bailouts need not always be costly to 
taxpayers, pointing out as an example the case of the US financial rescues through the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP). Prof. Goodhart calls this assumption a ‘mantra’ and considers 
that: ‘(…) when the dust settles, the authorities will generally find that they have made a nominal 
profit from exercises like TARP and injecting equity into RBS and Lloyds (…)’. Nonetheless, he 
does recognize that the exposure of large, complex financial institutions can be costly to society. 
See Charles Goodhart, ‘The Squam Lake Report: Commentary’ (2011) 49 Journal of Economic 
Literature 114, 119. See also Emilios Avgouleas and Charles Goodhart, ‘Critical Reflections on 
Bank Bail-ins’ (2015) 1 Journal of Financial Regulation 3, fn 1.  
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Orderly bank resolution frameworks are essential in order to address the cross-border 
systemic risks that large systemically important banks pose to financial stability.98 
Special Resolution Regimes (‘SRR’) are exclusive bankruptcy proceedings for 
commercial banks and other SIFIs.99 Regular insolvency rules have traditionally been 
considered inadequate to address some of the structural features involved in the failure of 
financial institutions.100 In addition, many other insolvency practices used for banks, such 
as ‘convoy rescues’ and asset fire sales, have proven to be defective for minimizing the 
costs of bank failure.  
 
Another important limitation of traditional insolvency regimes is that they are nationally 
based and tend to have a functional focus, centered on individual entities.101 
Consequently the developments of SRRs are an important challenge in order to mitigate 
the moral hazard that SIFIs pose across borders.102 In addition, every State should have 
SRRs in place in their own jurisdiction in order to be able to effectively deal with bank 
failures.  
 
3. WHAT ARE ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS? 
 
The law provides for many ways to organize a firm. Legal or organizational forms refer 
to the different ways that economic agents can arrange their enterprises.103 Organizational 
forms are often studied under the label of the ‘law of business associations’. However, 
organizational law governs and regulates both for profit and nonprofit – as well as 
                                                
98 Edward Greene et al., ‘A Closer Look at “Too Big to Fail”: National and International 
Approaches to Addressing the Risks of Large, Interconnected Financial Institutions’ (2010) 5 
Capital Market Law Journal 117, 131. 
99 See Jonathan Edwards, ‘A Model Law Framework for the Resolution of G-SIFIs’ (2012) 7 
Capital Markets Law Journal 122. 
100 Lastra, ‘Systemic Risk, SIFIs and Financial Stability’ (n 70) 212. 
101  Eva Hüpkes, ‘“Form Follows Function” – A New Architecture for Regulating and Resolving 
Global Financial Institutions’ (2009) 10 European Business Organization Law Review 369, 371. 
102 Lastra and Wood (n 64) 549. 
103 See Eilis Ferran and Look Chan Ho, Principles of Corporate Finance Law (2nd edn, OUP 
2014) 3-7; Andreas Cahn and David C Donald, Comparative Company Law: Text and Cases on 
the Laws Governing Corporations in Germany, the UK and the USA (CUP 2010) 24.  
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incorporated and unincorporated – legal vehicles used for setting up economic activities 
and arranging property rights and contracts.  
 
Firms are formally established according to statutory or legal provisions that grant 
organizational forms their own distinctive features. Private (or close) and public business 
corporations, general and limited partnerships, community interest companies, trusts and 
mutual societies, charities and non-profit associations – even condominiums – are all 
contemporary examples of legal forms governed by different organizational laws.  
 
From an economic perspective firms have been characterized as production functions, 
‘black boxes’ or bundles of contracts.104 These frameworks have provided the foundation 
for very powerful and valuable economic insights. On the other hand, the legal 
configuration of firms has not always been fully appreciated in policy debates. This can 
also be true for banks, which are often assumed to be (public or private) corporations 
owned by shareholders, disregarding the fact that historically – and even today – many 
banks are not legally organized under the corporate form.  
 
Thus, company law is merely a subset of the much larger set of rules comprised by 
organizational law. Other laws and statutes that govern the organization of economic and 
social enterprise include, the law of co-operative and mutual societies, non-profit 
organizations, partnerships and even marriage. Different organizational laws establish 
what the specific attributes of legal forms are, how they are formed and governed, who 
are their main stakeholders and ultimate risk-bearers, as well as other aspects such as 
their taxation, insolvency and competition rules.105   
 
                                                
104 See generally Randall Kroszner and Louis Putterman, The Economic Nature of the Firm: A 
Reader (3rd edn, CUP 2009). 
105 For a discussion from the perspective of co-operative law, see Antonio Fici, ‘An Introduction 
to Cooperative Law’ in Dante Cracogna et al. (eds) International Handbook of Cooperative Law 
(Springer 2013) 9.  
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The next subsections aim to draw a distinction between bank legal forms and other 
related concepts, such as bank chartering, structural banking reforms and business 
models.   
 
3.1. Organizational Forms and Bank Chartering 
 
‘Universal bank’, ‘commercial bank’, ‘savings bank’, ‘Sparkasse’, ‘building society’, 
cassa di risparmio are only a few of the labels that have become familiar to consumers of 
financial services worldwide. These regulatory denominations are different from 
organizational forms and they serve various important objectives. They generally signal 
public authorization to conduct financial intermediation. That is to take deposits from the 
general public and on-lend the funds to third parties. In many jurisdictions, they also 
inform the general public about the type of services that clients can expect to receive 
from different types of firms (eg opening current and savings account, cashing checks, 
obtaining loans, buying securities, purchasing insurance or a foreign currency, etc.).  
 
Other similar signals – like the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) official 
teller signage in the USA – serve to make customers aware of the existence of certain 
levels of depositor insurance protection. However, these bank denominations are mostly 
functional. They are connected to the activities that different types of financial entities are 
authorized to carry-on.  
 
In turn, financial entities are also legally organized or incorporated.106 Incorporation is 
different to chartering. While a banking license allows a firm to conduct certain financial 
activities in a particular jurisdiction, incorporation entails other legal consequences, such 
as having a legal personality and being able to own property.  
 
There is often a subtle difference between the functional banking license type and the 
legal form that an institution adopts. Legal forms carry other suffixes and labels that are 
                                                
106 The term ‘incorporation’ as used here refers to the personhood of all types of organizational 
forms – not just corporations.  
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also familiar to the general public, such as: ‘società per azioni’, ‘plc.’, ‘ltd.’, ‘cooperativa 
por acciones’. Some legal forms can be flexible vehicles for setting up a wide array of 
business types. For example, a corporation can be used for setting up a co-operative. 
Notwithstanding, certain organizational forms are strictly associated with specific bank 
forms (ie building societies with mutual societies).107 In the economic sense, 
organizational forms often underline the ownership configuration of firms.  
 
While primarily, the organizational form of a bank is established before the firm is 
allowed to provide services to the public108, it is bound to remain relevant throughout the 
regulatory and supervisory lifecycle. Banking regulation and supervision are two 
different concepts. R. M. Lastra distinguishes between banking regulation and 
supervision (lato sensu) by stating that the former refers to rulemaking, while the later is 
a process comprised of four stages: (a) licensing or chartering (market entry), (b) 
supervision (stricto sensu), (c) sanctioning and enforcement and (d) crisis management 
(which includes deposit protection insurance schemes, lender of last resort and bank 
resolution).109 Thus, regulation is a continuous rulemaking process throughout a bank’s 
business cycle. On the other hand, supervision (in the broad sense) comprises a four-stage 
process that starts and ends with market entry and exit respectively.  
 
Legal form is not only important for bank licensing or authorization (market entry), but is 
also bound to be relevant during the complete lifecycle of a bank as a going concern. For 
example, most jurisdictions allow firms, including banks, to change their legal form. This 
means that organizational forms are not set in stone. In addition, legal form can be 
                                                
107 Further examples are presented in the next chapter, like the requirement that banks in Spain 
and Italy (other than co-operatives) be organized under the corporate form. In the Dominican 
Republic, for example, Multiple Services Banks (bancos múltiples) and Credit Entities 
(entididades de crédito) are also required to adopt the corporate form (sociedad anónima – 
previously called compañía por acciones), according to art 38 of the Dominican Monetary and 
Financial Law n 183-02.  
108 It is possible for a bank to change its organizational form once it has been licensed. For 
example, when a mutual bank transforms into a corporate bank (demutualization). These 
operations are typically subject to supervisory approval.  
109 Lastra, International Financial and Monetary Law (n 17) 112-123. See also Rosa Lastra, 
Central Banking and Banking Regulation (FMG London School of Economics 1996) 108-144. 
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especially important during crisis management or in the vicinity of insolvency, given that 
banks typically face special resolution regimes.110   
 
3.2. Organizational Forms and Functional Segregation 
 
An analysis of the relation between legal forms and financial regulation evokes some of 
the recent banking structural reforms undertaken in major jurisdictions, including the 
USA, the UK, the EU, Germany and France. However, they are somewhat related but 
different. Organizational forms refer to the way that banks are legally organized and not 
to the activities that they can and cannot perform.  
 
The label of banking structural reforms, such as the ‘Volcker rule’ or ‘Vickers type ring-
fencing’111, has been increasingly used when referring to a wide array of reforms aimed 
at separating some banking activities regarded as being riskier (eg dealing in certain 
kinds of securities) from others considered as being essential or critical – like deposit-
taking, payments clearing and settlement, and lending to small and medium enterprises. 
The functional segregation of banking activities is not new. One notable example is the 
historical separation between commercial and investment banking that occurred in the 
USA in the aftermath of the New Deal and the Glass-Steagall Act 1934. However, the 
functional separation of activities seems to have regained consideration after the 
onslaught of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
 
While some banking structural reforms – like UK type ring-fencing – take some aspects 
of legal organization slightly into account, others do not. For example, the so-called 
‘Volcker rule’ in the USA merely restricts banks from engaging in proprietary trading or 
investing in hedge funds or private equity funds. The Volcker rule does not delve into 
deeper issues regarding how banks are legally organized, or whether they should ideally 
be corporations or non-corporate entities. 
                                                
110 The relationship between legal forms and bank resolution is discussed with greater detail in 
chapter 6.  
111 Banking structural reforms are discussed with greater detail in chapter 6.  
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In the particular case of UK type ring-fencing, the proposed rules implemented so far 
simply state that for banks with deposits in excess of GBP 25 billion, deposit-taking 
activities should be apportioned into separate legal entities. However, no distinction is 
made regarding which types of legal forms should be used for organizing ring-fenced 
bodies. In other words, the rules do not prescribe whether ring-fenced bodies should be 
organized as corporations, co-operatives or nonprofit entities. One of the main arguments 
presented in this book is that such a discussion matters for the design of financial 
regulation.  
3.3. Legal Forms and Business Models 
 
Legal forms are also slightly different – but strongly related to banks’ business models. 
According to Bülbül, Schmidt and Schüwer: ‘banks’ business models and their 
institutional features are interdependent and complementary to each other’.112 
 
Organizational forms refer to how banks are legally set-up. On the other hand, business 
models refer to the financial structure and the activities that banks do.113 This includes 
how they fund their activities (capital structure), and in what types of assets they invest 
their own and borrowed funds (securities and other derivatives, mortgages, consumer 
lending, securitization, etc.).  
 
Business models and strategies can vary – and for some types of private banks – they are 
not necessarily linked to how banks are legally organized. Some banks pursue a pure 
‘retail strategy’, other might pursue a universal banking model, while others dedicate 
themselves to investment banking activities.  
 
                                                
112 Dilek Bülbül, Reinhard Schmidt and Ulrich Schüwer, ‘Caisses D’épargne et Banques 
Coopératives en Europe’ (2013) 111 Revue d'Economie Financière 159. 
113 See Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Paul Atkinson and Caroline Roulet, ‘Bank Business Models and 
the Basel System: Complexity and Interconnectedness’ (2013) 2 OECD Journal: Market Trends.  
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On the other hand, as is commonly the case with mutual and co-operative banks, and also 
with savings banks, there is a strong connection between their business models and legal 
forms. As is further discussed in chapter three, these banks are characterized by serving 
and transacting with their member-base and typically exhibit a regional or geographical 
scope of action (the so-called ‘regional principle’).114  
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
The underlying argument of this thesis is that legal forms matter for banking regulation. 
In other words, it states that banks are legal entities that are setup under organizational 
law and contracts. This legal configuration is bound to be important when devising bank 
regulation. Organizational law creates partitions of assets that re-arrange the patterns of 
property rights of different groups of bank stakeholders. Organizational law determines 
how legal entities are created, how they finance their activities and how they cease to 
exist. Thus, organizational forms are a distinctive variable that should be taken into 
account for the design and implementation of banking regulation.  
 
Moreover, corporate law is insufficient to fully analyze the legal organizational aspects of 
banking. Many banks worldwide are not organized as corporations. Corporate law is 
merely a ‘subset of organizational law’115, which also includes the legal framework for 
arranging different types of enterprises. Organizational law comprises the legal rules that 
govern: (general and limited liability) partnerships, business trusts, (limited and unlimited 
liability) sole proprietorships, limited liability companies, nonprofit entities, charities, co-
operatives and other types of mutual societies.  
 
The next chapter describes how banks are organized in some leading jurisdictions. The 
chapter looks at the main economic attributes that bank legal forms have as well as their 
different converging stakeholders, incentives and interests.  
                                                
114 Bülbül et al. (n 112) 159. 
115 Brian Cheffins, ‘The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) Scholarship’ (2004) 63 Cambridge Law 
Journal 456. 
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Chapter Three 
The Legal and Ownership  
Structure of Commercial Banks 
 
 
SUMMARY 
How are commercial banks legally organized around the world? What are the main features and 
attributes of the predominant bank organizational forms? Do differences across bank forms 
matter for the design of financial regulation? This chapter analyzes the different ways that banks 
can be legally organized across six major jurisdictions, including: the European Union, Italy, 
Spain, the United States, the United Kingdom and France. The chapter finds that in these 
jurisdictions, banks are mainly organized as corporations, mutual and co-operative associations, 
and nonprofit entities. The chapter then fleshes out the salient features of the most important 
organizational forms used for structuring banking activities in order to functionally compare 
them against the foil of the business corporation. Methodologically, the study combines a 
functional comparative legal analysis informed by some insights from the economic analysis of 
law.  
 
Keywords: Organizational forms, co-operative and mutual banks, limited liability, asset 
partitioning, entity shielding.  
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‘The process of contracting needs to be studied in a real world setting. We would then 
learn of the problems that are encountered and of how they are overcome and we would 
certainly become aware of the richness of the institutional alternatives between which we 
have to choose’.   
Ronald Coase, ‘Nobel Prize Lecture’ (1991)116 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The 2007-09 financial crisis was associated to the bursting of real estate bubbles across 
several jurisdictions. In Spain, the mortgage crisis took a toll on several regional savings 
banks (called cajas de ahorros, in Spanish) that had successfully operated for over 180 
years.117 By the end of 2010, seven of these saving banks had formed a conglomerate 
business corporation (sociedad anónima) through a legal process that some commentators 
referred to as ‘cold fusion’.118 The resulting entity was Bankia, at that point Spain’s 
biggest real estate lender.119  
 
In July 2011, Bankia publicly listed its shares in the securities exchange (Bolsa de 
Madrid) and peddled them to its own customers, alongside other preference shares that it 
had issued.120 Many clients exchanged their savings and pensions from deposits into 
Bankia’s securities. By 2012, Bankia had suffered major losses and was in need of a 
                                                
116 R H Coase, ‘The Institutional Structure of Production’ (1992) 82 American Economic Review 
713. 
117 For a comprehensive account of the demise of the Spanish cajas de ahorros see Emili Tortosa, 
Fulgor y Muerte de las Cajas de Ahorros (Universitat de Valencia 2015); IMF, ‘The Reform of 
Spanish Savings Banks: Technical Note’ (May 2012) 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12141.pdf accessed 6 December 2016; Pablo 
Martín-Aceña, ‘The Savings Bank Crisis in Spain: When and How’ (2013) 66 ESBG Perspectives 
85 < http://www.savings-banks.com/Who-we-are/History/Pages/MartinAcena.aspx> accessed 6 
December 2016. 
118 Through the so-called ‘cold fusion’ several Spanish saving banks formed a new entity for 
sharing overhead costs while keeping their own internal structures and the legal personality of 
each constituting member entity.    
119 Johan A Lybeck, The Future of Financial Regulation: Who Should Pay for the Failures of 
American and European Banks? (CUP 2016) 273.  
120 These are shares that typically have an automatic right to fixed income. Unlike common 
stocks, which do not have this right. See Stephen M Bainbridge, Corporate Law (3rd edn, 
Foundation Press 2015) 36-37.  
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publicly funded bailout amounting to over EUR 22 billion.121 Many customers who held 
Bankia’s preferred stocks and securities lost all of their investments. Moreover, after the 
onslaught of the crisis that ensued, the number of Spanish savings banks diminished – 
from 79 entities in 1985, to only two cajas by the end of 2015.122  
 
What led the Spanish savings banks (cajas de ahorros) to change their legal form? Was 
this organizational change part of their demise? 
 
The legal changes undertaken by the Spanish savings banks are reminiscent of the wave 
of transformations that several building societies in the United Kingdom experienced 
from 1989 and onwards. The legal and ownership structure of building societies is legally 
different to that of Spanish savings banks. While the Spanish cajas had no residual 
owners, building societies are mutual organizations that are funded and jointly owned by 
their members.  
 
Historically, building societies lent money to their members in order for the latter to build 
or purchase their houses (hence the name ‘building’ society). These loans were secured 
on residential property and were largely funded by members’ deposits.123 In 1989, the 
members of Abbey National Building Society decided to demutualize that entity – that is, 
to convert the institution from a mutual society into a public limited company (a listed 
corporation). In the following years, other building societies followed suit with their own 
                                                
121 See Banco de España / FROB, ‘Public financial Assistance in the Recapitalisation of the 
Spanish Banking System (2009-2013)’ (2 September 2013) 
<http://www.frob.es/es/Documents/cayudas20614EN.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016.  
122 See Banco de España, ‘Consulta de Datos Actuales de Entidades Registradas en el Banco de 
España’ 
<http://app.bde.es/ren/app/Search?CFG=ConsultaEntidadesCon.xml&TipoFormato=XSL&Pagin
ate=OPEN&TIPO=CA&DONDE=11&LEI=&ORDEN=2&RADIO=0> accessed 6 December 
2016.  
123 Sub-s 3.2.4 explains the legal aspects of building societies with greater detail. See also Paul L 
Davies and Sarah Worthington, Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2012) 1-29.  
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demutualization processes.124 Some of these former building societies, like Northern 
Rock and Alliance & Leicester, went on to fail during the 2007-08 financial crisis.   
 
Meanwhile, in Switzerland, another group of banks were also undertaking 
transformations in early 2013. After more than two centuries of banking under the 
unlimited liability partnership form, Swiss private banks125 Pictect and Lombard Odier 
announced their transformation into a legal structure endowed with limited liability for 
their managing partners and residual owners.126 According to some commentators, the 
conversions were allegedly driven by the closing of Wegelin & Co. – Switzerland’s 
oldest private bank – after being convicted for money laundering and tax evasion charges 
in the United States (US).127 After 270 years Wegelin & Co. ceased to exist and its assets, 
operations and employees were rearranged through one if its corporate subsidiaries. 
 
What is the underlying thread that binds theses cases together? Aside from their relation 
to banking, these cases share another – often-overlooked – unifying thread: the banks 
involved experienced important changes in the ways that they were legally organized.  
 
Currently, the business corporation dominates as the organizational form of choice for 
most banks in leading jurisdictions around the world. However, this has not always been 
the case. Well into the 20th century, employee-owned firms (organized as partnerships) 
were commonplace in both the investment and the private banking industries. In previous 
                                                
124 For a summary of the historical process see Bank of England, ‘Explanatory Notes - Building 
Societies’ Balance Sheet’ (December 2007) 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/iadb/notesiadb/building_society_bs_07.aspx> 
accessed 6 December 2016.  
125 Private banks offer their services to an affluent clientele and were historically organized as 
partnerships (in some countries, unincorporated entities). Their general or managing partners 
were unlimitedly liable. Purportedly, this feature helped to better align the incentives between 
bank managers and their (often wealthy) clients. 
126 James Shotter, ‘Swiss Private Banks End Partner Liability’ Financial Times (London, 5 
February 2013) <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/436771ce-6f7b-11e2-b906-
00144feab49a.html#axzz3pX64cWKl> accessed 6 December 2016. 
127 See Daniel Schafer and James Shotter, ‘Lombard Odier Undergoes Transformation to Limit its 
Liabilities’ Financial Times (1 May 2013) <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/12269968-ae97-11e2-
8316-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3pX64cWKl> accessed 6 December 2016. 
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times, other organizational forms, such as nonprofit entities, co-operatives128 and mutual 
societies were prevalent providers of some consumer banking services, such as savings 
accounts and mortgages.129 Nowadays, these non-joint stock banks have increasingly 
become less common. On the other hand, corporations seem to dominate banking.  
 
The transition into the 21st century saw the rise of the corporation as the predominant 
legal vehicle for conducting business.130 Even though many banks have migrated to the 
corporate form, its shortcomings have gained widespread attention in recent years. The 
corporation has been at the heart of heated academic and policy debates, even before the 
recent financial crisis. The downfall of companies such as Enron, Parmalat and 
WorldCom due to dubious bookkeeping practices and fraudulent activities gave rise to 
                                                
128 Co-operatives are defined as ‘democratic organizations controlled by their members, who 
actively participate in setting their policies and making decisions’ based on the principle of one-
vote-per member and as ‘autonomous associations of persons united voluntarily to meet their 
common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and 
democratically controlled enterprise’. See International Labor Organization (ILO), 
Recommendation Concerning Promotion of Cooperatives n 193 (2002) available online 
<http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:R
193> accessed 6 December 2016. 
129 Adam Smith had the opinion that business corporations (joint-stock companies) were ideally 
suited for the banking trade and other businesses that could be reduced to ‘a routine or uniformity 
of method’ that admitted ‘little or no variation’. Alan Morrison and William Wilhelm Jr argue 
that the indispensability of human judgment and expertise made the partnership the 
organizational form of choice for investment banking until the flight towards other forms 
endowed with limited liability. For example, investment bank Goldman Sachs was historically 
referred to as ‘the partnership’. See generally Alan D Morrison and William J Wilhelm Jr, 
Investment Banking: Institutions, Politics, Law (OUP 2007) 265-292. See also Charles D Ellis, 
The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs (Penguin Books 2009).  
130 Sole proprietorships are still the dominant ownership structure in the US in terms of number of 
firms. However, corporations overpass both sole proprietorships and partnerships in receipts and 
net income. According to the US 2008 Census Data, while on estimate corporations accounted for 
only 18.49% of the total unaudited tax returns (nonfarm proprietorships were around 71.54% of 
all businesses and partnerships accounted for 9.95%), they were responsible for 81.28% of total 
business receipts and 57.66% of all net income in the US economy for that year. See U.S. Census 
Bureau, ‘Statistical Abstract of the United States’ (2012). 
<https://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0744.pdf> accessed 6 December 
2016. 
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important reforms regarding securities disclosure rules, corporate governance and 
accounting standards.131  
 
In spite of such recent corporate reforms, the 2007-2008 financial crisis still ensued. This 
has led some authors to criticize not only banks – but also the current institutional 
standing of the modern business corporation.132 What was at the time seen as a ‘golden 
opportunity’ for alternative lenders organized under non-corporate forms (mutual 
societies, co-operatives and nonprofits)133 quickly buckled when many non-corporate 
banks decided to either demutualize, sell their assets to corporate banks, or simply went 
bankrupt.134  
 
These facts lead to questions regarding the many ways that banks can be legally 
organized. Is the corporate form the ideal structure for organizing banks? In addition to 
the corporation, what other alternatives exist for organizing banking activities in leading 
jurisdictions? Were there any differences between the incentive structures of the Spanish 
savings banks (cajas de ahorros) and the British building societies? How are these legal 
forms different to corporate banks? And most importantly – if and how such 
organizational differences matter for the design of financial regulation? These are some 
of the central questions that this chapter purports to address. 
 
                                                
131 For a comprehensive account, see the contributions in John Armour and Joseph McCahery 
(eds), After Enron:  Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in Europe 
and the US (Hart Publishing 2006).  
132 See Kent Greenfield, The Failure of Corporate Law: Fundamental Flaws and Progressive 
Possibilities (University of Chicago Press 2006). See also Colin Mayer, Firm Commitment: Why 
the Corporation is Failing Us and How to Restore Trust in It (OUP 2013).   
133 ‘The Co-op and the Mutuals Have failed us Almost as Badly as the Banks’ The Guardian 
(London, 23 November 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/nov/23/co-operative-
mutual-failed-badly-as-banks> accessed 6 December 2016.  
134 Notable examples include the 2013 public bailout of the Co-op Bank in the United Kingdom, 
as well as the ill fate of several former British mutual societies that converted into corporations in 
the 1990s. These institutions include not so distant bank failures, such as Northern Rock and 
Bradford & Bingley. David Bholat and Joanna Gray consider that: ‘All eleven [British] building 
societies that demutualized in the 1990s have since lost their operational independence, either 
because they have been acquired by other banks, or because they have received a public bailout 
(…)’. See David Bholat and Joanna Gray, ‘Organizational Form as a Source of Systemic Risk’ 
(2013) 7 Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, 7.  
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The chapter looks at the legal and ownership structure of different banks across 
jurisdictions in order to pinpoint the main set of generic features that the predominant 
organizational forms used for commercial banking have.135 The study identifies and 
breaks down the essential ownership features exhibited by corporate, mutual and co-
operative, and nonprofit banks in order to examine how they could interact with existing 
financial regulations – like deposit protection insurance schemes, bank resolution and 
prudential regulation. Mutual, co-operative and nonprofit banks are then compared 
against the foil of corporate banks.  
 
The underlying rationale behind the use of the ownership analysis is the intuition that the 
dissection of the incentive structure of bank legal forms can help shed some light on 
existing tensions between banks as legal entities and financial regulation. This 
exploration can also provide some insights regarding which legal and economic features 
need to be taken into account for the ongoing financial reforms.  
 
The rest of the chapter is divided into four additional sections. The second section 
presents an overview of the analytical framework used throughout the chapter – but also 
during the rest of the book. The third section expands the analysis by describing how 
banks can be legally organized and chartered in the European Union, France, Italy, Spain, 
the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The common generic features that 
underpin the economic structure of the main types of bank organizational forms are then 
identified and explained. The fourth section then compares the main features of mutual, 
co-operative and nonprofit banks against the foil of corporate banks. The final section 
concludes.  
 
 
 
                                                
135 The study primarily focuses on those commercial banks that take deposits from the general 
public in order to on-lend funds to third parties – regardless of whether they are owned by private 
parties or have been nationalized. The study excludes so-called ‘public’ or ‘State-owned banks’ 
that do not fund themselves by deposits and typically grant loans from a national budget or by 
issuing securities (eg the Instituto de Crédito Oficial, in Spain).  
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2. FRAMEWORK  
 
This chapter conducts a positive analysis, based on the ownership structure of legal 
entities. In particular, it relies on some of Harold Demsetz’s ideas on ownership, which 
consider the bundles of property rights that different bank constituencies have.136 The 
framework also builds on and complements the so-called ‘contractarian’ theory of the 
firm, which sees them as nexuses both of and for contracts.137 This perspective is also 
consistent with the emerging legal theory of finance (LTF) that considers law as a 
constitutive part of finance – which in turn is formed by a complex cobweb of contractual 
rapports and obligations.138  
 
Organizational forms are typically viewed as off-the-rack, incomplete standard form 
contracts established by the law.139 Each type of organizational form is a template 
endowed with its own set of generic attributes or features. The framework focuses on the 
economic structure of these contracts.140  
 
                                                
136 Harold Demsetz, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’ (1967) 57 American Economic 
Review 347.  
137 The firm as a ‘nexus of contracts’ was a seminal contribution of Michael Jensen and William 
Meckling. See Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) Journal of Financial Economics 305. 
However, Jensen and Meckling mostly focused on the corporate form – which they acknowledge 
is ‘simply one form of legal fiction that serves as a nexus of contracting relations (…)’ – while 
precluding other important existing legal organizational forms. For critiques to this limited 
characterization see Tobias Tröger, ‘Asset Partitioning, Debt-Equity Agency Conflicts, and 
Choice of Organizational Form’ (2007) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1068063> accessed 6 
December 2016. Moreover, the interpretation of the firm as a ‘nexus for contracts’ entails the 
view of the firm as a common contracting party to many contracts. See Henry Hansmann, 
‘Ownership and Organizational Form’ in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts (eds), The Handbook 
of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press 2013) and later restated by Reinier 
Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law: a Comparative and Functional Approach (2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 6.  
138 See Katharina Pistor, ‘A Legal Theory of Finance’ (2013) 41 Journal of Comparative 
Economics 315.  
139 Stephen Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics (Foundation Press 2002) 33. See also H 
Hansmann and R Kraakman, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’ (2000) 110 Yale Law 
Journal 387. 
140 See Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen, ‘Agency Problems and Residual Claims’ (1983) 26 
Journal of Law and Economics 327. 
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While this ownership framework is ubiquitous in corporate law and economics, it 
provides a different perspective to more traditional civil law doctrinal classifications of 
firms.141 Many other alternative analytical frameworks could be and have been 
considered and used (eg public choice, agency theory, etc.). However, this chapter 
focuses on the economic configuration that legal forms have in order to examine the 
interplay between the ownership structures of certain leading organizational forms and 
financial regulations, like deposit protection insurance schemes. The framework also 
provides a theoretical basis for subsequent analysis in the following chapters, which 
cover: capital and liquidity standards (chapter 4), bank resolution and creditor rank 
(chapter 5), and ring-fencing and other types of banking structural reforms (chapter 6).  
 
This chapter describes and analyzes how deposit-taking institutions are legally organized 
in several European countries and in the United States. The European countries of choice 
include: France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom – as well as the existing 
organizational forms available under EU law. The functional method of comparative law 
allows the study of organizational types across several jurisdictions. 142  The features of 
each major type of bank legal form are then compared to the attributes of the business 
corporation. 
 
Functional analyses of banking institutions have dominated the academic and policy 
debates on banking structural reforms in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. 
However, existing functional distinctions seem to be more concerned with what banks are 
allowed to do (activities) than with the rules under which they are legally organized (legal 
form). The objective of this chapter is to raise some attention regarding the importance of 
legal form for the design of financial regulation.  
 
                                                
141 For example, distinguishing between ‘civil’ and ‘commercial’ firms, or between sociétés de 
capitaux and sociétés de personnes, which are ubiquitous doctrinal classifications across some 
civil law legal systems. See Philippe Merle and Anne Fauchon, Droit Commercial  – Sociétés 
Commerciales (19 edn, Dalloz 2016) 24-25.  
142 Using the functional method of comparative law means focusing on the similarities of bank 
organizational forms across jurisdictions. For the purpose of this chapter it entails focusing on the 
legal forms that fulfill the same tasks and functions and thus become comparable. See Konrad 
Zweigert, ‘Methodological Problems in Comparative Law’ [1972] Israel Law Review 465.  
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Henry Hansmann developed a comprehensive proprietary classification of firms.143 The 
main distinction is between producer and customer owned firms. Producer-owned firms 
receive their inputs (capital, labor, technology) from their owners. This category includes 
producer-owned co-operatives (eg agricultural co-operatives), investor-owned firms such 
as the business corporation (which according to Hansmann is a form of producer owned 
co-operative144), and employee-owned firms, such as partnerships.  
 
Customer-owned firms provide goods and services primarily to their owners or patrons. 
This category includes consumer-owned co-operatives, like wholesale supermarkets, 
clubs and some utility companies. Nonprofit enterprises are a third category of firms. 
Under the framework, the term ‘nonprofit’ is used differently as it is often colloquially 
employed. Nonprofits refer to firms that have no owners: that is, where patrons: ‘(a) often 
lack ownership units and voting rights, (b) face distributional constraints, and (c) are not 
entitled to receive residual property upon liquidation’.145 In this sense of the term, most 
mutual and co-operative banks that operate for the benefit of their members cannot be 
considered to be true ‘nonprofit’ entities. The fact that mutual associations and co-
operatives maximize the objectives and wellbeing of their members (instead of 
shareholder value) does not entail that they operate as nonprofits under the framework. 
The aforementioned taxonomy will be used throughout this chapter and the rest of the 
book.  
 
An analysis of banks’ ownership structures requires drawing certain distinctions between 
the constituencies involved in the impending discussion. These constituencies are defined 
by the literature as the individuals and firms that typically transact with a particular 
                                                
143 See Henry Hansmann, ‘Ownership of the Firm’ (1988) 4 Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization 267. See also Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press 1996).  
144 Hansmann ‘Ownership of the Firm’ (n 143)12-15. 
145 Henry Hansmann, ‘The Economic Role of Commercial Nonprofits: the Evolution of the US 
Savings Banks Industry’ in H Anheier and W Seibel (eds), The Third Sector: Comparative 
Studies of Nonprofit Organizations (de Gruyter 1989). 
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firm.146 In recent years, the definition has been expanded to include stakeholders – or 
interest groups that are affected by the actions of the firm.147  
 
Firms typically have owners, managers and board members, debtors and creditors. 
Because the discussion focuses on banks organized either as corporations, co-operatives 
and mutual societies, or nonprofit entities, the constituencies referred to throughout the 
chapter are: managers (including board members), (secured and unsecured) creditors, 
debtors, (insured and uninsured) depositors (a special type of unsecured bank creditor) 
and residual owners (also known as residual risk-bearers). Taxpayers are also important 
stakeholders for the analysis, since they often (and involuntarily) could end up providing 
some sort of fiscal backstop or become residual risk-bearers whenever banking 
institutions fail and are bailed out using public funds. 
 
Banks’ residual owners include shareholders, for the case of corporate banks. Mutual 
banks and co-operative banks typically do not have ‘shareholders’ as their residual 
owners because they are collective and jointly owned by their depositors-members. 
Commercial nonprofit banks are a special case covered by the literature, because – by 
definition – they are characterized as having no owners.148  
 
3. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BANK LEGAL FORMS 
 
This section presents a functional comparative analysis of bank legal forms across several 
European jurisdictions and the US. The selected countries include: France, Italy, Spain 
and the United Kingdom. The rationale behind this selection is twofold. Firstly, some of 
                                                
146 Hansmann calls them ‘patrons’. See Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (n 143) 12.  
147 See E Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Pitman 1984). See also T 
Donaldson and Lee E Preston, ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, 
and Implications’ (1995) 20 Academy of Management Review 65.  
148 Hansmann, ‘The Economic Role of Commercial Nonprofits’ (n 145). See also Henry 
Hansmann, ‘Ownership and Organizational Form’ in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts (eds), The 
Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press 2013). 
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these countries host the most important financial institutions and markets in the world.149 
These jurisdictions are power-yielding countries that exert widespread influence in the 
design of financial regulations and standards. The second reason is practical. It responds 
to the availability of information and legal statutes (primary legal sources) in a language 
accessible in order to be able to conduct the analysis.   
 
The scope of inquiry does not intend to explain the organizational laws of each country in 
great detail. Instead, it offers an observational snapshot of how banks in the selected 
countries are legally organized in the wake of the 2007-08 crisis. Some of the available 
organizational forms in these jurisdictions are now seldom used for banking (eg 
partnerships, limited partnerships, amongst others). As a result, the study is limited to a 
cross-sectional overview of the predominant organizational forms and bank types 
currently in existence.  
 
3.1. The EU Framework for Enterprise and Credit Institutions 
 
The EU has made significant efforts towards company law harmonization. The 1958 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (‘Treaty of Rome’) laid the 
foundations for the right to establishment of companies and co-operatives across EU 
member states. Subsequent decades also saw an increasing number of directives and 
proposals aimed at harmonizing – not only the company laws of member countries – but 
also corporate governance matters and the provision of financial services.150 
 
In spite of these integration efforts, EU member countries still retain a great say over their 
organizational laws. The resulting diversity is said to create potential arbitrage 
                                                
149 In combination with Germany, these jurisdictions are home countries to 20 out of the 30 
Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) identified by the Financial Stability Board (FSB). 
See Financial Stability Board (FSB), ‘2016 List of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-
SIBs)’ (21 November 2016) <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016-list-of-global-
systemically-important-banks-G-SIBs.pdf > 6 December 2016. 
150 For a detailed account, see Mads Andenas and Frank Wooldridge, European Comparative 
Company Law (Cambridge University Press 2009).  
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opportunities and forum shopping for seats of incorporation.151 Differences in domestic 
insolvency regimes and creditor rank can also create distortions for bank resolution 
across the EU.152   
 
3.1.1. Organizational Forms in the EU 
 
In addition to the regulatory efforts for attaining European company law harmonization, 
the EU has also created two pan-European legal vehicles: (a) the European Company 
(‘SE’ according to its Latin name – Societas Europaea); and (b) the European 
Cooperative Society (‘SCE’ according to its Latin name – Societas Cooperativa 
Europaea).153 In turn, these pan European legal forms are described.  
 
In 2001 the European Commission adopted a regulation creating a public limited liability 
company, with the objective of ‘adapting structures for production’ in order to achieve 
the completion of the EU internal market.154 The SE is functionally equivalent to the 
publicly traded business corporation.  
 
Some commentators consider that the European Commission’s main argument for 
creating the SE was facilitating cross-border mergers between companies incorporated in 
two different member countries.155 However, the regulations did not cover important 
topics such as taxation and insolvency matters, which were left to the laws of each 
                                                
151 Paul Davies, Introduction to Company Law (2nd edn, OUP 2010) 302-304. 
152 As further analyzed under chapter five of this thesis. 
153 A third model is also being discussed: the European Private Company (SPE – Societa Privata 
Europaea – in Latin), which is modeled around the German GmbH (the precursor to the limited 
liability company – or LLC) and is targeted as an organizational form for small and medium size 
businesses (SMEs).  
154 Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European 
Company (SE). 
155 Paul Davies provides the example of a cross-border merger of ‘Company A’ incorporated in 
jurisdiction ‘X’, with ‘Company B’ incorporated in country ‘Y’. The resulting entity could be 
either companies A or B, or a new ‘Company C’ (both A and B disappearing). However, these 
cross-border issued did not prevent takeovers to occur (the purchase of the shares of either 
company by the shareholders of the other).  See Davies (n 151) 302-304.  
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member state.156 In spite of this, very few European banks have decided to organize or 
migrate to the SE model.157 
 
In a similar fashion to the SE, the European Cooperative Society (SCE) was created as an 
archetype so that co-operatives could operate across the European Single Market. In 
1992, the European Commission submitted three regulatory proposals to the European 
Council for the establishment of supranational organizational forms aimed at the 
expansion of the so-called ‘social economy enterprises’. These were essentially standard 
form pan-European alternatives to the business corporation.  
 
The aforementioned proposals aimed at the creation of model European: (a) co-operative 
societies; (b) mutual insurance societies158 and (c) nonprofit associations.159 However, 
only the Statute of the European Cooperative Society was subsequently adopted in 
2003.160 The SCE Regulations entered into force in 2006. By that year, the European 
                                                
156 See Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert and Lars Hornuf, ‘Incorporating under European law: 
the Societas Europaea as a Vehicle for Legal Arbitrage’ (2009) European Business Organization 
Law Review 1. 
157 According to the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), by 15 November 2015 there were 
2525 registered and established SEs. Around 160 of these SEs were associated to the financial 
sector, mainly related to the insurance industry. See The European Trade Union Institute’s 
(ETUI) European Company (SE) Database <http://ecdb.worker-participation.eu/index.php> 
accessed 6 December 2016. 
158 These were defined as: ‘a permanent grouping of natural or legal persons whose members pool 
their knowledge or activities either for a purpose in the general interest or in order to directly or 
indirectly promote the trade or professional interests of its members’. 
159 The European Commission defines mutual societies as: ‘voluntary groups of persons (natural 
or legal) whose purpose is primarily to meet the needs of their members rather tan achieve a 
return on investment. These kinds of enterprise operate according to the principles of solidarity 
between members, and their participation in the governance of the business. They are governed 
by private law. The profits and surpluses of a mutual are not used to pay a return on investment; 
they are rather used to improve the services offered to members, to finance and develop the 
business and to increase its own reserves. Within certain limits, they may be redistributed to 
members in any form. Unlike co-operatives, whose capital is represented by shares, the funds of 
mutuals are owned and managed jointly and indivisibly’. See European Commission, ‘Mutual 
Societies in an Enlarged Europe’ – Consultation Document (3 October 2003) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/files/mutuals/mutuals-consult-doc_en.pdf> accessed 
6 December 2016.  
160 See Council Regulation (EC) No 1435/2003 of 22 July 2003 on the Statute for a European 
Cooperative Society (SCE). 
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Commission had withdrawn the regulatory proposals for European mutual societies and 
associations because of a lack of widespread support.  
 
An SCE’s principal objectives must be ‘the satisfaction of its members’ needs and/or the 
development of their economic and social activities, in particular through the conclusion 
of agreements with them to supply goods or services or to execute work of the kind that 
the SCE carries out or commissions’.161 Unlike the capital of a mutual society – which is 
the common property of its members – an SCE’s capital is divided into ownership units 
called ‘shares’.162 Its minimum capital was set at EUR 30,000.  
 
According to article 2 of the SCE Regulation, they can be formed: 
 
(a) by five or more natural persons resident in at least two Member States, (b) 
by five or more natural persons and companies and firms within the meaning 
of the second paragraph of Article 48 of the Treaty (current article 54 of the 
TFEU) and other legal bodies governed by public or private law, formed 
under the law of a Member State, resident in, or governed by the law of, at 
least two different Member States, (c) by companies and firms within the 
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48 of the Treaty (current article 
54 of the TFEU) and other legal bodies governed by public or private law 
formed under the law of a Member State which are governed by the law of at 
least two different Member States, (d) by a merger between cooperatives 
formed under the law of a Member State with registered offices and head 
offices within the Community, provided that at least two of them are 
governed by the law of different Member States or (e) by conversion of a 
cooperative formed under the law of a Member State, which has its registered 
office and head office within the Community if for at least two years it has 
had an establishment or subsidiary governed by the law of another Member 
State.  
                                                
161 ibid art 1.3. 
162 ibid art 1.2. 
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The aforementioned requirements accentuate the need of a so-called ‘international 
element’ for the formation of SCEs. 
 
Like other co-operative types, the members of an SCE would typically be customers or 
suppliers (‘patrons’) that benefit from the activities that the co-operative conducts. As a 
result, they could be classified into producer-owned co-operatives and customer-owned 
co-operatives. In the case of co-operative banks, customers can either be depositors, 
borrowers or both. This is why banking co-ops are typically categorized as consumer-
owned co-operatives. 
  
The European Company (‘SE’) and the European Cooperative Society (‘SCE’) could be 
further considered as instruments for homogenizing bank legal forms across the EU. 
Gustaf Sjoberg credits Prof. Rosa M. Lastra with having once proposed harmonizing the 
EU corporate law for banks with the SE.163  
 
Moreover, the introduction of the SCE seemed to expand the choice for European non-
corporate bank forms. Even though this proposal is worth discussing with greater detail, 
one could argue that imposing a set of homogenous legal forms for arranging banking 
across Europe could contravene some of the EU’s internal market principles – namely 
freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services.  
 
The principle of freedom of establishment is contained in articles 49-55 of the Treaty of 
the Functioning of the European Union (the ‘TFEU’). Article 49 of the TFEU states that: 
‘restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the 
territory of another Member State shall be prohibited’.164 Article 56 of the TFEU 
                                                
163 See Gustaf Sjoberg, ‘Handling Systemically Important Banks in Distress – Some Thoughts 
from a Swedish Perspective’ (2011) 12 European Business Organization Law Review 227, fn 96.  
164 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art 49, 2008 
O.J. C 115/47.  
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establishes that this protection extends to legal persons such as firms and co-operatives165 
against ‘restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of 
any Member State established in the territory of any Member State’.166 The European 
Court of Justice has consistently upheld this protection to firms in some notable cases.167 
In December 2006, a Directive on Services in the Internal Market168 was issued, but it 
excludes financial services from its scope.   
 
3.2. Bank Organizational Forms in Selected European Jurisdictions 
 
This subsection provides a succinct overview of the leading organizational forms used for 
organizing credit institutions across four EU countries: France, Spain, Italy and the UK 
(which at the time of writing, was still a member in spite having celebrated a referendum 
on 23 June 2016, where a majority of voters decided for the UK to leave the EU). The 
objective is to find a common set of functionally equivalent bank legal forms and 
describe their main ownership features. The features of non-corporate bank 
organizational forms are then compared to the salient features of corporate banks. 
 
Historically, a so-called ‘three pillar banking’ model characterized many western 
European countries. This consisted in the existence of private (commercial banks), 
                                                
165 Article 56 of the TFEU states that: ‘[c]ompanies or firms formed in accordance with the law of 
a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of 
business within the Union shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as 
natural persons who are nationals of Member States. “Companies or firms” means companies or 
firms constituted under civil or commercial law, including cooperative societies, and other legal 
persons governed by public or private law, save for those which are non-profit-making’. 
166 TFEU art 49. Regarding the prohibitions or restrictions to the establishment of bank branches 
and subsidiaries see Almudena de la Mata Muñoz ‘The Future of Cross-Border Banking After the 
Crisis: Facing the Challenges Through Regulation and Supervision’ (2010) 11 European Business 
Organization Law Review 575.  
167 Case C-140/03 Commission v Greece [2005] ECR I-3177 §29; Case C-299/02 Commission v 
Netherlands [2004] ECR I-9761 §16; Case 81/87 Daily Mail and General Trust [1988] ECR 
5483; Case C-212/97 Centros [1999] ECR I-1459 para 18; Case C-208/00 Überseering [2002] 
ECR I-9919 para 56. 
168 Directive on Services in the Internal Market 2006/123/EC of 12 December 2006. 
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mutual and cooperative banks, and nonprofit or savings banks.169 Moreover, in spite of 
trends that tried to develop a set of pan-European organizational forms, each member 
country has retained its own sets of legal entities endowed with their own particular rules 
and features.  
 
3.2.1 France  
 
In France, the Financial and Monetary Code (Code Monétaire et Financier) regulates 
credit institutions (établissements de crédit). Articles L511-1 and 311-1 of the Financial 
and Monetary Code define credit institutions as those legal persons that habitually 
perform banking functions comprising: deposit taking from the public, credit operations 
and providing payments services.170 Article L512-1 of the Code Monétaire also 
contemplates the existence of mutual and co-operative banks (banques mutualistes ou 
coopérative).171 The French Commercial Code (Code du Commerce) creates legal 
business forms. The business corporation (société anonyme) is the organizational form of 
choice for most French banks. It is governed by article L225 of the Commercial Code.  
 
French co-operative and mutual banks are organized under Law No. 47-1775 of 10 Sept. 
1947 (and its subsequent modifications).172 The original text of the law reduced the scope 
of co-operatives’ objectives to ‘price reduction, disintermediation, and the improvement 
of the quality of the goods transacted with patrons’. In 1992, a legal reform included ‘the 
                                                
169 Dilek Bülbül, Reinhard Schmidt and Ulrich Schüwer, ‘Caisses D’épargne et Banques 
Coopératives en Europe’ (2013) 111 Revue d'Economie Financière 159.  
170 Article L511-1 states that: ‘[l]es établissements de crédit sont des personnes morales qui 
effectuent à titre de profession habituelle des opérations de banque au sens de l'article L. 311-1’. 
In turn, Article L311-1 defines banking operations as comprising: ‘la réception de fonds 
remboursables du public, les opérations de crédit, ainsi que les services bancaires de paiement’. 
171 Paul Mentré and Antoine Mérieux, Les Institutions D’Épargne en Europe et en France: Le 
Secteur Public et Mutualiste (Association d’Économie Financière 2003). 
172 L. no. 47-1775, 10 sept. 1947 portant statut de la coopération, JO 11 sept., p. 9088. See also L. 
no. 92-643, 13 Juill. 1992 relative a la modernisation des entreprises coopératives, JO 14 juill., p. 
9450.  
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improvement of the needs of their members’ as part of co-operatives’ statutory 
objectives.173   
 
Three types of ownership units represent the funds owned by co-operatives. These 
include: (a) common ownership unit (parts sociales A), (b) preferred ownership units 
(parts a avantage particulier) and (c) priority units without voting rights (parts à intérêt 
prioritaire dépourvues du droit de vote). The terminology is used to distinguish these 
ownership interests to shares and other types of securities issued by joint stock companies 
and limited liability companies.  
 
The members of co-operatives subscribe common ownership units. They carry the right 
to one vote per member – a feature that is common across co-operatives – because of the 
one-vote-per-member principle. Finally, priority units without voting rights are a special 
type of ownership interest aimed at third parties and issued in order to raise funds. As 
their name suggests, they carry no voting rights.174  
 
3.2.2. Spain 
 
There are three main types of credit institutions in Spain.175 These are: corporate banks, 
credit co-operatives (cooperativas de crédito) and the – now almost extinct – savings 
banks (cajas de ahorro). The Bank of Spain (Banco de España) was their common 
supervisor, until the initial phase of the EU’s Banking Union entered into force in 
November 2014.176  
                                                
173 L. no. 92-643, 13 Juill. 1992 relative a la modernisation des entreprises coopératives, JO 14 
juill., p. 9450. 
174 See generally David Hiez, Coopératives: Création, Organisation, Fonctionnement (Editions 
Delmas 2014).  
175 A fourth deposit-taking institution exists, which is the Confederation of Spanish Savings 
Banks (Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros – CECA). This is the governmental 
consultative agency for Spanish cajas de ahorros. In addition to its administrative functions, it is 
authorized to perform certain banking activities. However, it is not included in the functional 
analysis presented due to its administrative features. Neither is the Instituto de Crédito Oficial, 
which is mainly a State or ‘public bank’.   
176 The European Banking Union is the European Commission’s multipronged regulatory 
response to the 2007 financial Crisis. It consists of a ‘single rulebook’, a Single Supervisory 
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Article 2 of the Spanish Banking Law177 requires that banks be organized as business 
corporations (sociedades anónimas) under the Spanish Business Corporations Act 2010 
(Ley de Sociedades de Capital178). Organizationally, Spanish corporate banks have the 
general features that business corporations exhibit. Namely: legal personality, limited 
liability, delegated board management, share alienability and voting rights assigned 
according to the number of shares owned.  
 
Article 129.2 of the Spanish Constitution declares that public authorities commit to 
promoting the co-operative organizational form through adequate legislation.179 Spain has 
both a national Co-operative Law no. 27/1999 as well as regional co-operative statutes 
across all but one of the Spanish Autonomous Communities.180 This means that 
autonomous communities have supplementary regulatory powers over credit co-
operatives operating within their jurisdiction. 
 
Article 104 of the National Co-operative Law No. 27/ 1999 recognizes 
credit co-operatives and points out that they are regulated through 
special rules. Law No. 13/1989 lays out more detailed rules for credit co-
operatives.181 Spanish credit co-operatives have the statutory objective of servicing the 
financial needs of their members and third parties through the exercise of the activities 
undertaken by credit institutions. Law No. 13/1989 on Credit Co-operatives asserts that 
these entities are endowed with their own legal personality and their members also 
                                                
Mechanism (SSM) and a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The latter are compulsory for all 
Euro Area Member States and are open to all other countries in the EU. The SSM became 
operational in November 2014, and since then the European Central Bank (ECB) has become the 
banking supervisor for all banks in the Euro Area. 
177 Real Decreto 1245/1995 of 14 July. As modified by Real Decreto 256/2013, of April 12. 
178 Real Decreto legislativo 1/2010. 
179 Spanish Constitution (Constitución Española), «BOE» No. 311, 29 December 1978. 
180 Carlos Vargas Vasserot, Enrique Gadea Soler and Fernando Sacristán Bergia, Derecho de las 
Sociedades Cooperativas: Introducción, Constitución, Estatuto del Socio y Órganos Sociales (La 
Ley 2014) 63. Only the Canary Islands lack their own Co-operative statute.  
181 As well as by Law No. 27/1999 of 16 de July, which regulates co-operatives in general. 
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benefit from limited liability up to the amount of their individual contributions.182 
Membership in credit co-operatives is open to both individuals and firms.  
 
According to the Spanish Law no. 13/1989 on Credit Co-operatives, members are 
required to subscribe at least one membership share. Pursuant to the default legal 
provisions, each member is entitled to one vote, which is a common voting rule amongst 
co-operatives worldwide. This feature is a major difference between co-ops and 
corporations, where voting rights are typically assigned on a one vote per share basis.  
 
However, the members of Spanish co-operatives can also agree to depart from this 
default voting rights rule by modifying a co-op’s charter in order to assign voting rights 
according to other criteria (eg such as total number of subscribed shares).183 In such 
cases, members’ ownership interests (and votes) are capped at 2.5% and 20% of 
subscribed capital for physical and legal persons, respectively. The rationale behind 
capping votes is to prevent any one member from exercising full control of a co-
operative.  
 
The third type of legal form is the Spanish savings bank. Law No. 26/2013 of 27 
December now regulates the Spanish savings banks called cajas de ahorros.184 The cajas 
have existed and have been regulated in Spain since the 18th century.185 However, as was 
previously mentioned, Spanish savings banks have had many institutional changes 
throughout the years.   
 
Historically, the Spanish cajas originated from thrift pawnbroker institutions called 
montes de piedad, which are associated to catholic Europe.186 Spanish cajas had no 
residual owners, but were rather setup as entities endowed with resources (donations) for 
                                                
182 Law No. 13/1989 on Credit Cooperatives art 1. 
183 Law No. 27/1999 art 107. See also Vargas Vasserot et al. (n 180) 215.  
184 Spanish Law No. 26/2013 of 27 December. 
185 International Monetary Fund, ‘The Reform of Spanish Savings Banks: Technical Note’ (May 
2012). 
186 See Montserrat Carbonell-Esteller, ‘Montes de Piedad and Savings Banks as Microfinance 
Institutions on the Periphery of the Financial System of Mid-Nineteenth-Century Barcelona’ 
(2012) 54 Business History 363. 
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conducting their activities. Like other savings banks across Europe, they were devised as 
nonprofit associations, rooted in specific geographical areas, and with a dual objective of 
providing both services to their clients (retail clients and SMEs) and promoting 
community welfare programs.  
 
The governance structure of the Spanish savings banks experienced many difficulties 
over recent years due to the increasing participation of public administration officers in 
their main governing bodies. Some scholars and commentators point to two specific 
reforms that set the groundwork for their demise. The first came in August 1977, with the 
Royal Decree Law no. 2290/1977, which placed the cajas on equal footing with 
corporate banks. This norm liberalized competition between saving banks and private 
banks by allowing the cajas to grow territorially (instead of being circumscribed to a 
specific location) and also allowed them to offer all of the same products and services 
offered by private corporate banks.   
 
In 1985 the Spanish cajas experienced yet another important transformation through the 
Ley de los Órganos Rectores de las Cajas de Ahorros (commonly known as ‘LORCA’). 
The LORCA introduced the presence of politicians and other local public authorities in 
the boards of the Spanish saving banks. In the words of Martín-Aceñas: ‘The [cajas’] 
boards of directors fell into the hands of the local and regional (Autonomous 
Communities) corporations controlled by the political parties and the trade unions 
connected to them’. According to many commentators, the de-professionalization of the 
management in connection with their peculiar ownerless structures and with the 
elimination of the geographical and functional distinctions that differentiated cajas from 
commercial banks, would lead to severe agency costs during the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis.  
 
Together, the aforementioned legislative changes led to a general watershed of the 
Spanish saving banks during and after the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Their legal and 
institutional form was extensively reformed and one can safely conclude that – with the 
exception of two entities – their original institutional configuration no longer exists.  
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The Spanish cajas currently provide consumer-banking services and also perform 
community welfare activities for the benefit of their depositors, their employees, charities 
or the regions where they operate. However, the banking unit and the entity that does the 
charitable works have been legally separated. Moreover, the ownership and governance 
structure of the Spanish cajas is different to that of other savings associations 
(particularly those in the US). Instead of being owned and controlled by their depositors 
(called impositores in the Spanish legislation), the mayor decision-making body for the 
Spanish cajas de ahorros is an Assembly comprised of 30 to 150 members. These 
members must reflect a caja’s constituencies including: its founding entities, its clients, 
employees and the beneficiaries of its social benefit activities.187  
 
3.2.3. Italy 
 
Article 47 of the Italian Constitution states that the Italian Republic ‘(…) encourages and 
safeguards savings in all forms. It regulates, co-ordinates and oversees the operation of 
credit’.188 The consolidated Legislative Decree issued on 1st September 1993, No. 385 
and its amendments (hereinafter, referred to as the consolidated ‘TUB’ – or Testo Unico 
Bancario) is the primary domestic legislation that organizes banking activities in Italy.189 
Banks are defined as firms authorized to conduct banking activities. In turn, these 
activities are defined by Article 10 of the TUB as taking deposits from the public and 
extending credit. 
 
Before the entry into force of the first phase of the Banking Union in the EU, Italian 
banks were under the joint supervision and oversight of the Bank of Italy (Banca 
d’Italia), the Ministry of Finance and Economy, and the Inter-ministerial Committee for 
                                                
187 Spanish Law No. 26/2013 of 27 December art 4-14.  
188 From the official English translation by the Senate  (Senato della Repubblica). ‘Constitution of 
the Italian Republic’ 
<https://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf> accessed 6 
December 2016. The original version reads: ‘La Repubblica incoraggia e tutela il risparmio in 
tutte le sue forme; disciplina, coordina e controlla l'esercizio del credito’.   
189 Testo Unico delle leggi in materia bancaria e creditizia. Decreto Legislativo 1 Settembre 1993, 
No. 385 (hereinafter, the ‘TUB’). 
  68
Credit and Savings or ‘CICR’ (Comitato interministeriale per il credito e il risparmio). 
These entities are jointly referred to as Credit Authorities throughout the TUB (autorità 
creditizie).190  
 
In order to obtain a banking license, Article 14.1 (a) of the TUB requires that banks adopt 
either the corporate business form (società per azioni) or the limited liability co-operative 
legal form (società cooperative per azioni a responsabilità limitata).191 The latter serves 
as the organizational form of choice for Italian co-operative banks (banche cooperative) 
that operate under two functional licenses: popular banks (banche popolari) and credit 
co-operative banks (banche di credito cooperativo).192  
 
According to the TUB, popular banks (banche popolari) are co-operative banks with 200 
or more members that can offer banking services to the general public. Their shares must 
be issued for EUR 2.00 or more. Each member has one vote, regardless of the number of 
shares that they own. No member can own more than 50% of the subscribed capital of a 
popular bank. In addition, theses entities can be authorized to demutualize in order to 
transform their legal form into business corporations.193  
 
On the other hand, Italian credit co-operative banks (banche di credito cooperativo) are 
co-operative societies with a mutual benefit orientation. They are comprised of 200 or 
more members, and their objective is to provide financial services primarily to their 
membership base.194 Like other co-operatives, members are entitled to exercise one vote, 
regardless of their total shareholding. In these institutions shares must have a face value 
between EUR 25 and EUR 500. Additionally, individual shareholdings cannot exceed 
EUR 50,000. Credit co-operatives banks can also transform their legal and functional 
forms in order to become corporate banks or popular banks.  
                                                
190 TUB arts 2-9. 
191 Additional legal organizational forms are established in the Italian Civil Code. See Codice 
Civile Italiano, R.D. 16 marzo 1942, n 262. Approvazione del testo del Codice Civile, Pubblicato 
nella edizione straordinaria della Gazzetta Ufficiale, n. 79 del 4 aprile 1942. 
192 TUB arts 28-37. 
193 ibid arts 28-32. 
194 The Bank of Italy can waive this restriction for a limited period, attending to stability 
purposes. See TUB art 35.1.   
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A final remark is in place regarding the historical Italian savings banks, called casse di 
risparmio.195 These were nonprofit entities, functionally equivalent to the Spanish cajas 
de ahorros and the French casses d’épargne.  Thus, they constituted the third pillar – or 
nonprofit banks – in the Italian banking system. Because of banking reforms that took 
place in the year 1990 (through the so-called Legge Amato), most of these institutions 
were transformed into corporate banks, under the corporate (società per azioni) legal 
form.196  
 
3.2.4. United Kingdom 
 
In the United Kingdom, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) (as 
amended by the Financial Services Act 2012) does not contain a definition explaining 
what banks are.197 However, the Bank of England’s list of banks (up to February 2016) 
showcases that most authorized institutions were incorporated as either public or private 
business corporations.198 In addition to corporate banks, there are building societies, co-
                                                
195 This chapter does not purport to provide the full historical evolution of banking in each 
analyzed country. As a result, many functional forms of historical importance have been left 
outside of the analysis. In the case of Italy, for example, the monti di credito su pegno and casse 
rurali et artigiane. For a comprehensive historical account see Leonardo Giani, ‘Ownership And 
Control Of Italian Banks: A Short Inquiry Into The Roots Of The Current Context’ (2008) 6 
Corporate Ownership and Control. 
196 See Giani (n 195).   
197 The UK’s Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) defines banks in its Handbook as: ‘(a) 
a firm with a Part 4A permission (under FSMA) which includes accepting deposits and: (i) which 
is a credit institution; or (ii) whose Part 4A permission includes a requirement that it comply with 
the rules in General prudential Sourcebook and the Prudential sourcebook for Banks, Building 
Societies and Investment Firms relating to banks; but which is not a building society, a friendly 
society or a credit union; (b) an EEA bank which is a full credit institution’. References to credit 
institutions mean under Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (Regulation (EU) No 575/2013) and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. 
198 Bank of England, ‘Bank & Building Societies Lists’ (March 2016). 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/authorisations/buildingsocietieslist/buildingsoc
ieties1602.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016. 
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operative banks and credit unions operating in the UK.199 The Prudential Regulatory 
Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) supervise these entities.200 
 
Building societies are currently regulated under the Building Societies Act 1986-1997.201 
They are mutual entities defined as having the principal purpose ‘of making loans which 
are secured on residential property and are funded substantially by its members’.202 As 
their names imply, theses institutions historically emerged and developed as vehicles to 
pool money from their membership base in order allow some of them to save and others 
to take out loans in order to build or purchase their homes. However, today building 
societies are allowed to offer many of the same consumer banking services as corporate 
banks (although many do not provide current accounts). As of 1st August 2016, there 
were 45 building societies in the UK.203  
 
Credit Unions are co-operative societies owned by their members. They are regulated by 
the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965, the Friendly and Industrial and Provident 
Societies Act 1968 and the Credit Unions Act 1979. The Credit Unions Act 1979 defines 
their objects and purposes as: ‘(a) the promotion of thrift among the members of the 
society by the accumulation of their savings; (b) the creation of sources of credit for the 
benefit of the members of the society at a fair and reasonable rate of interest; (c) the use 
and control of the members’ savings for their mutual benefit; and (d) the training and 
education of the members in the wise use of money and in the management of their 
financial affairs’. Membership in a UK credit union is granted upon the fulfillment of 
certain criteria, including a minimum subscription of at least one share. Each share is 
                                                
199 In the insurance sector there are also friendly societies, whose ‘principal purpose must include 
the provision on a mutual basis of insurance against loss of income arising out of sickness, 
unemployment or retirement’. See Paul L Davies and Sarah Worthington, Principles of Modern 
Company Law (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 1-29. 
200 The FCA serves as a registering authority and oversees competition and conduct of business 
rules. The FCA and the PRA are successors of the now extinct Financial Services Authority 
(FSA).  
201 Building societies have been regulated in the UK since an Act of 1874.  
202 Building Societies Act 1986 s 5 (1).  
203 Bank of England, Bank & Building Societies Lists (1st August 2016) 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/authorisations/buildingsocietylist1507.pdf> 
accessed 6 December 2016. 
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denominated with a £1 face value. Shares in a credit union are nontransferable. Each 
member is entitled to one vote in members’ assembly meetings, thus adhering to the 
‘one-vote-per-member’ rule.  
 
In a similar fashion to other European countries, the UK also historically developed a 
three-pillar banking system. The third-pillar was comprised of a group of savings banks 
known as trustee savings banks, which dated back to 1810. Like other nonprofit savings 
banks, British trustee savings banks operated within a specific geographical area, had no 
residual owners and were managed by boards of trustees. In 1986, the group of 
decentralized, regional trustee and savings banks reorganized as a public corporation 
under the name of ‘TSB Group plc’. In 1995, the TSB Group merged with another 
corporate bank and became known as Lloyd’s TSB, thus ending the era of savings banks 
in the UK.    
 
3.3.  Bank Organizational Forms in the United States (US) 
 
The US law of business associations is largely a matter of state jurisdiction.204 Each state 
has its own statutes covering several basic forms, such as: business corporations, 
partnerships, co-operatives, nonprofits, amongst others. There are two notable exceptions 
to this rule. First, some firms – including banks – can be federally chartered. Secondly, 
the issue and public offering of securities falls under the jurisdiction of federal law. In 
this sense, companies and banks listed in the securities markets are subject to federal 
regulations.205 
 
The banking licensing scheme for US banks follows this federal-state duality. However, 
it is much more complex than the EU system. Some banks are licensed under state law 
(‘state banks’), while others are chartered under federal law (‘national banks’). The 
                                                
204 Which has been revised by the Building Societies Act 1997, by the FSMA 2000 and by the 
Financial Services Act 2012. 
205 This includes corporate banks that list and issue shares, but can also include mutual societies 
and co-operative banks that issue debt instruments.  
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official organizational form designation for corporate, federally chartered banks is 
‘National Associations’ or ‘N.A.’. These entities are chartered and regulated by the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The Federal Deposits Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) insures deposits across both national and state banks. This duality is 
associated with some of the historical developments of US banking laws.  
 
In addition to investor-owned banks, there are three ownership structures for US banks: 
mutual savings banks, mutual savings and loans associations (MSLAs) and credit 
unions.206 As Henry Hansmann indicates, mutual savings banks (hereinafter, ‘US mutual 
savings banks’) have a misleading name.207 In spite of having the word ‘mutual’ in their 
denomination, these entities are described as commercial nonprofit banking institutions. 
US mutual savings banks do not have owners and are often managed by self-perpetuating 
boards of directors.208 Credit unions and MSLAs are the final pair of US bank forms. 
Both are customer-owned co-operative societies.  
 
3.4. Summary of the Cross-Border Comparative Analysis  
 
In the analyzed selected jurisdictions banks are typically incorporated entities (eg they are 
not sole proprietorships209 nor joint ventures). Nowadays, commercial banks are seldom 
organized as partnerships, limited partnerships210 or other related forms of producer or 
employee-owned business associations.211 Despite of the existing variety of bank 
denominations and functions across the studied countries, the legal forms analyzed can be 
categorized into three main types of organizational forms. These are: (1) investor-owned 
                                                
206 Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (n 143) 246-264.  
207 ibid. 
208 Henry Hansmann, ‘The Economic Role of Commercial Nonprofits: the Evolution of the US 
Savings Banks Industry’ in H Anheier and W Seibel (eds) The Third Sector: Comparative Studies 
of Nonprofit Organizations (de Gruyter 1989). 
209 Even though a corporate bank can have a single major shareholder (like a bank holding 
company or an institutional shareholder, such as a pension fund or a private equity fund). A bank 
could also entirely own its subsidiaries.  
210 For example, limited partnerships (LPs), which are commonplace organizational forms for 
structuring private equity funds and also hedge funds.  
211 Such as limited liability companies (LLCs), limited liability partnerships (LLPs) and limited 
liability limited partnerships (LLLPs). 
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corporate banks212, (2) customer-owned mutual and co-operative banks, and (3) 
commercial nonprofit or ownerless savings banks (in the fashion of the Spanish cajas or 
US mutual savings banks), which are increasingly less common.  
 
This finding is consistent with the existence of the so-called ‘three pillar banking model’ 
that is characteristic of many European countries. Moreover, in most of the studied 
jurisdictions, specialized laws exist that regulate the creation and the features of the 
different types of legal organizational forms. Each jurisdiction has its own legal rules 
governing the creation of business corporations as well as co-operatives, mutual societies 
and nonprofit entities. This entails, that for example, in spite of the Spanish sociedad 
anónima being functionally equivalent to the English business corporation, it does not 
mean that both are regulated by identical rules. The same caveat applies to other types of 
bank legal forms.   
 
In terms of size and performance, the participation of non-corporate banks across 
European countries is not negligible. For example, according to the European Association 
of Co-Operative Banks (EACB), in 2015 french co-operative banks serviced 115,700 
clients, had over 326,800 full time employees, and commanded around 61.4% of the 
domestic market share of deposits and around 59% of the domestic market share for 
loans. In the UK, building societies serviced around 22.4 MM clients and held 18.3% of 
the domestic market share of deposits. While in other countries not specifically analyzed 
in this chapter, like Germany and Austria, co-operative banks are also relevant 
participants, commanding around 21.0% and 30.3%, respectively, of the market share in 
domestic deposits.213  
 
Corporate banks are owned by their shareholders. Equity holders are entitled to residual 
value and are typically granted voting rights on a ‘one-vote-per-share’ basis. In corporate 
                                                
212 Which can be a listed (public) company or a closely held corporation.  
213 See European Association of Co-Operative Banks, ‘Key Statistics as of 31-12-15’ available 
online at: 
http://v3.globalcube.net/clients/eacb/content/medias/key_figures/20161124_final__final_tias_eac
b_2015_key_statistics.pdf accessed 6 December 2016.  
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banks, the owners need not transact with the corporation in order to receive a return for 
their investments. This means that bank shareholders are capital providers, and they are 
not required to be customers. In fact, modern financial regulations limit many 
transactions between banks and their major shareholders (related party transaction 
prohibitions). Capital flexibility is one of the major advantages that corporate banks are 
said to have over other organizational forms. This is because they can raise capital in 
order to expand their operations by selling shares to their existing shareholders (eg 
through a ‘rights issue’) or to the general public. Paradoxically, this feature can become 
impaired in the event of insolvency or financial distress, when fresh capital could be 
needed the most.  
 
As the cross-country comparative analysis shows, the capital of some co-operative banks 
and credit unions can also be divided into shares or other type of ownership units. 
However, voting rights in co-ops are often capped at a maximum number of votes per 
member or are based on a ‘one-vote-per-member’ voting rule. Across jurisdictions, co-
operative banks also follow the International Co-Operative Alliance’s ‘Co-operative 
Principles’.214 
 
Mutual banks (such as building societies in the UK) are typically funded by deposits and 
retained earnings. One feature of some mutual banks is that their capital is not always 
divided into shares held by their depositors-members. Rather deposits form part of their 
equity capital, and all depositors jointly own this asset pool.   
 
The members of co-operative banks are often entitled to receive part of the earnings of 
the bank in proportion to their ownership interest. This means in proportion to their 
contribution and the use of the bank’s services (eg their shareholding). The situation can 
                                                
214 These principles are: ‘(1) Voluntary and Open Membership, (2) Democratic Member Control, 
(3) Member Economic Participation, (4) Autonomy and Independence, (5) Education, Training 
and Information, (6) Co-operation among Co-operatives, and  (7) Concern for Community’. See 
International Co-Operative Alliance, ‘Co-Operative Principles’ <http://ica.coop/en/whats-co-
op/co-operative-identity-values-principles> accessed 6 December 2016. See also the ILO’s 
Recommendation Concerning Promotion of Cooperatives n 193 (n 128).   
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be different in some mutual and nonprofit banks, where depositors are fixed claimants 
and receive a specific amount of interest on their savings. In some mutual entities, 
depositors do not have an individualized ownership interest (like shareholders and co-
operative members do). Instead, depositors-members in mutual societies commonly own 
the pool of resources that the entity is endowed with and also get to vote in meetings.  
 
Moreover, in both co-operative and mutual banks, ownership and membership are 
conflated. This means that members-depositors are the residual owners and the residual 
risk-bearers of the firms. In addition, membership affiliations are often established based 
on a common linkage – or ‘unity of interest’ – between members.  
 
Finally, commercial nonprofit or savings banks are ownerless (or self owned) entities. 
This means that their depositors are not entitled to residual claims and generally do not 
have voting rights to elect directors and decide on important matters. Some of the 
examples studied include the Mutual Savings Banks in the US, and to a certain extent, the 
pre-crisis structure for the Spanish cajas de ahorros, which are now nearly extinct.  
 
Nonprofit banks typically pay depositors fixed interest on their savings. In addition, they 
have legal statutory distribution constraints (ie do not distribute earnings) and instead 
profits are continually reinvested in order to purse the organization’s objectives – which 
often include, social benefit or charitable activities. In addition, self-perpetuating boards 
of directors (or trustees) manage these entities, making them susceptible to specific types 
of agency problems. Table 2 summarizes the previously described findings of the 
comparative analysis. 
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Table 2 
Summary of Existing Types of Bank Organizational Forms in Selected Jurisdictions 
 
  
INVESTOR-
OWNED  
 
CUSTOMER-
OWNED 
CO-OPERATIVE 
AND MUTUAL 
BANKS 
 
NONPROFIT 
BANKS 
 
FRANCE 
 
Société anonyme (S.A.) 
 
Banques mutualistes 
and Banques 
coopératives  
 
Caisses/ associations 
d'épargne et de crédit 
 
ITALY 
 
Società per azioni 
(S.p.A.) 
Banche Popolare and 
Banche di Credito 
Cooperativo (BCC) 
 
 
Casse di risparmio 
 
SPAIN 
Sociedad Anónima 
(S.A.) 
Cooperativas de crédito Cajas de Ahorros 
 
UK 
Public limited 
company (p.l.c.) 
Private limited 
company (Co. or Ltd.) 
 
Building societies  
Co-operative banks 
Credit Unions 
 
  
Trustee savings banks 
 
US 
 
Public and private 
corporate banks (Corp. 
or Inc.) 
National Associations 
N.A. 
Corporate Savings 
Banks 
 
Co-operative banks 
Mutual Savings and 
Loans Associations 
(MSLAs) 
Credit Unions 
 
 
Mutual Savings Banks  
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4. THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF BANK LEGAL FORMS 
 
Having identified and described the three main categories of organizational forms used 
for arranging banking activities across several leading jurisdictions, the following section 
compares their main attributes. The corporate form is used as a baseline for the 
comparison, since it is the best-known and most widely studied legal form.  
 
Several leading corporate law academics agree that the flagship characteristics that 
business corporations exhibit across several jurisdictions are: ‘(a) legal personality, (b) 
limited liability, (c) share transferability, (d) centralized management under a board 
structure; and (e) shared ownership by contributors of capital’.215 This ‘corporate 
anatomy’ has served to differentiate the business corporation from other types of 
organizational forms. Existing legal vehicles for structuring enterprise, like co-operatives 
and mutual associations, often combine or substitute variations of these attributes. 
Moreover, these features have important economic implications that characterize and 
distinguish different types of legal organizations.  
 
The aforementioned features of the corporation are also strongly intertwined. For 
example, legal personality (‘entity shielding’) and limited liability (‘owner shielding’) are 
considered two sides of the same coin – known as ‘asset partitioning’ – by a notable 
strand of the law and economics literature.216 In addition, ownership structure, share 
transferability and voting rights are related to how funds are raised and combined, how 
board members are elected as well as with corporate governance features across different 
types of banks. Furthermore, limited liability and the unrestricted transferability of shares 
                                                
215 Kraakman et al. (n 137) 5-16. Steven Bainbridge considers six very similar attributes, namely: 
‘(a) formal creation, (b) legal personality, (c) separation of ownership and control, (d) indefinite 
duration, (e) transferability and (f) limited liability’. Bainbridge, Corporate Law (n 120) 1-8. For 
a discussion on the development of these core characteristics, see Andreas Cahn and David C 
Donald, Comparative Company Law – Text and Cases on the Laws Governing Corporations in 
Germany, the UK and the USA (CUP 2010) 9-11.  
216 See Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’ 
(2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 387; Henry Hansmann and R Kraakman, ‘Organizational Law as 
Asset Partitioning’ (2000) 44 European Economic Review 807. Much of the following discussion 
draws on the ‘asset partitioning’ framework set forth in these seminal articles.  
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are recognized to allow investors to diversify risks without compromising their general 
property.217 Thus, it is often the case that whenever discussing these features in the 
context of any type of legal organization one tends to jump from one to the other, 
describing how they interplay with each other.  
 
Since banks are not always organized under the corporate form, it is useful to analyze if 
and how the referenced attributes are bundled across non-joint stock banks such as co-
operatives, mutual associations and nonprofit banks. More importantly, the various 
combinations of these attributes (or the lack thereof) could interact differently with 
financial regulations – such as deposit protection insurance, for example – and could lead 
to diverse economic incentive structures and consequences for constituents in each type 
of bank.  
 
In turn, the analysis of each one of the aforementioned attributes is carried out. The 
differences in these attributes are identified and described across corporate, co-operative, 
mutual and nonprofit banks. The chapter then explains if and how these structural 
differences matter for the design of financial regulation.    
 
4.1. Legal Personality (Entity Shielding) 
 
Incorporated and chartered banks typically have a standalone legal personality.218 The 
same can be said of bank subsidiaries and affiliates that form part of a wider group 
comprised of different legal entities. Thus, legal personality cannot be considered to be 
an exclusive attribute of banks organized as business corporations, but is rather a 
common feature of several bank legal forms – including co-operatives, mutual and 
nonprofit associations.    
 
                                                
217 In Henry Manne’s words: ‘(…) the concept of limited liability also flows logically from the 
concept of the corporation as a capital-raising mechanisms’. See Henry Manne, ‘Our Two 
Corporation Systems: Law and Economics’ (1967) 53(2) Virginia Law Review 259. 
218 Bank branches and unincorporated representative offices are typical exceptions to this.  
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Having a stand-alone legal personality implies being a ‘subject of law’ – or put 
differently, having rights and obligations, being able to own property, capacity to enter 
into contracts, having standing to sue and be sued in court, etc. It also entails that 
incorporated banks have a different legal personality to their employees, managers and 
their residual owners219 (eg shareholders in the case of corporate banks, and depositors-
members in the case of co-operative and mutual banks). In other words, incorporated 
banks have their own identity, which is different to the identity of other entities within a 
banking group. Legal personality allows different constituents to use a bank as a 
‘common contracting party’.220  
 
Treating banks – and entities in general – as persons is often described as a ‘legal fiction’ 
or convention that results from organizational laws, like corporate statutes, co-operative 
laws or the laws of mutual associations. Eric Orts considers that: ‘firms exist as legal 
“entities” and “persons” because statutes and courts have recognized them as such for 
centuries and continue to do so today in almost all modern societies’.221 As Orts adds, in 
spite of the use of the term ‘fiction’, the consequences of the recognition of banks as 
persons are very real.222 Once a group of constituents – like shareholders or members – 
follow the rules to incorporate a joint-stock company or mutual association, and that 
entity then obtains a charter or license as a credit institution, the resulting bank operates 
as a distinct person, legally recognized by depositors, other banks, regulators, 
supervisors, courts, etc.223  
 
According to one strand of the law and economics literature, organizational laws provide 
two important functions. Firstly, organizational laws create a menu of different types of 
off-the-rack standard forms that allow economic agents to organize their enterprises and 
be recognized as standalone subjects of law, which can enter into contracts and own 
                                                
219 Bainbridge (n 120) 2. The seminal case in English Law that recognizes the separate and 
distinct legal personality of corporations and their owners is Salomon v Salomon & Co. [1897] 
AC 22 HL.  
220 A concept used by Hansmann, ‘Ownership and Organizational Form’ (n 148) 6.  
221 Eric W Orts, Business Persons: A Legal Theory of the Firm (OUP 2013) 28.  
222 ibid. 
223 Orts (n 221) 32.  
  80
property.224 Secondly, organizational laws allow establishing patterns of creditors’ rights 
over the assets of a firm.225 Typically, these contractual and ownership patterns are 
deviations from the default rules of creditor rank under the existing legislation. This is 
called ‘entity shielding’ or ‘affirmative asset partitioning’ in the literature.226 Entity 
shielding is an economic consequence of having a legal personality. Together with 
limited liability (also called ‘owner shielding’ or ‘defensive asset partitioning’), entity 
shielding forms the ‘asset partitioning’ framework.227   
 
In the words of Hansmann and Kraakman, entity shielding: ‘(…) not only assigns to the 
corporation’s creditors a prior claim on corporate assets, but also provides that, if a 
shareholder becomes insolvent, the shareholder’s personal creditors cannot force 
liquidation of corporate assets to satisfy their claims upon exhausting the shareholder’s 
personal assets’.228 According to the ‘asset partitioning’ framework, two consequences 
stem from entity shielding: ‘creditor priority’ and so-called ‘liquidation protection’. In 
turn, both creditor rank and liquidation protection are analyzed for the specific case of 
bank legal forms.  
 
R. Kraakman et al., explain that having a standalone legal personality implies: ‘(…) the 
demarcation of a pool of assets that are distinct from the assets owned, singly or jointly, 
by the firm’s owners’.229 For banks, entity shielding means that the assets of the banks 
                                                
224 The seminal article presenting this framework is Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, 
‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’ (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 387. Further building 
blocks are found in Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘Organizational Law as Asset 
Partitioning’ (2000) 44 European Economic Review 807; Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman 
and Richard Squire, ‘Law and the Rise of the Firm’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 1333; 
Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman and Richard Squire, ‘The New Business Entities in 
Evolutionary Perspective’ (2007) 8 European Business Organization Law Review 59. See also H 
Hansmann and U Mattei, ‘The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic 
Analysis’ (1998) 73 New York University Law Review 434. See also: Henry Hansmann and 
Richard Squire, ‘External and Internal Asset Partitioning: Corporations and Their Subsidiaries’ in 
Jeffrey N Gordon and Wolf-Georg Ringe (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and 
Governance (forthcoming OUP 2017). 
225 ibid. See also Bainbridge (n 120) 3. 
226 ibid. 
227 ibid. 
228 Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’ (n 224). 
229 Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law (n 137) 6. 
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are different to the assets and the property of their residual owners – eg shareholders, in 
the case of corporate banks, or depositors-members, in the case of mutual and co-
operative banks.230 While for the case of nonprofit or savings banks, partitioned assets 
have no owners, but rather beneficiaries or beneficial owners (or can be seen as being self 
owned from the perspective of the nonprofit bank).231 In any case, such assets are distinct 
from the assets of a nonprofit bank’s founding patrons and also to the property of their 
beneficiaries or beneficial owners.  
 
The creditor priority that results from ‘entity shielding’ is also relevant when referring to 
cross-border banking groups, comprised of multiple standalone legal entities that can be 
incorporated in different jurisdictions.232 Each legal entity within a group will be entitled 
to its own assets and will have its own priority of creditors with varying hierarchies. In 
principle, the assets of each entity are preferentially ‘pledged’ for that entity’s creditors – 
shielding such assets from the claims of the creditors of other group entities (including 
parent and sibling entities) as well as from the claims of the creditors of their owners, 
directors and managers. Thus the entity shielding (priority and liquidation protection) that 
results from having a legal personality is an important organizational feature that can 
have significant legal and economic consequences relevant to cross-border bank 
resolution processes, as well as for several structural banking reforms – like bank ring-
fencing proposals in the UK (as further discussed in chapters five and six, respectively).  
 
In spite of entity shielding being a common feature of all major bank organizational 
forms, creditor rank or priority rules vary across different types of banks. This is because 
the constituents for different types of bank legal forms also vary. For example, corporate 
banks have shareholders as residual owners (including common and preferred 
shareholders) alongside creditors (secured and unsecured) – and depositors (a special 
type of unsecured bank creditor).  
                                                
230 Kraakman et al. state that this creditor priority rule is ‘shared by all modern legal forms for 
enterprise organization’. ibid 7.  
231 Hansmann, ‘Ownership and Organizational Form’ (n 148).  
232 For a recent discussion of the implications see Hansmann and Squire ‘External and Internal 
Asset Partitioning’ (n 224). 
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On the other hand, in the case of co-operative and mutual banks there is a conflation 
between residual owners and depositors – implying that the creditor rank in these 
customer-owned entities is different to the creditor rank that corporate banks exhibit. The 
same applies to nonprofit banks that have no residual owners. These differences are 
further discussed under section 4.3 below.  
 
Moreover, creditor rank can also be altered through legal rules that explicitly change the 
loss-bearing order of different bank constituents. Creditor rank can sometimes also be 
contractually agreed (eg offer and subscription of subordinate bonds).   
 
The second consequence that stems from entity shielding is ‘liquidation protection’. In 
the context of banks – and paraphrasing the language used by Hansmann and Kraakman – 
liquidation protection implies that if a bank’s owner (ie an investor, a holding or parent 
company) or other group entities become insolvent, the owner’s personal creditors (or the 
personal creditors of other group entities) cannot force liquidation of the bank and its 
assets in order to satisfy their claims once the owner’s assets have been exhausted.233  
 
A stylized example could further help explain how creditor rank and liquidation 
protection play out in the case of cross-border banking conglomerates. Assuming that 
‘XYZ Bank Holding Company’ wholly owns and operates three incorporated banking 
subsidiaries across different countries: ‘X Bank Plc’, ‘Y Co-operative Bank’ and ‘Z Bank 
Limited’. Figure 2 depicts the simplified organizational chart of XYZ Bank Holding 
Company. 
 
Each one of the four legal entities in this example has its own hierarchy of personal 
creditors, which can include (insured and uninsured) depositors, bondholders, central 
banks, etc. Thus if ‘X Bank Plc’ enters into financial distress and ceases to honor its 
deposits, unpaid depositors cannot expect ‘Z Bank Limited’ to payout their deposits – 
even taking into account that both entities are part of the same banking group. Thus, the 
                                                
233 Hansmann and Kraakmann, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’ (n 224).  
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assets of ‘Bank X plc’ serve to bond its obligations vis-à-vis its depositors and creditors, 
while the assets of ‘Z Bank Limited’ are pledged for the benefit of its own creditors.   
 
Turning to liquidation protection, and using the same setup, if ‘XYZ Bank Holding Co.’ 
enters into financial distress, its unpaid creditors cannot forcibly liquidate its banking 
subsidiaries in order for ‘XYZ Bank Holding Company’ to get its residual property back 
(assuming a positive residual value) and then trying to claim that residual value in order 
to satisfy existing debts. In that way, the assets of a legal entity are protected (for the 
benefit of its own creditors) against forced liquidation for the sole purpose that its 
owners’ creditors can satisfy their claims.  
 
Figure 2 
Liquidation Protection and Creditor Rank 
 
4.2. Limited Liability (Owner Shielding) 
 
Limited liability has always been considered to be a salient feature of the business 
corporation, since it originally became commonplace in corporate statutes around the mid 
XYZ Bank Holding 
Company 
X Bank Plc Y Co-operative Bank Z Bank Limited 
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19th century.234 Limited liability has been called a ‘fundamental principle of corporate 
law’235 – especially with the objective of better distinguishing the corporation limited by 
shares from other competing business forms that lacked this feature, such as unlimited 
liability general partnerships and sole proprietorships.236 Thus, limited liability has been 
extensively studied in the context of corporate law.  
 
When referring specifically to banks and their constituents, limited liability ‘is an 
attribute of the investment’ rather than of the entity.237 It entails that residual owners (eg 
shareholders and depositors-members) are not liable for banks’ debts. Unless the law or 
courts allow it, bank creditors cannot try to satisfy their claims against a bank’s 
owners.238 However, banks’ residual owners are not the only investors that benefit from 
limited liability. Fixed claimants, like unsecured depositors and bondholders, only risk 
losing whatever amount they have invested in a bank.  
 
Limited liability is a feature shared by co-operative, mutual and nonprofit banks. When a 
co-operative or a mutual bank’s liabilities exceed its assets, its depositors-members 
typically do not have a legal obligation to respond to the entity’s creditors with their 
personal assets.239 Attempting to collect debts owned by a co-operative or a mutual bank 
                                                
234 Since the XVI century special statutes granted limited liability to companies and guilds 
chartered by monarchies for conducting business, trade and exploration in overseas territories (eg 
The East India Company), it took several centuries for limited liability to become readily 
available to all incorporated entities. Such was the case of the limited liability partnership (en 
commandite) in the French Code de Commerce, the first limited liability company statute in New 
York in 1811, and the Limited Liability Act 1855, in Britain. See Christine E Amsler, Robin L 
Barlett and Craig J Bolton, ‘Thoughts of Some British Economists on Early Limited Liability and 
Corporate Legislation’ (1981) 13 (4) History of Political Economy 774.  See also S M Bainbridge 
and M T Henderson, Limited Liability: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Elgar 2016), 
235 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, ‘Limited Liability and the Corporation’ (1985) 52 
University of Chicago Law Review 89. 
236 Roberta Romano, Foundations of Corporate Law (2nd edn, Lexis Nexis 2013) 61. 
237 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard 
University Press 1996) 11.  
238 A discussion on ‘corporate veil piercing’ and other exceptions to the limited liability of banks 
is included under chapter six.  
239 For some unlimited liability co-operatives, members can be jointly and severally liable for the 
co-operative’s debts. 
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from depositors could be prohibitively expensive or simply unfeasible.240 Depositors-
members could be geographically dispersed or insolvent.241 What is more, depositor 
protection insurance schemes, which are commonplace in many jurisdictions, tend to 
further safeguard depositors – who residually own co-operative and mutual banks – from 
losses. Thus there is a certain duality regarding whether depositors-members in mutual 
and co-operative banks should be treated like residual owners or as insured creditors. The 
same can be said of nonprofit banks, which by definition lack owners for creditors to 
chase, but that have directors and can also have beneficiaries.   
 
The fact that most corporate, mutual, co-operative and nonprofit banks enjoy limited 
liability has several implications. Foremost, from the academic literature it is well 
established that limited liability can potentially externalize risks242 and can also be a 
source of moral hazard for firms’ residual owners and managers.243 Owner limited 
liability (‘owner shielding’) shifts some of the risk of business failure to creditors.244 The 
aforementioned externality problem can affect banks’ involuntary creditors the worst – eg 
deposit insurers and taxpayers in the case of bank bailouts – because unlike bank 
bondholders or depositors, they have not consented (ex ante) to shouldering the costs of 
bank failure.  
 
The externality and moral hazard problems previously discussed can be exacerbated by 
banks’ leverage structures and the ‘too-big-to’ set of problems (‘too-big-to-fail’, ‘too-big-
to-save’, ‘too-big-to-resolve’, etc.) that have become prominent in recent years. Leverage 
refers to how much debt (borrowed funds) banks have in proportion to the amount of 
their own funds – or ‘bonding assets’ contributed by banks’ owners. Excessive leverage 
                                                
240 While referring specifically to investors in public corporations, Henry Manne stated: ‘There 
are practical difficulties as well, since the costs involved in assessing and collecting fractional 
liabilities from large numbers of small investors might frequently be greater than the anticipated 
recovery’. The preceding analysis can also be extended to the case of depositors-members in co-
operative and mutual banks. See Manne (n 217).  
241 ibid. The same reasoning applies to shareholders in corporate banks. 
242 Romano (n 236).  
243 ibid. 
244 Easterbrook and Fischel ‘Limited Liability and the Corporation’ (n 235). See also Manne 
(217).  
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occurs because banks fund themselves mainly with deposits and other liabilities, and they 
often have a larger amount of borrowed funds than the sum of their own funds (capital). 
As C Hadjiemmanuil argues, as a bank’s equity is depleted (its net worth approaches 
zero) the shareholders, owners and managers ‘could have incentives lead them to gamble 
for resurrection, because they have very little to lose and everything to gain by 
speculating with the resources still left under their control’.245   
  
Limited liability also has benefits. It is generally considered to reduce the cost of capital 
for public corporations and allows for risk diversification.246 These benefits are closely 
linked to how residual property and income stream rights are legally characterized and 
whether they are transferable or not. For example, the fact that the capital of publicly 
owned corporations is divided into transferable securities called shares, means that these 
shares can be listed and traded in securities markets.247 
 
Co-operative banks can also have their capital divided by shares (or other types of 
ownership units), but these shares are often not assignable and are also subject to 
particular voting rules – like the ‘one-vote-per-member’ rule or capped voting rights at a 
maximum number of votes per member. The differences in the bundles of economic and 
political rights that shares in a corporate bank and shares in a co-operative bank have, 
imply different incentive structures for the owners of each type of entity – as is further 
discussed under section 4.3.  
 
The previously described situation contrasts sharply with the situation of mutual and 
nonprofit banks. In the case of mutual banks (eg building societies), which often do not 
issue shares, ownership is characterized by keeping a minimum balance deposited with 
the bank during a particular timeframe. Deposits are not transferable in the same way that 
                                                
245 Christos Hadjiemmanuil, ‘Special Resolution Regimes for Banking Organizations: Objectives 
and Limitations’ in Wolf-Georg Ringe and Peter M Huber (eds) Legal Challenges in the Global 
Financial Crisis: Bail-outs, the Euro and Regulation (Hart Publishing 2014). 
246 Easterbrook and Fischel ‘Limited Liability and the Corporation’ (n 235). 
247 The shares of banks setup as close corporations are also transferable, but their transferability 
can be restricted in their bylaws or articles of incorporation (eg through preemption rights, rights 
of first refusal, etc.).  
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shares are (ie you cannot assign your savings account). On the far end of the spectrum, 
nonprofit banks, like the Spanish cajas de ahorros, lack owners. However, depositors and 
other beneficiaries are limitedly liable in those capacities.  
 
Even though entity shielding and limited liability (‘owner shielding’) are both sides of the 
same ‘asset partitioning’ coin, they have very distinctive implications.248 The difference 
between both types of asset partitioning lies in that: ‘entity shielding protects the assets of 
the firm from the creditors of the firm’s owners, while limited liability protects the assets 
of the firm’s owners from the claims of the firm’s creditors’.249 This is why often entity 
shielding is described as the exact opposite of limited liability.250  
 
When referring to the particular context of commercial banking, the latter differences can 
be characterized in the following way: entity shielding (legal personality) protects a 
bank’s assets from the claims of the creditors of a bank’s owners251; while the owner 
shielding provided by limited liability protects the property rights of a bank’s owners 
(shareholders, depositors-members) from the claims of the bank’s creditors. All of the 
identified organizational forms that are predominant in banking today have ‘strong form’ 
owner shielding and provide ‘strong to complete levels’ of entity shielding, according to 
the taxonomy used under the asset partitioning framework.252  
 
However, as stated before, creditor ranks vary across bank legal forms and this should be 
taken into account whenever designing financial regulations that either hinge on or 
change these pecking orders.  
 
 
 
                                                
248 Hansmann and Kraakman (n 224) 
249 Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law (n 137) 10. 
250 ibid. See also Hansmann and Kraakman (n 224).  
251 Owners are shareholders in the case of corporations and depositors in the case of co-ops and 
mutual societies.  
252 See Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman and Richard Squire, ‘Law and the Rise of the Firm’ 
(2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 1333. 
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4.3. Shared Ownership by Contributors of Capital  
 
As has been described in the preceding comparative analysis, the ownership structure of 
corporate and non-corporate banks is diverse. This is mainly because the legal 
characterization of residual ownership varies across different types of banks. Thus, 
examining the ownership structure of diverse bank legal forms can provide useful 
insights into the relationship between legal form and financial regulation.  
 
Shareholders own both private and listed corporate banks. In the case of corporate banks, 
depositors and shareholders are typically two different groups of stakeholders. This 
means that there is a separation between ‘ownership and consumption’.253  
 
Shareholders are investors that contribute capital of the highest loss absorbency through 
the subscription of common or preferred (preference) shares. They can have a different 
risk profile to depositors. Common shareholders do not have a right to automatic income 
– like depositors and other fix claimants in corporate banks typically have. Thus, if 
dividends are not distributed, a corporate bank does not enter into default. Moreover, in 
many countries dividend payments are not tax deductible (while interest payments 
typically are).   
 
Because of limited liability, bank shareholders have a ‘loss floor’ of a threshold of 
downside risk, but also an unlimited potential upside. This contrasts sharply with 
depositors, who are often (at least) partially insured. Banks can have several classes and 
types of shareholders – including those that own preferred (or preference) shares, which 
receive fixed dividends and are ‘senior’ (eg they get paid first) to common shareholders 
during liquidation and dividend payments (but are ‘junior’ to bank creditors, like 
depositors). Common shareholders are the last to get paid, pro rata, upon liquidation, 
should any residual value exist after all of a bank’s creditors have been fully paid. Bank 
shareholders are also the first to endure the full brunt of losses whenever they occur.   
                                                
253 Henry Hansmann and Mariana Pargendler, ‘The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: 
Separation of Ownership and Consumption’ (2014) 123 Yale Law Journal 948. 
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One cannot speculate nor generalize regarding the identities, characteristics and the risk 
profile of corporate banks’ shareholders. Bank ownership can be at the hands of a 
reduced number of private investors (block-holders), wholly owned by a bank holding 
company, or it can be dispersed and atomized through small shareholdings across one or 
more jurisdictions. Bank shareholders can be individuals or small investors, but they 
could also be sophisticated institutional investors (like hedge funds, private equity funds, 
pension or sovereign wealth funds), a bank parent company or even a varying mix of 
different types of economic agents. Moreover, as investors, shareholders could either be 
risk neutral, risk loving or risk averse.  
 
On the other hand, co-operative and mutual banks are owned by their depositors-
members. Co-operative members can be fixed claimants (eg receive passive interest rate 
payments on their deposits) and at the same time can receive additional dividend 
payments whenever profits exist and are distributed. Co-operative [and mutual banks] are 
‘funded to a larger extent by retail deposits and to a lesser extent by wholesale funding in 
comparison with all other banks’.254  
 
In the case of mutual associations, profits tend to accrue for the benefit of the bank’s 
equity and are not distributed individually to depositors-members. In such cases, 
depositors-members typically get compensated through interest payments on their 
deposits – under market conditions that can be no more advantageous than the 
remuneration that depositors in corporate banks receive.255 Unlike common shareholders 
– who do not have an automatic right to income – depositors have a legal recourse to 
claim interest payments when they are due.    
 
                                                
254 See Hans Groeneveld ‘A Snapshot of European Co-operative Banking’ (April 2016) 14  
<http://www.globalcube.net/clients/eacb/content/medias/publications/annual_reports/20160411_
HG_EACB_FINAL_Snapshot.pdf > accessed 6 December 2016. 
255 From the perspective of the bank, this characterization can also have some tax implications as 
interest payments are typically tax deductible, while dividend payments are not.  
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These differences between how ownership is legally characterized across different bank 
legal forms are subtle – but nonetheless – important. Mainly, they are important because 
they are directly linked to banks’ capital structures and can also have implications for 
consumer protection. The identity of banks’ owners can also be relevant when 
governments and politicians decide on whether to bailout banks or grant them other 
forms of state aid. For example, regulators could feel more inclined to inject capital into a 
bank owned by domestic pensioners than one owned by a foreign sovereign wealth fund.  
 
A bank’s capital structure refers to the mix of own funds (capital) and borrowed funds 
(liabilities) that they combine in order to conduct their activities. Residual owners – eg 
depositors, for customer-owned banks; or shareholders, in the case of corporate banks – 
endow banks with the capital and funds that they dedicate to their operations. Moreover, 
depositors (in corporate banks) and other types of creditors provide funds that form part 
of banks’ liabilities. It is well known, that capital, liquidity and leverage are critical for 
banks.256  
 
Moreover, as is further discussed in chapter four, when referring to banks, the word 
‘capital’ carries a very specific meaning. It is more than just the difference between the 
assets and liabilities that appear in banks’ balance sheets. Financial regulators and 
supervisors – under the influence of the Basel Committee – define what bank capital is. 
This definition has traditionally included both equity components  – like common shares 
and retained earnings – as well as certain debt instruments, like subordinated (or ‘junior’) 
debt securities or contingent capital instruments (‘CoCos’).257  
 
Capital formation, expansion and maintenance is directly linked to the legal 
characteristics of different bank organizational forms. It is often assumed that all banks 
issue shares or other types of securities that contribute to capital formation or that 
                                                
256 As is further analyzed in Chapter four, which studies the relationship between bank capital 
rules and ownership structure. 
257 CoCos are ‘hybrid capital securities that absorb losses in accordance with their contractual 
terms when the capital of the issuing bank falls below a certain level’. See Stefan Avdjiev, 
Anastasia Kartasheva and Bilyana Bogdanova, ‘Cocos: A Primer’ (September 2013) BIS 
Quarterly Review 46. CoCos are further discussed in chapter 4.  
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facilitate raising capital. As has been discussed, mutual banks, for example, do not 
typically issue shares. Thus, different organizational features matter for designing 
financial regulations that do not distort competition or that could create an uneven 
playing field for some types of banks.  
 
Moreover, the legal characterization of ownership interests is also linked to the position 
of different stakeholders in a bank’s loss-bearing pecking order. Confusion or lack of 
knowledge regarding these issues can have implications for consumer protection. 
Depending of the type of bank in question, the distinction between what it means to be an 
insured depositor and an uninsured bank’s residual owner can often be blurred. This 
confusion can be exacerbated across jurisdictions with different organizational legal 
frameworks, institutions – and even languages – as is the case of the EU’s Single Market.  
 
Recent historical examples of the latter issue can be found is the cases of demutualized 
British building societies and the transformed Spanish savings banks (cajas de ahorros) 
discussed at the beginning of the chapter. After demutualization, the members of UK 
building societies that accepted to exchange their deposits for shares went from being (at 
least partially insured) depositors to becoming uninsured shareholders. This change in 
their legal status meant that whenever losses occurred or a bank’s stock dropped in value, 
their residual property rights would be affected. It also entailed that they no longer had 
rights to receive a fixed income for their ownership interest. The same analysis could be 
extended to the Spanish savings banks that transformed into corporate banks that then 
prompted customers to exchange their (partially) insured deposits for riskier securities, 
like preferred or common shares. 
 
The preceding discussion on ownership structures also reveals different transaction costs 
between corporate and non-corporate banks. Corporate banks potentially carry higher 
transaction costs resulting from the conflicting and diverging identity and interests 
between owners (shareholders) and depositors. On the other hand, co-operative and 
mutual banks could purportedly benefit from transaction cost reducing ‘unity of interest’ 
through the conflation of owners and depositors and also through the ‘common bond’ 
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established as a prerequisite for membership.258 According to the academic literature, 
unity of interests translates into reductions in transaction costs (governance and 
monitoring costs).259 
 
However, there could be an upside to the duplicitous transaction costs that corporate 
banks seem to exhibit in terms of enhanced monitoring. This results from having two 
different groups of internal stakeholders (shareholders and depositors) purportedly 
observing the actions of managers and monitoring bank performance.260 Co-operative and 
mutual banks do not receive the benefits from extra monitoring because of the conflation 
between owners and depositors, which implies that a single group of insiders (depositors-
members) is in charge of the monitoring. 
 
Another consequence of these ownership differences is that for customer-owned co-
operative and mutual banks the protection offered by entity shielding is coupled to the 
governmental safety net offered by deposit protection insurance schemes. Such 
arrangements have become a common feature of many financial regulatory regimes – 
including all of the jurisdictions analyzed in this chapter.261 The aforementioned elements 
entail that in the case of corporate banks, shareholders and depositors have limited 
exposure to losses resulting from bank insolvency.262 While in the particular case of 
customer-owned co-operative and mutual banks, depositors-members, who are at the 
                                                
258 Donald Wittman, Economic Foundations of Law and Organization (CUP 2006) 306-307. 
259 ibid. 
260 This analysis assumes that both shareholders and depositors have access to perfect and correct 
information and that they are sophisticated, interested and motivated enough to adequately 
monitor bank managers and their operations. Moreover, the moral hazard resulting from limited 
liability and deposit protection insurance could counteract their monitoring incentives.  
261 In the US, the FDIC standard insurance amount is USD 250,000.00 per depositor, per insured 
bank, for each account ownership category. Deposits in the EU are guaranteed pursuant to 
Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-
guarantee schemes. Before the onslaught of the financial crisis, deposits in the Eurozone were 
covered up to EUR 20,000. In 2010, the coverage was raised to EUR 100,000. In April 2014, the 
European Parliament adopted the Commission’s proposal for a revision of the Directive 94/19/EC 
on Deposit Guarantee schemes. At the time of writing this review was still ongoing. In the UK, 
starting from 31 December 2010, the deposit compensation limit was GBP 85,000.  
262 In a corporate bank, shareholders’ losses would be limited to the amount of their shareholding. 
Depositors would benefit from the threshold of insure amounts by the State, and would only 
suffer losses should their deposits exceed the insurable amount.  
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same time protected by deposit protection insurance, also benefit from a limited loss 
exposure. 
 
This can be seen as two – slightly different – manifestations of moral hazard problems. 
The first case of moral hazard arises from organizational law and the owner shielding that 
limited liability provides. The second moral hazard problem develops from deposit 
protection insurance schemes. The combination that these two effects exert on members 
in a customer-owned co-operative or mutual bank could create incentives for them to 
neglect or reduce their efforts to monitor a bank’s management. Moreover, deposit 
protection shifts residual risk bearing from the owners of customer-owned co-operatives, 
to the deposit insurer – and ultimately, to taxpayers. Because of the conflation between 
the identity of owners and depositors, the moral hazard problem affects the same group of 
people, potentially incentivizing member-depositor inertia. Whereas in the case of 
corporate banks, owners are affected by the moral hazard that stems from limited 
liability, while secured depositors can be affected by the moral hazard that originates 
from deposit protection insurance schemes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A practical example can help to better illustrate these different incentive structures and 
their economic consequences during bank insolvency procedures, commonly known as 
bank resolution.263 Figure 3 depicts the bank claims priority structure in the US. 
                                                
263 A wider discussion on bank resolution is provided in chapter 5.  
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Shareholders are the residual claimants of a corporate bank– which means that they are 
entitled to receive any existing funds after all of the bank’s liabilities are paid in full, 
according to the depicted order. Seen in the opposite sense, the pattern also shows that 
losses are first off-set against shareholders’ equity. This means that bank shareholders are 
the first to suffer losses, but the last constituents to receive residual claims – should any 
exist – upon liquidation or after bank resolution.  
 
This creditor rank is different for co-operative and mutual banks. Instead of being the 
first to take losses (like shareholders in corporate banks), depositors in co-operative and 
mutual banks are typically protected – up to a threshold – by deposit protection 
insurance. As a result, deposit insurance shields the owners of co-operative and mutual 
banks against certain losses. This protection essentially changes their loss-bearing order 
in the creditor rank (as will be further discussed under chapter 5). Borrowing Alan 
Parmiter’s colorful terminology, it allows them to ‘leapfrog from the back of the line to 
the front’.264 This protection also shifts loss-bearing to other types of creditors – 
including taxpayers who have not consented ex ante to bailing out banks using public 
funds.  
 
4.4. Shares, Transferability and Voting Rights 
 
Bank legal forms provide different bundles or packages of property rights (financial and 
voting rights) for their constituents. As has already been discussed, the equity of 
corporate banks is divided into stocks or shares. Equity securities package some degree of 
basic common elements, like: transferability, voting rights, liquidation rights after bank 
dissolution, rights to dividend payments – as well as other rules like redemption and 
preemptive rights.  
 
Common shares can be freely transferable (in the case of listed banks) or they can be 
transferable upon the adherence to certain rules contained in a corporation’s by-laws or 
                                                
264 Alan R Palmiter, Corporations (7th edn, Wolters Kluwer 2012) 69.  
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articles of incorporation (eg in the case of close corporate banks). In some jurisdictions, 
co-operative banks also issue shares. While mutual associations and nonprofit banks are 
different in the sense that they do not issue shares – but can issue other types of securities 
that grant their holders different income stream rights, typically as fixed claimants and 
not as residual owners.  
 
Voting rights can be subject to different rules.265 Voting rights are associated to formal 
control, which allows owners to vote for the election of directors as well as deciding on 
the approval of other important matters, like amending a bank’s articles of incorporation 
or corporate control transactions.  
 
In order to better illustrate the differences between these ownership packages, one can 
refer to A. Hirschman’s influential ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty’ framework.266 In particular, 
one can apply this framework to understand the choices that different bank stakeholders – 
like residual owners and depositors have – whenever they are not satisfied with 
management or they perceive a deteriorating quality in the services that they are 
receiving. According to Hirschman, owners could either ‘exit’ (by selling their shares or 
withdrawing their deposits) or they could express their dissatisfaction through their right 
to ‘voice’ concerns in general meetings (or other mechanisms).  
 
Extending this framework to banks, ‘voice’ or voting rights are different across the 
identified organizational forms. In the case of public and close corporate banks, common 
stocks typically carry ‘one-vote-per-share’. Thus, in principle, shareholders can increase 
their voting capacity by augmenting their shareholding.267 Shareholders can increase their 
marginal voting rights by investing more money in a bank’s capital.  
 
                                                
265 See generally David L Ratner, ‘The Government of Business Corporations: Critical 
Reflections on the Rule of “One Share, One Vote”’, (1970) 56 Cornell Law Review 1; Coleen A 
Dunlavy, ‘Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the History of Shareholder 
Voting Rights’ (2006) 63 Washington and Lee Law Review 1347; Hansmann and Pargendler 
‘The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights’ (n 253).  
266 Albert O Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations 
and States (Harvard University Press 1970).  
267 Or through proxy voting, but this falls outside of the scope of analysis.   
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For co-operative banks, voting can be either on a one-vote-per-member basis or in other 
cases it can be granted on a one-vote-per-share basis – but is typically capped at a certain 
maximum number of votes per member (regardless of the amount that members have 
deposited in the co-operative bank). The rational behind this is that co-operatives are seen 
to be more democratic (eg less plutocratic268) than modern corporations and in order to 
prevent any one member from controlling the entity.  
 
The same can be said of mutual associations, where voting rights are assigned contingent 
to the balance deposited with the bank during a particular timeframe. Voting rights are 
different in nonprofit banks, which lack residual owners and where decisions are often 
made by groups of different stakeholders – which can include depositors. Figure 4 
graphically depicts the relationship between the number of votes and ownership interests 
across the three discussed types of voting rights rules.  
 
Differences in voting rights (together with variations in economic or financial rights) 
imply diverging incentives for investment and ownership across organizational forms. 
This can be related specifically to deciding on important matters, like corporate control 
transactions, selecting board members and senior managers or investing additional capital 
whenever it is needed.  
 
For example, investors in a listed corporate bank are aware that they could (in principle) 
increase their shareholding up to the required threshold for achieving corporate control. 
However, depositors in mutual and co-operative banks that are governed by different 
voting rules, might not have the same incentives to transact or deposit more money in a 
bank – particularly since it does not always marginally grant them greater voting power 
                                                
268 Henry Hansmann and Mariana Pargendler have argued that restricted voting rules in 
corporations ‘generally served not to protect shareholders as investors, but to protect them as 
consumers’ whenever they transacted with the firm. See Hansmann and Pargendler (n 253).  
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(more ‘voice’). Thus, a ‘one-vote-per-share’ rule creates different incentives than a ‘one-
vote-per-member’ or than a ‘capped voting’ rule.269  
 
 
Figure 4 
Bank Ownership and Different Voting Rules 
 
 
Exit rights also vary across the studied bank legal forms. If shareholders (in both public 
and private corporate banks) cannot be influential by voting ‘with their hands’, they can 
opt to ‘vote with their feet’, and sell their shares.270 One can assume that whenever 
shareholders sell their stock, they receive (at least) its fair market value at the time of the 
                                                
269 Another possible voting rule is what Henry Hansmann calls ‘graduated voting’: ‘in which the 
number of votes exercisable by a single shareholder increased less than proportionately with the 
number of sharers owned’. See Hansmann and Pargendler (n 253). 
270 D Gordon Smith, ‘The Role of Shareholders in the Modern American Corporation’ in Claire A 
Hill and Brett H McDonnell (eds) Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law 
(Edgar Elgar 2012) 52.  
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sale. Share transferability is often restricted in a co-operative bank. However, members 
can exit by withdrawing their deposits – getting to keep any recently paid out earnings.  
 
In the case of mutual banks – where there are no shares and the bank’s reserves and 
retained earnings do not accrue for the direct and individualized benefit of depositors, 
members can exit by withdrawing their deposits. The downside in these cases, however, 
is that their corresponding proportion in the accrued equity pool of a mutual bank cannot 
always be unlocked and withdrawn. Thus, residual or liquidation property rights are 
different for mutual banks, and unlocking this accrued equity pool has been identified as 
a potential incentive fueling demutualization processes.   
 
Exit and voice are also different for nonprofit banks, which lack residual owners. 
Depositors and other beneficiaries typically do not have voting rights and they cannot 
appropriate the value that accrues to the banks’ residual equity pools.  
 
4.5. Centralized Management  
 
Contemporary corporate, mutual and co-operative banks exhibit a separation between 
‘ownership and control’. While in the past, it was commonplace for some private and 
investment banks to be organized as partnerships (which conflate ownership and control), 
it has become increasingly less common. Bank management is normally delegated to a 
(single or dual271) board of directors, elected by banks’ constituents. This separation also 
applies to ‘ownerless’, non-profit banks, where there is a separation between the banks’ 
managers and directors, on the one hand, and their beneficiaries or beneficial owners, on 
the other.  
 
                                                
271 As Kraakman et al. specify, in some jurisdictions, corporate banks are governed by two-tier 
boards where ‘top corporate officers occupy the board’s second (managing) tier, but are generally 
absent from the first (supervisory) tier, which is at least nominally independent from the firm’s 
hired officers’. See Kraakman et al. ‘The Anatomy of Corporate Law’ (n 137) 13.  
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As a consequence of this separation, banks are subject to many of the same tensions 
between different stakeholders that are ubiquitous in other firms. In spite of this, some 
commentators and policymakers have strongly argued that banks are different to other 
firms and that they require special governance rules.272  
 
Moreover, when referring to bank corporate governance it is often neglected that banks 
are not always publicly traded companies. Thus, corporate governance is not only 
relevant for corporate banks. The OECD and the G20 recognize this omission in their 
2015 Principles of Corporate Governance, when stating that: ‘The Principles [of 
Corporate Governance] focus on publicly traded companies, both financial and non-
financial (…)’ and that ‘to the extent that they are deemed applicable, they might also be 
a useful tool to improve corporate governance in companies whose shares are not 
publicly traded’.273 The latter can also be applied to the case of non-corporate banks. 
 
Bank corporate governance issues have received increased attention after the onslaught of 
the latest financial crisis.274 Some issues that have received widespread attention include: 
the compensation and qualifications of executives, board members, senior – and even 
junior employees (like traders and relationship managers)275, misaligned incentives 
between different stakeholders, risk management and financial crime compliance, etc.  
 
                                                
272 See Marco Becth, Patrick Bolton and Ailsa Röell, ‘Why Bank Governance is Different’ (2012) 
27 (3) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 437; Peter O Mülbert, ‘Corporate Governance of 
Banks’ (2009) 10 European Business Organization Law Review 411. Mülbert considers that: 
‘The economics and functions of banks differ from those of industrial firms (…)’ and that ‘these 
differences are reflected in corporate governance practices observed in the banking sector and in 
theoretical works on “the good corporate governance of banks”’.  
273 G20/ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Principles of 
Corporate Governance (2015).  
274 See Hamid Mehran, Alan Morrison, and Joel Shapiro, ‘Corporate Governance and Banks: 
What Have We Learned from the Financial Crisis?’ (2011) Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Staff Reports n 502 
<https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr502.pdf> 6 December 
2016.  
275 Mülbert (n 272).  
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As a response to the financial crisis, in 2010 the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) presented a third version276 of its ‘Principles for Enhancing 
Corporate Governance’.277 In 2015, the BCBS revisited corporate governance issues and 
published its ‘Corporate Governance Principles for Banks’ in order to take account of 
connected work that had been carried out by the Financial Stability Board (FSB).278  
 
The Basel Committee recognizes that its principles draw from the OECD’s corporate 
governance guidelines. The latest version of the BCBS’s ‘Corporate Governance 
Principles for Banks’ echoes the OECD’s definition of corporate governance. 
Consequently, the principles come across as having been developed with corporate banks 
in mind. Differences in bank legal form are not explicitly taken into account. However, 
the Basel Committee does recognize that ‘there are significant differences in the 
legislative and regulatory frameworks across countries which may restrict the application 
of certain principles or provisions therein279’ and that the principles are ‘intended to guide 
the actions of board members, senior managers, control function heads and supervisors of 
a diverse range of banks in a number of countries with varying legal and regulatory 
systems, including both Committee member and non-member jurisdictions’.280 
 
In spite of being subject to many of the same agency costs, different types of banks have 
also exhibited their own specific governance problems pursuant to the organizational 
differences described in this chapter. For example, the conflation of depositors and 
owners in co-operative and mutual banks, and their unity of interest, is a transaction-cost 
                                                
276 The Basel Committee first published guidelines regarding bank corporate governance in 1999. 
It later revised the principles in 2006.  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Enhancing 
Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations’ (September 1999) and Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, ‘Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations’ (February 
2006) <www.bis.org/publ/bcbs122.htm> accessed 6 December 2016.  
277 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance’ 
(October 2010) < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs176.htm> accessed 6 December 2016.  
278 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision ‘Corporate Governance Principles for Banks’ 
(July 2015) < http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d328.htm> accessed on 6 December 2016. The FSB 
had issued its ‘Thematic Review on Risk and Governance’ in February 2013, after conduction 
peer reviews on corporate governance across countries.  
279 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Corporate Governance Principles for Banks’ (n 
278) par 15.  
280 ibid. 
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reducing feature that is absent in corporate banks. Moreover, the fact that nonprofit banks 
are ownerless and depositors lack voting rights entails that they are prone to fall pray to 
self-perpetuating boards of directors. These are slightly different agency costs to the 
principal-agent problems that can occur in corporate banks, for example, because the 
voting rules are different in both types of organizations. Thus, the preceding analysis 
helps shed some light to the differences between bank organizational forms.  
4.6. Summary  
 
Table 3 presents and summarizes some of the main findings regarding the attributes of 
different bank legal forms. The table is intended to show a general anatomy of bank legal 
forms. Partnerships are included in this table in order to contrast how some of the studied 
features vary across other forms of business organization.  
 
The variations across organizational attributes can help identify why the design of 
financial regulation needs to take legal form into account. The main differences across 
bank legal forms are: (1) the identity of banks’ residual owners (eg whether they are 
shareholders, depositors or ownerless); (2) the legal rules underpinning different 
packages of banks’ property rights (eg financial rights, capital structure, transferability 
and voting rules); and (3) the differences in the creditor rank that results from entity 
shielding.  
 
The abovementioned features vary across bank legal forms. Moreover, they can be linked 
to financial regulation. For example: capital, liquidity and leverage rules dictate banks’ 
capital structures. Moral hazard inducing deposit protection insurance schemes might be 
duplicitous when there is a conflation between bank owners and depositors. Creditor rank 
is bound to be important during bank resolution. And the liquidation protection and 
creditor rank that results from entity shielding can become a problem for multiple point 
of entry (MPE resolution). These scenarios are explained with a greater level of detail in 
the following chapters.  
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Table 3 
Summary of the Main Attributes of Bank Organizational Forms 
 
Ownership 
Features 
 
Corporate 
Banks 
 
General 
Partnerships 
 
Mutual 
Banks 
 
 
Co-
operative 
Banks 
 
Nonprofit 
Banks 
 
 
Level of Entity 
Shielding 
 
Strong entity 
shielding 
with 
liquidation 
protection 
 
Weak entity 
shielding and 
weak 
liquidation 
protection 
 
Strong 
entity 
shielding 
with 
liquidation 
protection 
 
Strong entity 
shielding with 
liquidation 
protection 
 
 
 
Complete entity 
shielding 
 
Level of owner 
shielding 
 
Strong 
owner 
shielding 
 
Weak owner 
shielding 
 
Strong 
owner 
shielding 
 
Strong 
owner 
shielding 
 
 
Lack owners 
 
 
Property 
Alienability 
 
Capital is 
divided into 
transferable 
shares  
 
Capital is 
represented by 
ownership 
interest with 
restricted 
alienability 
 
All 
members 
jointly own 
capital. 
Depositors 
can only 
withdraw 
their 
savings 
 
Capital is 
sometimes 
represented by 
shares. 
However, they 
are not always 
transferable  
 
Members can 
withdraw their 
deposits 
 
 
No ownership   
 
Depositors can 
withdraw their 
savings 
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Ownership 
Features 
 
Corporate 
Banks 
 
General 
Partnerships 
 
Mutual 
Banks 
 
 
Co-
operative 
Banks 
 
Nonprofit 
Banks 
 
 
Identity of  
Residual 
Claimants 
 
Shareholders 
 
Partners 
 
Members 
are joint 
residual 
claimants 
 
Members 
have residual 
property 
rights 
 
 
No one owns 
residual assets 
 
Effective 
Control 
 
 
Delegated 
management  
 
Board 
members 
need not be 
shareholders 
 
 
Partners 
manage the 
business 
 
Delegated 
manageme
nt  
 
Board 
members 
need not be 
depositors 
 
Delegated 
management  
 
Board 
members 
often required 
to be members 
for a 
predetermined 
timeframe 
before tenure 
 
Delegated 
management  
 
Self-perpetuating 
boards of directors 
 
Ownership 
 
 
Investor 
ownership 
 
 
Employee 
ownership 
 
Depositor 
joint 
ownership 
 
Member 
ownership 
 
 Members can 
be depositors, 
borrowers or 
both 
 
Unowned 
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Ownership 
Features 
 
Corporate 
Banks 
 
General 
Partnerships 
 
Mutual 
Banks 
 
 
Co-
operative 
Banks 
 
Nonprofit 
Banks 
 
Formal Control One vote per 
share 
 
One vote per 
partner 
Voting 
assigned to 
members 
according 
to their 
contributio
ns (usually 
one vote 
per 
member or 
capped to a 
specific 
amount of 
votes per 
person 
according 
to deposits) 
One vote per 
member 
Voting rights 
assigned to 
governing bodies 
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
This chapter set out to answer two main questions: first, how are banks legally organized 
in certain leading jurisdictions? And secondly, if and how the attributes of existing bank 
organizational forms vary and can interfere with financial regulation? In order to answer 
both questions, the study first conducted a comparative functional analysis of the leading 
bank organizational forms in the European Union (EU), France, Italy, Spain, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. The study then compared the features of the identified 
existing bank legal forms against the foil of the corporate bank.  
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There are three predominant categories of bank organizational forms in the studied 
countries. These are: (1) investor-owned business corporations, (2) customer-owned 
mutual and co-operative associations (including credit unions); and (3) ‘ownerless’, 
nonprofit savings banks. Although these legal forms are functionally equivalent, they 
have specific and sometimes different attributes that result from national (and 
supranational) organizational laws.  
 
Across the examined jurisdictions, leading bank organizational forms share some 
common features and attributes – like limited liability and delegated management. These 
features are explained with detail throughout the discussion.  
 
However, the main insights from the comparison result from the differences across the 
attributes of bank legal forms. These differences are: (1) the identity of banks’ residual 
owners (eg whether they are uninsured shareholders, insured depositors or lack owners); 
(2) the legal rules underpinning different packages of banks’ residual property rights (eg 
financial rights, capital structure, transferability and voting rules); and (3) the differences 
in the creditor rank that results from entity shielding (further discussed in chapter 5). 
 
There is a connection between a firm’s ownership legal form and its capital structure. For 
example, in the case of corporations, residual ownership resides with shareholders. 
Shares or stocks represent shareholders’ ownership interests. However, as this chapter 
described, banks are not always corporations, and consequently, not all banks issue 
common shares. This can result in some challenges for non-corporate banks because the 
most recent capital, liquidity and leverage standards (commonly known as ‘Basel III’) 
rely on common shares as the main source of loss absorbency. In turn, the next chapter 
analyses the linkage between organizational forms and bank capital requirements.  
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Chapter Four 
Capital and Liquidity Standards:  
Does One-Size-Fit-All Types of Bank 
Organizational Forms? 
 
SUMMARY 
Do existing international bank capital and liquidity standards take into account the different 
ways that banks are legally organized around the world? This chapter examines the link 
between capital requirements and bank organizational forms. The main question it seeks to 
answer is whether capital requirements take into account the fact that – across jurisdictions – 
banks are organized using different legal forms. The chapter finds that the leading capital 
standards promoted in the Basel Accords seem to mainly target corporate banks. This design 
can give rise to uncertainty, inconsistencies, lacunae and implementation gaps whenever 
applying bank capital requirements to non-corporate banks in different countries. Moreover, 
it can also create an ‘uneven playing field’ between corporate and non-corporate banks. The 
analysis focuses on bank capital requirements and organizational forms in the European 
Union (EU). In the aftermath of the latest financial crisis, the reform of bank capital and 
liquidity rules has been one of the main responses for revamping global financial regulation. 
Capital requirements aim to curb excessive risk-taking and the moral hazard of too-big-to-fail 
banks, as well as to avoid publicly funded bailouts and implicit State guarantees. Since 1988, 
the world’s capital standards are mainly specified by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) – arguably one of the most important and influential standard setting 
bodies for all things related to international banking regulation. The latest version of the 
standards, known as Basel III, have been implemented in the EU through the Capital 
Requirements Regulation (CRR) and the Directive on Access to the Activity of Credit 
Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms (CRD 
IV). The chapter examines how the most recent redefinition of regulatory capital, in 
particular the so-called Common Equity Tier 1 capital (CET 1), seems to be primarily 
  108 
designed for banks organized as companies limited by shares (joint stock companies). The 
chapter argues that when designing international standards and rules, financial regulators and 
international financial standard setting bodies should take heed and pay greater attention to 
the variety of bank organizational forms that exist in different jurisdictions. 
 
KEYWORDS: Basel III, bank capital requirements, CET1, Co-operative banks, mutual 
banks. 
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 ‘When new regulation is being drafted by officials that have mainstream banks in mind, 
they don’t think about co-operative banks’. 281 
Arnold Kuijpers,  
DIRECTOR CORPORATE AFFAIRS OF RABOBANK 
 
 
‘Simply learning the precise meanings of some of the terms that are used, such as the 
word “capital”, can help uncover some of the nonsense’.282 
Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig 
The Bankers’ New Clothes (PUP 2013) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Bank capital and liquidity requirements are one of the main items in the ongoing agenda 
for revamping international financial regulation. During the 2007-2008 financial crisis, 
pre-existing bank capital and liquidity levels were widely regarded as having been 
insufficient to effectively absorb the losses that were experienced throughout the 
sector.283 Banks were also heavily leveraged, both on and off their balance sheets. 
Consequently, when losses materialized, many governments had to intervene in order to 
provide banks with capital and liquidity through State aid and other forms of implicit and 
                                                
281 ‘Leaders Discuss New Regulations at European Co-operative Banks Convention’ 
International Co-operative Alliance (December 2012) <http://ica.coop/en/media/news/leaders-
discuss-new-regulations-european-co-operative-banks-convention> accessed 6 December 2016.  
282 Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with Banking 
and What to Do About It (Princeton University Press 2013).  
283 Some examples include: investment bank Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual, UBS, Hypo 
Real Estate, Dexia, Royal Bank of Scotland group (RBS) and Lloyds TSB. The last five entities 
listed received governmental bailouts. Rossignollo et al. consider that: ‘(…) capital shortages 
verified in most financial institutions represent one of the most pernicious effects to be dealt 
with’. See Adrian F Rossignollo et al., ‘Market crises and Basel capital requirements: Could 
Basel III have Been Different? – Evidence from Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain (PIGS)’ 
(2013) 37 Journal of Banking and Finance 1323. 
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explicit guarantees.284 All of this ultimately exposed taxpayers to the losses that stemmed 
from the financial system.  
 
The large size of the banking system relative to GDP in many countries raised questions 
regarding some governments’ availability to provide credible support during times of 
crises. While some banks in the USA were regarded as ‘too-big-to-fail’ (or ‘too-systemic-
to-fail’285), in other jurisdictions – including several European countries – banks were 
simply ‘too-big-to-save’.286 As J. Gordon and Georg Ringe have pointed out, this implied 
that many governments could not always credibly afford to bailout their biggest banks in 
the event of failure.287 In some case, it simply was prohibitively expensive to do so given 
that aggregate assets in the banking system sometimes represented a significant share of – 
or even exceeded – a country’s GDP.  
 
The situation previously described highlights several vulnerabilities affecting the 
financial sector in the onslaught of the crisis. Foremost, the existing capital rules – based 
on the consensus of the ‘Basel Accords’ – proved to be in need of substantive reforms. 
Secondly, banks having insufficient capital levels could incentivize excessive risk taking, 
fueling moral hazard and further eroding market discipline. Moreover, as was witnessed 
in several European countries after the impact of the 2007-2008 economic meltdown, a 
large banking crisis can also have a negative impact on public finances. Consequently, it 
is understandable why reforming capital and liquidity standards has become an important 
response to the most recent financial crisis.  
 
                                                
284 For example, the US implemented its ‘Troubled Asset Relief Program’ (TARP), which 
originally authorized expenditures of up to USD $700 billion. The authorized amount was later 
reduced to USD $475 billion by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (‘Dodd-Frank Act’). 
285 A concept coined by then economist and professor – and now Governor of the Reserve Bank 
of India – Raghuram Rajan. See Raghuram G Rajan, ‘Prepared Statement for the Regulation and 
Resolving Institutions Considered “Too Big to Fail” Hearing before the United States Congress 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs’ (May 2009). 
286 Jeffrey N Gordon and W Georg Ringe, ‘Bank Resolution in Europe: the Unfinished Agenda of 
Structural Reform’, in Danny Busch & Guido Ferrarini (eds), European Banking Union (OUP 
2015).   
287 ibid. 
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Capital adequacy and liquidity requirements are at the heart of the still ongoing policy 
debates for revamping banking regulation. Needless to say, this does not mean that 
capital and liquidity requirements are expected to solve all of the problems experienced 
during the latest financial crisis. As Prof. Rosa Lastra has rightly pointed out in the past – 
in spite of their central importance – capital and liquidity standards are ‘no panacea’.288 
Other factors are also important, such as: the quality of banks’ assets, the nature of banks’ 
liabilities, their off-balance sheet activities and the competence and compensation of their 
directors, managers and employees.  
 
Nevertheless, revamping capital, liquidity and leverage requirements is still regarded as 
being important. If capital rules are too lax, banks and their stakeholders might not have 
enough incentives or ‘skin-in-the-game’ to curb moral hazard and avoid excessive risk-
taking. On the other hand, there is widespread concern that if the capital rules are too 
stringent or their unintended consequences are disregarded, they could hamper growth by 
affecting lending to households, firms and infrastructure projects that have financing 
needs.289  
 
After the onslaught of the 2007-08 global financial crisis many major jurisdictions – led 
by international financial standard setting bodies, like the Basel Committee on Banking 
                                                
288 Rosa M Lastra, ‘Risk-based Capital Requirements and their Impact upon the Banking 
Industry: Basel II and CAD III’ (2004) 12 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 225.  
289 The European Commission and the Basel Committee have expressed their concerns about this 
tradeoff. On 15 July 2015, the European Commission launched a ‘Public Consultation on the 
possible impact of the CRR and CRD IV on bank financing of the economy’. Moreover, the 
Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) have also launched a ‘Macroeconomic 
Assessment Group’ for evaluating the macroeconomic impact of the transition to stronger capital 
and liquidity requirements. See Macroeconomic Assessment Group, ‘Final Report: Assessing the 
Macroeconomic Impact of the Transition to Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements’ 
(December 2010) <http://www.bis.org/press/p101217.htm> accessed 6 December 2016. Some 
academics – such as Admati and Hellwig – are critical of these purported tradeoffs between 
higher capital requirements and reduced lending that could potentially dampen the economic 
recovery. See generally Admati and Hellwig (n 282) chs 6, 11. See also Ana Admati and Martin 
Hellwig, ‘The Parade of Bankers’ New Clothes Continues: 28 Flawed Claims Debunked’ (2014) 
Working Paper n 3031 <https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/parade-
bankers%E2%80%99-new-clothes-continues-23-flawed-claims-debunked> accessed 6 December 
2016.  
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Supervision290 (‘BCBS’ or the ‘Basel Committee’) – started to overhaul the existing bank 
capital standards. Since 1988, the BCBS sets out the main capital and liquidity standards. 
The Basel Committee is arguably one of the most influential global standard setting 
bodies for financial regulation of the last decades. The latest version of the revised Basel 
Accords that is currently being implemented is widely known as ‘Basel III’.  
 
This chapter examines the links between capital standards and banks’ legal structures. 
The chapter’s main research question is whether capital requirements entirely take into 
account the fact that across jurisdictions banks are organized using several different legal 
forms. The chapter finds that the leading capital standards promoted in Basel III seem to 
mainly target corporate banks. This conclusion is largely due to the fact that some 
commonplace organizational forms do not issue common shares. The analysis focuses on 
bank capital requirements and organizational forms in the EU. The chapter argues that 
implementation gaps, legal uncertainty, regulatory lacunae and divergent and inconsistent 
approaches could persist regarding capital and liquidity standards should financial 
regulators and international standard setting bodies fail to take organizational differences 
into account when designing and putting such rules into practice.  
 
The rest of the chapter is divided into four additional sections. The second section 
presents a brief overview of the first two Basel Capital Accords. The third section 
explores Basel III and some of the new tools and measures that it introduces – with 
special attention to the concept of Common Equity Tier 1 capital (‘CET 1’). The fourth 
section discusses the challenges that exist for defining CET 1 for non-joint stock banks. 
A final section summarizes the chapter’s main findings.    
 
2. BANK CAPITAL RULES: THE ROAD TO BASEL III  
 
What is bank capital and why is it important? This section briefly discusses the rationale 
behind bank prudential regulation. It also seeks to provide a succinct background on the 
                                                
290 Chapter two provides a brief background on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS).  
  113 
first two Basel Accords and their evolution. This preamble is relevant in order to explain 
how Basel III is different from its predecessors, but still does not sufficiently take into 
account the differences in bank legal forms across countries.  
 
2.1. What is Bank Capital and Why is it Regulated? 
 
Banks’ total capital is a changing regulatory construct. Regulatory capital is different 
from shareholders’ equity or capital according to conventional accounting terms. The 
latter is usually defined as the difference obtained by subtracting an entity’s liabilities 
from its assets. On the other hand, regulatory capital also includes different types of 
securities – like subordinated debt and other financial instruments – which regulators 
count as capital for regulatory purposes.291  
 
 Regulatory capital is also different to bank reserve requirements.292 As Admati et al. 
explain, while capital refers to the mix of funding that banks exhibit, ‘(l)iquidity or 
reserve requirements relate to the type of assets and asset mix banks must hold’.293 
Consequently, banks do not hold nor set capital aside. They simply have it – or not.  
 
So what is bank capital and why is it so important to correctly define it? Regulatory 
capital refers to a certain mix of an entity’s own funds, some types of borrowed funds and 
other liquid assets that regulators accept as capital because of their loss-absorbing 
features. Thus, regulators and financial standard setting bodies define what counts as 
                                                
291 See Marco Pagano, ‘Lessons from the European Financial Crisis’ in Ester Faia, Andreas 
Hackenthal et al. (eds), Financial Regulation – A Transatlantic Perspective (Cambridge 
University Press 2015) 41-43. See also Kern Alexander, ‘The Role of Capital in Supporting 
Banking Stability’ in Niamh Moloney, Eilis Ferran, Jennifer Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of Financial Regulation (OUP 2015). 
292 Anat R Admati, Peter DeMarzo, Martin Hellwig and Pau Pfleiderer, ‘Fallacies, Irrelevant 
Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially 
Expensive’ (October 2013) 
<https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/research/documents/Fallacies%20Nov%201.pdf
> accessed 6 December 2016.  
293 ibid. 
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bank regulatory capital. Notwithstanding, shareholders’ equity is still considered the 
superior form of regulatory capital.  
 
Equity is essentially what banks’ owners provide, as part of any entity’s own funds, as 
well as future net earnings on those funds. Equity has always been considered to be a 
main component of regulatory capital. As opposed to banks’ borrowed funds, like 
deposits, debt securities and central bank loans, which are considered to be insufficient 
and inadequate to curb excessive risk-taking (ex ante) and absorb losses (ex post 
whenever they occur).   
 
There are several reasons why equity is widely regarded as bank capital of the highest 
quality. Firstly, equity holders absorb losses before any other claimants. Equity holders 
(residual owners) are the last to get paid whenever a bank is liquidated (assuming a 
positive liquidation residual value).  
 
Secondly, equity holders are also last in line to receive income stream payments, once 
employees, creditors, taxes and other obligations have been paid. Unlike creditors, 
common equity holders do not have an automatic right to income (dividends) from a 
bank. This entails that management or regulators can restrict dividend payouts to owners 
without a bank entering into default. Moreover, because of affirmative asset partitioning 
(entity shielding) – specifically a feature called ‘liquidation protection294’ – banks’ 
owners (or the owners’ creditors) cannot simply deplete a bank’s own funds at the 
expense of the bank’s creditors. In other words, bank equity holders can only obtain 
liquidity by selling their shares to third parties via secondary markets. They cannot force 
a bank to repurchase their stocks nor to go into liquidation in order to pay them their 
residual share.  
 
Daniel Tarullo identifies at least three main reasons why bank capital is regulated. He 
asserts that: ‘[p]olicymakers and commentators often begin a discussion of bank capital 
adequacy requirements by citing their role in providing a buffer against bank losses, 
                                                
294 Chapter 3 (sec 4) describes liquidation protection and the asset partitioning framework.   
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protecting creditors in the event a bank nonetheless fails, and creating a disincentive to 
excessive risk taking or shirking by bank owners and managers’.295 Contemporary views 
boil down the need for capital to two main reasons: (1) as a check on moral hazard and 
risk taking, and (2) providing loss absorbency.   
 
Capital adequacy has become a leading type of microprudential regulation designed in 
order to promote financial stability. It is generally assumed that some form of capital 
regulation is desirable because of banks’ ownership and capital structures. The rest of the 
chapter assumes that banks’ prudential regulation is socially desirable.  
 
Banks are highly levered firms.296 This is because banks have a greater proportion of 
borrowed funds than the amount of their own funds. Insured and uninsured deposits make 
up a significant part of banks’ liabilities. Depositors, other creditors – and potentially, the 
deposit insurer – are all bank fixed claimants. For corporate banks, shareholders typically 
benefit from limited liability. Limited liability protects shareholders from losses in excess 
of their shareholding. The combination of limited liability, excessive leverage, the short 
term compensation of managers and deposit protection insurance could incentivize 
banks’ managers to take on excessive risks in order to maximize shareholders’ return on 
equity (ROE).297 In other words, this combination can create a moral hazard problem.  
 
For non-joint stock banks, the previously described effect varies slightly. Co-operative 
and mutual banks are owned by their depositors-members.298 While non-profit banks 
have depositors, but no owners. In co-operative and mutual banks there is a conflation 
                                                
295 Daniel Tarullo, Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation (Peterson 
Institute for International Economics 2008) 16. 
296 Pagano (n 291) 41.  
297 See Alexander (n 291). 
298 Across the EU some co-operative banks can also be organized as limited liability companies or 
joint stock companies owned by a co-operative parent institution. See European Association of 
Co-operative Banks (EACB), ‘EACB Key priorities on the Capital Requirements Regulation 
(CRR) as regards Capital, Leverage Ratio and Liquidity; and on Capital Requirements Directive 
IV (CRD IV) regarding corporate governance’ (February 2012) 
<http://www.globalcube.net/clients/eacb/content/medias/publications/position_papers/banking_le
gislation/120224_EACB_Key_priorities_CRR-CRD_IV__FINAL.pdf> accessed 6 December 
2016.  
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between owners and depositors. For the depositors-owners of these types of non-joint 
stock banks, deposit protection insurance exerts similar effects to those that limited 
liability brings to bear to shareholders in corporate banks. This means that it limits 
potential losses and creates disincentives for depositors-members to monitor banks’ 
managers and activities. In other words, it can also generate a moral hazard problem.  
 
When banks are insufficiently capitalized, it means that they have low levels of own 
funds compared to their borrowed funds. As explained before, this can incentivize 
excessive risk taking at the expense of creditors and other types of fixed claimants. This 
is because leverage can potentially magnify both the upside and the downside of risk-
taking.  
 
2.2. How Much Capital are Banks Expected to Have? 
 
Banks’ regulatory capital under the Basel Accord is usually expressed as a percentage (eg 
8%) of their risk weighted assets (‘RWAs’). RWAs are different to the total assets that 
appear on banks’ balance sheets. This is because RWAs represent only a fraction or 
percentage of a bank’s total assets.  
 
The rationale for using RWAs – instead of simply taking total assets from the balance 
sheet – is that every asset (ie loans, credit cards, mortgages, sovereign debt, buildings and 
premises) does not have the same risk profile.299 Thus, depending of how risky their 
assets are, banks can adjust how much capital they need in order to absorb potential 
losses should they occur. Risk weighting is simply multiplying the value of the asset by a 
number between zero (0) and one (or 100%) – where a number closer to one implies a 
riskier asset. 
 
Figure 5 depicts bank capital ratios to total assets – instead of RWAs – for several 
jurisdictions. The figure shows how for some countries, (except the US) the capital to 
                                                
299 For example, risk weighting allows accounting for the fact that cash would presumably have a 
lower risk profile than an investment in a public company’s shares or than a mortgage.   
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total assets ratio is well below the 8% mark contained in the Basel Accords. Thus, 
measuring capital adequacy as a percentage of total assets instead of RWAs is a more 
stringent measure. More importantly, it also highlights that banks with capital ratios 
(capital to total assets) close to the 6% mark could have their equity wiped-out with a 
mere 6% reduction in the value of their assets.  
 
 
Figure 5 
Bank Capital to Total Assets Ratio300 for Selected Countries 
(Source: World Bank)  
 
 
 
                                                
300 For calculating this ratio the World Bank uses bank capital and reserves divided by total assets 
– and not as a percentage of risk-weighted assets (RWA). Capital and reserves include: ‘funds 
contributed by owners, retained earnings, general and special reserves, provisions, and valuation 
adjustments. Capital includes tier 1 capital (paid-up shares and common stock), which is a 
common feature in all countries’ banking systems, and total regulatory capital, which includes 
several specified types of subordinated debt instruments that need not be repaid if the funds are 
required to maintain minimum capital levels (these comprise tier 2 and tier 3 capital). Total assets 
include all nonfinancial and financial assets’. Source: World Bank.   
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2.3. Basel I and Basel II 
 
It is widely agreed that: ‘[t]he international convergence of bank capital regulation started 
with the 1988 Basle301 Accord on capital standards’.302 One of the main drivers behind 
the adoption of the original Basel Accord was the claim of unfair competition by leading 
international banks across G-10303 countries that were purportedly undercapitalized in 
comparison with some of their competitors. 
 
The first Basel Accord was signed in July 1988, and was phased in by January 1993.304 
This Accord became widely known as Basel I. Basel I was promoted and signed by the 
G-10, and was intended to create a level playing field for the capital maintenance of 
internationally active banks.305 Many countries worldwide eventually adopted Basel I, 
helping increase prudential requirements for banks across multiple jurisdictions.  
 
Basel I required banks to have a target ratio of capital to RWAs set at 8%. Half of this 
requirement (50% or 4 percentage points) had to be in the form of core or ‘Tier 1’ capital 
(also called ‘going concern capital’). The remaining half (50% or 4 percentage points) 
had to be in the form of ‘Tier 2’ capital (or ‘gone concern capital’). Under Basel I, Tier 1 
was comprised of: ‘(a) paid-up share capital/common stock; and (b) disclosed reserves’. 
While Tier 2 capital was comprised of: ‘(a) undisclosed reserves, (b) asset revaluation 
reserves, (c) general provisions/general loan-loss reserves, (d) hybrid (debt/equity) capital 
instruments, and (e) subordinated debt’.306  
                                                
301 It is common for early documents from the BCBS and its predecessors to use the ‘Basle’ 
spelling. In contemporary documents and the media ‘Basel’ is widely used instead.  
302 Joao A C Santos, ‘Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of 
the Literature’ (2000) BIS Working Papers n 90 <http://www.bis.org/publ/work90.pdf> accessed 
6 December 2016.  
303 At the time the BCBS was comprised of the Group of ten countries (‘G10’): Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 
States, and also Luxembourg.  
304 Santos (n 302) 17.  
305 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards’ (‘Basel I’) (July 1988) para 3 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.htm> accessed 6 December 2016.  
306 Basel I App 1.  
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Moreover, under Basel I: ‘on–balance sheet assets were assigned to one of four risk 
buckets (0%, 20%, 50% and 100%) and then weighted by the bucket’s weight’.307 This is 
how RWAs are calculated. So for example, an asset worth $100, with a risk weight of 
100% requires 8% of capital (or $8). While an asset with a similar value ($100) but with 
a lower risk weight of 25%, requires only $2 of regulatory capital. 
 
In spite of the many benefits brought by Basel I, in June 1999 the BCBS released its 
proposal for reforming the capital standards. One of the main critiques to Basel I was its 
‘(…) lack of sensitivity to credit risk’.308 Under Basel I risk weighing was done using 
fixed risk-buckets that depended on the type of asset rather than on the credit risk of the 
counterparty. For example, sovereign bonds from OECD countries had a 0% risk-weight 
– regardless of the issuer’s credit risk. In turn, corporate bonds were always given a 
100% risk-weight.  
 
In an effort to provide greater credit risk sensitivity, the BCBS published a revised Basel 
Accord in 2004. The Basel Committee’s revised proposal became widely known as 
‘Basel II’.309 Basel II kept some of the same capital standards as Basel I, namely 
improving the standardized approach to risk weighing. However, for larger and more 
sophisticated banks, Basel II introduced the so-called Internal Rating Based Approach 
(‘IRB’), which allowed banks to rely on their own in-house credit risk assessments. The 
IRB increased the dependence on ‘highly developed risk assessment capabilities by the 
banks themselves’.310  
 
                                                
307 Santos (n 302) 17. See also Basel I para 29.   
308 Irina Molostova, ‘Introduction to The Internal Ratings Based Approach Under Basel II’ (2008) 
1 JIBFL 19. 
309 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards – A Revised Framework’ (‘Basel II’) (Comprehensive 
Version, June 2006) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.htm> accessed 6 December 2016.  
310 Tarullo (n 295) 16.  
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Basel II also introduced the so-called ‘three pillars’ comprised of: ‘(a) minimum capital 
standards, (b) a supervisory review process and (c) effective use of market discipline’.311 
In spite of these changes, the 2007-2008 crisis ensued and Basel II came under fire. Some 
countries, like the US never fully implemented Basel II.  
 
3. WHAT DOES BASEL III BRING TO THE TABLE? 
 
Basel III is the latest version of the Basel Accords. It is expected to be fully in force by 
January 2019. Some parts of the accord are not yet finished.312 However, many countries 
have already adopted a large part of the reforms under the assumption that they are of 
crucial importance for strengthening and promoting financial stability.313  
 
Basel III builds on Basel II’s three pillars in order to strengthen banks’ resilience.314 Like 
the previous Basel Accords, Basel III relies on capital adequacy based on RWAs. 
However, Basel III introduces changes to the definition of total regulatory capital and 
also adds some tools in order to measure leverage and liquidity, and manage systemic 
risk. This section describes the new measures contained in Basel III with the objective of 
explaining how the revamped definition of a central component of these tools – called 
Common Equity Tier 1 capital (CET 1) – can pose challenges for non-corporate banks 
and financial regulators worldwide.  
 
 
                                                
311 Basel II was also notably longer and more complex than the first Basel Accord. While Basel I 
stretched for about 30 pages and relied on basic arithmetic, Basel II (including its annexes) 
exceed 340 pages and involved more advanced mathematics. See Andrew Haldane, ‘The Dog and 
the Frisbee – Speech given at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 36th economic policy 
symposium, “The Changing Policy Landscape”’ (31 August 2012) 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2012/speech596.pdf> 
accessed 6 December 2016.  
312 For example, the final version of the net stable funding ratio (‘NSFR’). 
313 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Basel III Monitoring Report’ (March 2016). 
<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d354.pdf > accessed 6 December 2016. 
314 Alexander (n 291).  
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3.1. More and Better Quality Capital  
 
One of the major objectives of Basel III is to strengthen bank capital requirements. The 
goal of these rules is to increase the ‘quality, quantity and the transparency’ of banks’ 
own funds in order to build capital cushions that increase loss-absorbency during difficult 
times.315 In order to achieve the objective of more and better quality capital, the Basel 
Committee has reformed the preexisting capital standards, focusing on greater common 
equity requirements.  
 
Basel III faces an important challenge. It has to provide the basis for a harmonized 
definition of what regulatory capital actually is. As Narissa Lyngen describes, in the past, 
some discretion was left to national regulators, which ultimately allowed banks: ‘to fulfill 
Tier 1 capital requirements with instruments that in some cases seemed unlikely to 
provide financial cushioning in the case of a loss’. Adding that: ‘[t]his allowed banks to 
effectively overstate their capital positions, creating issues of enforcement of the Accord 
at the national level’.316  
 
Moreover, studies have also shown inconsistencies in the way that banks used to 
calculate their RWAs.317 The aforementioned inconsistencies, which have existed in the 
past, could also be relevant for the calculation of capital and liquidly standards for non-
joint stock banks.   
 
Under Basel III, the regulatory capital ratio is still set at 8% of RWAs. Capital is also 
comprised of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital.318 However, banks are now required to have 75% 
                                                
315 Peter King and Heath Tarbert, ‘Basel III: An Overview’ (2011) 30 Banking & Financial 
Services Policy Report 3. See also Basel III, 2. 
316 Narissa Lyngen, ‘Bassel III: Dynamics of State Implementation’ (2012) 53 Harvard 
International Law Journal 519, 525.  
317 Vanessa Le Leslé and Sofiya Avramova, ‘Revisiting Risk-Weighted Assets – Why Do RWAs 
Differ Across Countries and What Can Be Done About It?’ (2012) IMF Working Papers 
WP/12/90 <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp1290.pdf> accessed 6 December 
2016. 
318 The concept of ‘Tier 3 capital’ that was presented under Basel II has been abandoned. See 
Basel III para 9.  
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of their capital ratio in the form of Tier 1 capital (6 percentage points), and only 25% (or 
2 percentage points) in the form of Tier 2 capital.319 Moreover, the definition of Tier 1 
capital has been slightly reformed and now includes two additional subcategories: (i) 
Common Equity Tier 1 capital (hereinafter, ‘CET 1’) and (ii) Additional Tier 1 capital 
(‘AT1’).  
 
CET 1 is capital of the highest quality and loss absorbency. It is mainly comprised of 
common stock and retained earnings. Banks are required to have at least 4.5 percentage 
points of their total capital ratio in the form of CET 1. This means that 75% – or three 
fourths (3/4) – of a bank’s Tier 1 capital (and over 56.25% of a bank’s total capital ratio) 
needs to be in the form of CET 1.  
 
Alongside CET 1, Additional Tier 1 capital (AT1) is the second component of Tier 1 
capital. AT1 should be equivalent to 1.5 percentage points of a bank’s total capital ratio. 
AT1 securities are subordinated to (eg rank junior or are paid later than) ‘depositors, 
general creditors and subordinated debt of the bank’.320 Tier 1 capital includes certain 
equity instruments, like preferred shares and share premiums that result from the sale of 
stocks at higher than par value.321 AT1 can also include loss absorbing securities held by 
banks’ parent entities and contingent capital securities (commonly referred to as 
‘CoCos’).322 CoCos are ‘hybrid capital securities that absorb losses in accordance with 
their contractual terms when the capital of the issuing bank falls below a certain level’.323  
 
According to S. Avdjiev et al. CoCos’ loss absorbency comes from two of their main 
features: their trigger event and their loss absorbency mechanism.324 CoCo-holders agree 
(ex ante) that regulators can offset their investment against losses in order to boost capital 
                                                
319 Under Basel I and Basel II, banks were required to have half (50%) of their total capital in the 
form of Tier 1 and the other half (50%) in the form of Tier 2 capital.  
320 The general characteristics of AT1 securities are listed in Basel III para 55. 
321 Basel III sets out the characteristics that instruments need to have in order to qualify as AT1. 
See Basel III para 54-56. 
322 Stefan Avdjiev, Anastasia Kartasheva and Bilyana Bogdanova, ‘Cocos: A Primer’ (September 
2013) BIS Quarterly Review 46.  
323 ibid. 
324 ibid.  
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levels whenever the latter are depleted or in the event that a pre-established trigger event 
occurs.325 Moreover, CoCos can also boost capital levels by equity conversion or through 
write-downs.326  
 
Tier 2 capital, also known as ‘gone concern’ capital327, now constitutes up to 2 
percentage points of the total capital ratio. Basel III establishes the criteria that Tier 2 
capital securities must have328. These are typically subordinated debt instruments and 
other securities ‘subordinated to depositors and general creditors of the bank’. Thus their 
creditor rank for loss-apportionment follows equity holders and investors in AT1 
instruments.  
 
The following stylized example can help illustrate the most recent changes in the 
composition of banks’ capital. Before Basel III, for every $16 of total regulatory capital 
that a bank had, $8 needed to be in the form of Tier 1 capital and $8 in the form of Tier 2 
capital. Under Basel III, for every $16 of total capital, Tier 1 capital now comprises $12, 
out of which $9 dollars need to be in the form of CET 1. In comparison, the amount of 
required CET 1 alone ($9) will now exceed the Tier 1 capital that was necessary under 
Basel I and Basel II ($8 in this simplified example). Figure 6 shows the total capital ratio 
under Basel III.  
 
Moreover, Figure 6 can also help illustrate how losses are apportioned across different 
bank stakeholders. Tier 1 capital instruments are written down first (CET1 and then 
AT1). Once Tier 1 capital is written down, Tier 2 instruments are next in line to absorb 
losses, if needed.   
 
                                                
325 ibid.  
326 Referring to CoCos, Christos Hadjiemmanuil considers that their: ‘unilateral conversion in the 
event of distress can permit a rapid debt-to-equity recapitalisation of the issuing institution, 
avoiding the need for public funding’.  C Hadjiemmanuil, ‘Special Resolution Regimes for 
Banking Organizations: Objectives and Limitations’ in Wolf-Georg Ringe and Peter M Huber 
(eds) Legal Challenges in the Global Financial Crisis: Bail-outs, the Euro and Regulation (Hart 
Publishing 2014). 
327 See Basel III para 58.  
328 ibid. 
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Figure 6  
8% Total Capital Ratio Under Basel III 
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Because of the importance that CET 1 plays with regards to total capital requirements, 
national regulators have the difficult task of defining it within the guidelines provided by 
the Basel Committee. The Basel Committee set out a list of 14 attributes that CET 1
needs to have (see Table 4). In the EU, Article 28 of the Capital Requirements Regulation 
(‘CRR’) sets out the conditions that capital instruments need to have in order to qualify as 
CET 1. This definition faces the additional challenge that across EU member countries a 
plethora of organizational forms exist – and not all of them issue common or ordinary 
shares.  
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Table 4  
Criteria for Classification as Common Shares under Basel III 
(Source: BCBS329) 
1. Represents the most subordinated claim in liquidation of the bank.  
2. Entitled to a claim on the residual assets that is proportional with its share of issued 
capital, after all senior claims have been repaid in liquidation (ie has an unlimited 
and variable claim, not a fixed or capped claim). 
3. Principal is perpetual and never repaid outside of liquidation (setting aside 
discretionary repurchases or other means of effectively reducing capital in a 
discretionary manner that is allowable under relevant law). 
4. The bank does nothing to create an expectation at issuance that the instrument will 
be bought back, redeemed or cancelled nor do the statutory or contractual terms 
provide any feature which might give rise to such an expectation. 
5. Distributions are paid out of distributable items (retained earnings included). The 
level of distributions is not in any way tied or linked to the amount paid in at 
issuance and is not subject to a contractual cap (except to the extent that a bank is 
unable to pay distributions that exceed the level of distributable items). 
6. There are no circumstances under which the distributions are obligatory. Non 
payment is therefore not an event of default. 
7. Distributions are paid only after all legal and contractual obligations have been met 
and payments on more senior capital instruments have been made. This means that 
there are no preferential distributions, including in respect of other elements 
classified as the highest quality issued capital. 
8. It is the issued capital that takes the first and proportionately greatest share of any 
losses as they occur. Within the highest quality capital, each instrument absorbs 
losses on a going concern basis proportionately and pari passu with all the others. 
 
9. The paid in amount is recognized as equity capital (eg not recognized as a liability) 
for determining balance sheet insolvency. 
                                                
329 Basel III 12-13.  
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10. The paid in amount is classified as equity under the relevant accounting standards.  
11. It is directly issued and paid-in and the bank cannot directly or indirectly have 
funded the purchase of the instrument.  
12. The paid in amount is neither secured nor covered by a guarantee of the issuer or 
related entity or subject to any other arrangement that legally or economically 
enhances the seniority of the claim. 
13. It is only issued with the approval of the owners of the issuing bank, either given 
directly by the owners or, if permitted by applicable law, given by the Board of 
Directors or by other persons duly authorized by the owners. 
14. It is clearly and separately disclosed on the bank’s balance sheet. 
 
 
Defining CET 1 is of utmost importance for the implementation of Basel III. This is 
because other complementary measures and tools introduced in Basel III hinge upon the 
concept of CET 1. The next subsections describe these measures in order to showcase 
how the concept of CET 1 is central to most of them. 
 
3.2. Capital Conservation Buffer 
 
Basel III introduces a capital conservation buffer in order to ensure that banks have 
enough accumulated capital to endure economic downturns. The capital conservation 
buffer has been set at 2.5% of RWAs. The capital conservation buffer is comprised of 
CET 1, and it is established on top of the regulatory minimum capital requirement.330 In 
the words of the BCBS, the capital conservation buffer: ‘is designed to ensure that banks 
build up capital buffers outside periods of stress which can be drawn down as losses are 
incurred’.331 Put differently, the capital conservation buffer seeks to guarantee that banks 
                                                
330 This means that it is in addition to the 8% capital ratio, which in turn must include 6% of 
RWAs in the form of Tier 1 capital – out of which 4.5 percentage points have to be in the form of 
CET 1. Consequently, adding the capital conservation buffer raises the capital ratio to 10.5% of 
RWAs – out of which 7% has to be in the form of CET 1.  
331 Basel III para 122.  
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have extra capital in addition to the minimum capital requirements, in order to maintain 
threshold conditions during economic downturns.      
 
The rationale behind the capital conservation buffer is that banks should exhibit high 
quality capital in excess of the minimum requirements. If a bank’s capital levels fall close 
to the minimum outside a period of financial distress, then it will be expected to rebuild 
its buffers in order to keep capital levels above and beyond the minimum requirements. 
This does not mean that regulators would intervene or sanction banks that exhibit a 
capital conservation buffer below the required levels. That is, the objective is not to 
create a new minimum capital requirement, but rather to restrict distributions to owners 
or managers whenever the buffer is too low and until it is fully replenished.332  
 
There are several ways for banks to increase their capital conservation buffer. One way is 
to reduce dividend and bonuses payments and build the buffer through retained earnings. 
The Basel Committee describes what it calls a ‘collective action problem’ that can occur 
with regards to distributions. Banks could want to signal financial strength (or avoid 
signaling weaknesses) by distributing (or failing to distribute) earnings. However, the 
BCBS wants to avoid distributions to the owners and managers whenever capital buffers 
are depleted in order to allow achieving the required thresholds.333 Assuming that 
earnings actually exist, increasing regulatory capital through retained earnings is a 
strategy that is available to both corporate and non-corporate banks.  
 
Another alternative for some banks in order to achieve the required conservation buffer is 
to raise funds from the public.334 Corporate banks can do this by offering new shares to 
existing shareholders (eg via a rights issue). In addition, joint-stock banks could also try 
                                                
332 According to the Basel Committee ‘[i]tems considered to be distributions include dividends 
and share buybacks, discretionary payments on other Tier 1 capital instruments and discretionary 
bonus payments to staff’. See Basel III para 132(a).  
333 Basel III para 127. For a detailed discussion on building up bank capital through retained 
earnings see Admati and Hellwig (n 282) 169-175.  
334 Adjusting the denominator of the capital adequacy ratio can also enhance regulatory capital. 
This includes investing in assets with lower risk weights or reducing the amount of RWAs.  
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selling shares to new shareholders335 or selling shares at a premium.336 Banks that are not 
organized as joint stock companies would face some funding challenges on this front, as 
their capital is not always represented in shares that they can issue to the general public. 
This makes the concept of CET1 – which is of central significance to the implementation 
of the capital conservation buffer – a challenging standard for non-joint stock banks. It 
also underscores why the relationship between legal form and capital requirements is 
important.  
 
 
 
                                                
335 According to Eilis Ferran and Look Chan Ho ‘[t]here are basically three ways for a company 
to finance its operations: share issues, debt, and retained profits’. See Eilis Ferran and Look Chan 
Ho, Principles of Corporate Finance Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 42.   
336 Alexander (n 291).  
Table 5  
Individual Bank Minimum Capital Conservation Standards  
(Source: Basel III) 
Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio 
 
Minimum Capital Conservation Ratios 
(expressed as a percentage of earnings) 
 
4.5% - 5.125% 
 
 
100% 
 
>5.125% - 5.75% 
 
80% 
 
>5.75% - 6.375% 
 
60% 
 
>6.375% - 7.0% 40% 
 
> 7.0% 
 
0% 
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Table 5 depicts the minimum capital conservation levels that banks have to maintain 
according to their level of CET1 capital ratios. For example, it establishes that a bank 
with a CET1 ratio of 6.5% would have to conserve at least 40% of its earnings in a 
subsequent period (eg the bank can only distribute up to 60% of its earnings as dividend 
payments, share buybacks or discretionary bonus payments) in order to replenish its 
capital conservation buffer until CET1 plus the capital conservation buffer reach or 
exceed 7% of RWAs.337 This amount is independent of any additional CET1 needed to 
meet the 6% Tier 1 and 8% Total Capital requirements.  
 
The capital conservation buffer will become fully effective on 1st January 2019. The 
Basel Committee has designed a schedule for phasing in the capital conservation buffer 
between 1st January 2016 and year-end 2018. In 2016, the capital conservation buffer is 
set to begin at 0.625% of RWAs and will increase each subsequent year by an additional 
0.625 percentage points, until its final level of 2.5% of RWAs is reached on 1 January 
2019.338 Table 6 depicts the required levels of the capital conservation buffer during the 
implementation period.  
 
                                                
337 Basel III para 130.  
338 Basel III para 133.  
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Table 6  
Capital Conservation Buffer Implementation  
(Source: Basel III) 
 
 
DATE 
 
  
CAPITAL 
CONSERVATION 
BUFFER  
(In percentage points) 
 
 
1st January 2016 
 
 
0.625% 
 
1st January 2017 
 
 
1.25% 
 
 
1st January 2018 
 
 
1.875% 
 
 
1st January 2019 
 
 
2.5% 
  131 
3.3. Countercyclical Capital Buffer  
 
Pro-cyclicality was a major issue experienced during the financial crisis. When there is an 
economic boom, markets and market participants tend to act accordingly: lending freely, 
making deals, requiring less collateral for loans, etc. However, during economic 
downturns, markets and market participants tend to dry-up. This pro-cyclical tendency is 
embedded in many aspects of modern finance. For example: collateral requirements 
(margin calls), mark-to-market accounting, leverage and the granting of credit. 
Paradoxically, capital seems to be most important whenever it is needed the most.  
 
Trying to counteract pro-cyclicality has also become one of the objectives of Basel III. 
The Basel Committee has introduced a countercyclical capital buffer that aims to increase 
the ‘sensitivity and coverage of the regulatory capital requirement’.339 The 
countercyclical capital buffer complements the capital conservation buffer. The rationale 
is that when financial supervisors perceive that credit growth promotes or leads to 
systemic risk, they can require extra capital from banks in order to restrict lending. Once 
the systemic risk considerations cease to exist, then this requirement is no longer needed.  
 
In order to illustrate countercyclical measures, Prof. Rosa M. Lastra refers to the story of 
Joseph found in the Bible and the Quran.340 Joseph implemented countercyclical 
measures in Egypt in order to save extra provisions in times of prosperity that were then 
used in subsequent periods of scarcity and famine. During times of credit growth, banks 
will be required to have additional levels of capital in order to prevent the potential 
buildup of systemic risk. Once the concerns of systemic risk are no longer present, 
financial supervisors can calibrate and reduce this requirement, stimulating banks to lend 
more and aiming to avoid a credit contraction.341  
                                                
339 Basel III para 20.  
340 Rosa M. Lastra, International Financial and Monetary Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 
2015).  
341 Financial commentator Frances Coppola alerts against the common misconception that the 
countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) is a: ‘ “reserve” built up in good times that can be drawn 
down in more challenging times’. She clarifies that the purpose of the CCB is to ‘(…) dampen 
credit booms and busts’. See Frances Coppola, ‘Capital, Liquidity and the Countercyclical Buffer 
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This buffer is one of the novel macroprudential measures included in Basel III.342 
Macroprudential regulation has become topical in the aftermath of the financial crisis.343 
Traditionally, the Basel Capital rules were considered to be microprudential in their 
nature, concerned mostly with the safety and soundness of individual financial 
institutions. In turn, macroprudential tools – like the countercyclical capital buffer and the 
SIFI surcharge discussed later in this chapter – aim to foster financial stability and 
prevent the build-up of systemic risk.  
 
The internationally agreed range of the discretionary countercyclical capital buffer has 
been set between zero and 2.5% of RWAs on top of the 8% baseline capital ratio. 
However, countries can also require greater levels if needed during periods of excessive 
credit expansion. The countercyclical capital buffer needs to be fulfilled with CET1, 
which is capital of the highest lost absorbency.344 If banks fail to meet this requirement, 
their distributions will be restricted until they do so. As Figure 7 shows, with the addition 
of the discretionary countercyclical capital buffer, potential total capital requirements 
have increased under Basel III to up to 13% of capital over RWAs.345  
 
Once again, because of their inability to issue and sell shares in order to build up their 
CET1, non-joint stock banks could be at a disadvantage vis-à-vis corporate banks with 
regards to the countercyclical capital buffer.  
 
 
                                                
– in plain English’ (Coppola Comment, 1 October 2015)  
<http://www.coppolacomment.com/2015/10/capital-liquidity-and-countercyclical.html> accessed 
6 December 2016.  
342 Introductory remarks on the rise of macroprudential regulation are discussed in chapter 2.  
343 For a general overview of the development of macroprudential regulation and supervision see 
Rosa Lastra, ‘Sistemic Risk and Macroprudential Supervision’ in Niamh Moloney, Eilis Ferran, 
Jennifer Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (OUP 2015). See also 
Gabriele Galati and Richhild Moessner, ‘Macroprudential Policy – A Literature Review’ (2011) 
BIS Working Papers n 337 <http://www.bis.org/publ/work337.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016; 
Samuel G Hanson, Anil K Kashyap, and Jeremy C Stein, ‘A Macroprudential Approach to 
Financial Regulation’ (2011) 25 Journal of Economic Perspectives 3.  
344 Basel III para 142.  
345 See also King and Tarbet (n 315).  
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Figure 7 
Total Regulatory Capital to RWAs Under Basel I and Basel III 
 
 
 
3.4.  G-SIB  Surcharge 
 
Global systemically important banks346 (‘SIBs’ or ‘SIFIs’) are of significant concern for 
standard setting bodies and supervisors. Since 2011, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
has worked under the mandate of the G20 on identifying global SIBs (G-SIBs’) and 
determining how much extra capital they should have. 
 
G-SIBs consist of open-ended list of around 30 large corporate banking groups 
considered ‘too-big-to-fail’ (‘TBTF’) – essentially because their failure could have an 
adverse impact of financial stability across different countries. The FSB publishes an 
updated list of G-SIBs on a yearly basis.  
                                                
346 Also called ‘systemically important financial institutions’ or ‘large and complex financial 
institutions’.  
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One of the main strategies implemented for tackling TBTF is requiring G-SIBs to have a 
higher capital ratio than regular banks. This would purportedly lower the probability of 
failure or financial distress. The Basel Committee has worked alongside the FSB and G-
SIB home country regulators in order to develop and implement a so-called ‘G-SIB 
surcharge’ of additional required capital.  
 
The FSB has created five ‘buckets’ of additional loss absorbency. The G-SIB surcharge 
adds an additional capital buffer between 1.0% and 3.5% for banks identified under each 
bucket. Table 7 depicts the list of G-SIBs alongside with their respective risk bucket. By 
2019, G-SIBs’ total loss-absorbency capacity will be expected to amount to a capital ratio 
of up to 16% of RWAs. The FSB plans to gradually raise G-SIB TLAC to 18% by 
January 2022.  
 
According to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System the rationale behind 
the G-SIFI surcharge is twofold. Firstly, it creates incentives for G-SIFIs to reduce ‘their 
systemic footprint’.347 In other words, it is intended to provide a disincentive for moral 
hazard that stems from being ‘too-big-to-fail’. Secondly, the surcharge may ‘may offset 
any funding advantage that SIFIs have on account of being perceived as “too big to 
fail”’.348 So it also serves as a ‘Pigouvian’ charge against any implicit subsidies and 
advantages that could result from being TBTF.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
347 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, ‘Calibrating the GSIB Surcharge’ (20 July 
2015) <http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/gsib-methodology-paper-
20150720.pdf > accessed 6 December 2016.  
348 ibid. 
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Table 7 
2016 List of G-SIBs and Their Required Level of Additional Loss 
Absorbency 
 (Source: FSB349) 
 G-SIBs   Bucket 
(Empty) 5 
(3,5%) 
Citigroup 
JP Morgan Chase 
 
4 
(2,5%) 
Bank of America 
BNP Paribas 
Deutsche Bank 
HSBC 
 
3 
(2,0%) 
 
Barclays 
Credit Suisse 
Goldman Sachs 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
Limited 
Mitsubishi UFJ FG 
Wells Fargo 
 
 
 
2 
(1,5%) 
Agricultural Bank of China 
Bank of China 
Bank of New York Mellon 
China Construction Bank 
Group BPCE 
Groupe Crédit Agricole 
ING Bank 
Mizuho FG  
Morgan Stanley 
Nordea 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
Banco Santander 
Société Générale 
Standard Chartered  
State Street 
Sumiomu Mitsui FG 
UBS 
Unicredit Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
(1,0%) 
                                                
349 Financial Stability Board, ‘2016 list of global systemically important banks’ (2016) 
<http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks-G-
SIBs.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016 - G-SIBs are allocated to buckets with regards to their loss 
absorbency requirements that will need to held. This is in addition to their Total Loss-Absorbing 
Capacity. 
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3.5.  Leverage Ratio 
 
So far, the measures contained in Basel III refer to more and better quality capital. In 
addition to the aforementioned buffers, Basel III also aims to tackle excessive leverage in 
the banking system.  
 
The BCBS considers that ‘[o]ne of the underlying features of the crisis was the build up 
of excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage in the banking system’.350 During the 
crisis, banks were required to reduce their debt levels. Deleveraging would often 
exacerbate problems creating a destructive downward spiral with sliding asset prices and 
fire sales that accentuated losses and led to a severe credit crunch.     
 
In order to tackle some of the leverage problems experienced during the crisis, the Basel 
Committee introduced a leverage ratio as part of Basel III. The leverage ratio’s main 
objectives are to curb the negative effects of deleveraging processes and to create a 
‘simple, transparent and independent measure of risk’.351  
 
The leverage ratio has been set at 3% of Tier 1 capital over a bank’s average total 
exposure. The capital measure used for the ratio is the revamped definition of Tier 1 
capital, which is mainly comprised of CET 1. In the denominator, the average total 
exposure includes on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet items, as well as derivatives.352  
 
Contrary to the previous measures described so far, the liquidity ratio does not hinge 
upon the concept of RWAs. Moreover, it uses Tier 1 capital instead of the more stringent 
CET 1. 
 
                                                
350 Basel III para 16.  
351 ibid. 
352 ibid para 154-160. 
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3.6.  Liquidity Ratios  
 
For any firm, liquidity can be as important as capital. Like any economic agent, a bank 
can be solvent and at the same time lack enough cash to make payments whenever they 
are due. Until the advent of Basel III no globalized liquidity standards existed. In order to 
strengthen liquidity management, Basel III introduces two new minimum liquidity 
standards.  
 
The first measure, called the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) addresses short term 
funding needs with the objective of promoting ‘short-term resilience of a bank’s liquidity 
risk profile by ensuring that it has sufficient high quality liquid resources to survive an 
acute stress scenario lasting for one month’.353 The second measure, called the Net Stable 
Funding Ratio (NSFR) is (at the time of writing) currently still been developed for 
supporting banks’ funding structure for one year and for supporting the maturity structure 
of assets and liabilities.  
 
3.7.  Summary 
 
Basel III redefines the main components of banks’ total regulatory capital. The revamped 
concept of Tier 1 capital – with CET 1 at its core – is essential to ensuring higher loss-
absorbency. As explained, CET 1 also plays a major role for the application of the 
counter cyclical capital buffer, the capital conservation buffer, the G-SIFI surcharge and 
the leverage ratio.  
 
However, CET 1 hinges on the assumption that all banks are corporations that can issue 
common shares. The BCBS acknowledges this assumption, addressing non-joint stock 
banks in a footnote to Basel III, which states that the:  
 
                                                
353 Basel III para 38.  
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(CET 1) criteria also apply to non joint stock companies, such as mutuals, 
cooperatives or savings institutions, taking into account their specific 
constitution and legal structure. The application of the criteria should 
preserve the quality of the instruments by requiring that they are deemed 
fully equivalent to common shares in terms of their capital quality as 
regards loss absorption and do not possess features which could cause the 
condition of the bank to be weakened as a going concern during periods of 
market stress. Supervisors will exchange information on how they apply 
the criteria to non joint stock companies in order to ensure consistent 
implementation.354   
 
In turn, the next section discusses some policy implications, challenges and unintended 
consequences that could arise regarding the design of capital and liquidity rules and their 
linkage to bank legal forms.  
 
4.  UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES  
 
The precedent discussion on Basel III and CET 1 leads to answering the main question 
that this chapter purports to examine: do international bank capital and liquidity standards 
account for the fact that – in a real world setting – commercial banks are not always 
organized as corporations? More importantly, it raises concerns regarding whether 
standard setting bodies like the BCBS and the FSB, and domestic financial supervisors 
across countries, are taking such organizational differences into account when they 
design and implement the most recent set of capital rules.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
354 ibid fn 12.  
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4.1. Capital Standards and Bank Organizational Forms: Does One-
Size-Fit-All? 
 
The definition of CET 1 is central for the implementation of several core parts of Basel 
III. However, CET1 seems to have been primarily designed for banks organized as joint 
stock companies. This has the potential of creating implementation inconsistencies and 
uncertainty for banks that are not organized under the corporate form, including: mutual 
banks, co-operative banks, savings institutions, credit unions, etc.  
 
Moreover, Basel III seems to allow leeway so that regulators across countries can design 
and implement different rules for non-joint stock banks. This could undermine the 
consistency of Basel III across countries. It is essential to prevent inconsistencies across 
countries regarding the application of CET 1 to non-joint stock banks.  
 
The Basel Committee acknowledges in Basel III that ‘[t]he vast majority of 
internationally active banks are structured as joint stock companies (…)’.355 However, the 
Basel Committee has also pointed out that Basel III’s objectives are to: ‘improve the 
banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, 
whatever the source, thus reducing the risk of spillover from the financial sector to the 
real economy’.356 Consequently, in order to achieve this policy objective, corporate and 
non-corporate banks should be deemed of equal importance. 
 
Domestic supervisors and regulators are faced with the task of implementing Basel III. In 
the EU, parts of the Basel III rules have been implemented through the Capital 
Requirements Regulation (‘CRR’) and the Directive on Access to the Activity of Credit 
Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms 
(‘CRD IV’).   
                                                
355 Basel III para 53.  For the purpose of Basel III, joint stock companies or corporations are 
defined as: ‘(…) companies that have issued common shares, irrespective of whether these shares 
are held privately or publically’. 
356 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Basel III: A global regulatory framework 
for more resilient banks and banking systems’ (December 2010) (rev June 2011) 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm> accessed 6 December 2016. 
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4.2. Capital Standards and Democratic Legitimacy   
 
Failing to take non-joint stock banks into account when designing capital and liquidity 
rules can raise concerns regarding the legitimacy of such standards. As Prof. Kern 
Alexander points out: ‘[m]any of the organisations and other bodies that produce 
international financial regulatory standards are themselves “soft” in the sense that they 
are networks of informally constituted international bodies consisting of public regulatory 
officials, or representatives from the financial services industry’.357 This is certainly the 
case with the BCBS – and to a certain extent, also the FSB. The fact that capital and 
liquidity rules are devised by international standard setting bodies with little connection 
to political constituencies raises important questions regarding the lack of democratic 
legitimacy and accountability.  
 
Non-joint stock banks, their managers and stakeholders could challenge the Basel 
Committee’s authority to determine how their regulatory capital is defined and measured. 
Moreover, there seems to be some discontent at the fact that intricacies of non-joint stock 
banks are often sidelined. Challenges to democratic legitimacy can also leave some room 
for regulators to attempt to maneuver exemptions or to apply different definitions of 
CET1 for their domestic non-joint stock banks. Ultimately, this can lead to the same 
problems and unaddressed loopholes that eroded the effectiveness of Basel I and Basel II. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
International capital and liquidity standards should be designed for all types of banks – 
including joint stock and non-joint stock banks. Some non-joint stock banks, like mutual 
associations and savings banks, do not issue common shares. This entails that some 
regulatory concepts, such as CET1, can pose some implementation challenges for their 
application to co-operatives, mutual societies and other forms of non-joint stock banks.  
                                                
357 See Kern Alexander, ‘Rebuilding International Financial Regulation’ (2011) Butterworth’s 
Journal of International Banking and Financial Law.  
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It could be argued that the biggest and most important banks are mostly chartered under 
the corporate form. In fact, all existing G-SIBs are legally organized as groups of 
different corporations (holding companies, affiliates, subsidiaries and the consolidated 
legal personality of branches). However, this does not necessarily mean that capital and 
liquidity requirements should be bespoke standards made primarily for the measure of 
corporate banks.  
 
Non-joint stock banks can also be of domestic and regional systemic importance.358 As 
was discussed under chapter 3, customer owned banks and nonprofit banks often provide 
essential financial services to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) within certain 
geographical areas, and have also historically focused on social benefit and charitable 
activities. The IMF has acknowledged the risk of creating an uneven playing field 
between different types of banks, when referring to the particular case of the Spanish 
saving banks (cajas de ahorros), it stated that: ‘[n]ew international capital standards, 
which put greater emphasis on equity capital and tighten asset risk weighing, represented 
an additional challenge’359 for the Spanish cajas. The same could be said about co-
operatives and mutual banks as well.  
 
Domestic and cross border systemic risk can buildup anywhere within a financial system. 
It is certainly not exclusively related to corporate banks. Non-corporate banks can also 
experience financial distress and bankruptcy, and when they do, their failure could imply 
some form of State intervention or taxpayer bailout.   
 
As the Vice-President of the European Association of Co-operative Banks (EACB), 
Gerhard Hofmann, has been credited with saying that co-operative – and I add, other 
types of non-joint stock banks – are ‘too important to be in the footnote when such 
                                                
358 Some co-operative banks can have domestic systemic importance. See Hans Groeneveld ‘A 
Snapshot of European Co-operative Banking’ (April 2016) 7 
http://www.globalcube.net/clients/eacb/content/medias/publications/annual_reports/20160411_H
G_EACB_FINAL_Snapshot.pdf accessed 6 December 2016. 
359 IMF ‘The Reform of Spanish Savings Banks: Technical Note’ (May 2012) para 13.   
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[capital and liquidity] regulations are drafted’.360 In a recent report, Hans Groeneveld has 
stated that ‘the effects of different organisational forms and/or business models on 
banking market structures remain relatively underexposed’ in the publications of leading 
financial regulators and international standard setting bodies, like the IMF, the BIS and 
the ECB.361  
 
An important linkage exists between legal form, the composition of regulatory capital 
(total loss-absorbing capacity) and bank resolution. As has been discussed so far, 
organizational forms determine how a bank’s regulatory capital structure is legally 
characterized. Legal forms – and their varying levels of affirmative asset partitioning 
(entity shielding) – also determine the pecking order of owners’ and creditors’ claims on 
a bank’s property.  
 
Broadly speaking, banks’ owners provide institutions with Tier 1 capital, while certain 
creditors and other investors provide its Tier 2 capital.362 Whenever a bank experiences 
losses (eg because of bad loans or investments), Tier 1 capital providers (eg owners) 
suffer losses first. Thus owners always absorb losses before creditors and depositors.  
 
It is important to note, as previously discussed in chapter 3, that some banks either have 
no owners (eg nonprofit banks like the Spanish saving banks) or are owned by their 
depositors (eg British building societies and credit unions). So a bank’s pecking order 
becomes important when losses have to be apportioned across different stakeholders. In 
turn, the next chapter examines the relationship that exists between organizational forms 
and bank resolution.  
 
                                                
360 See ‘Leaders discuss new regulations at European Co-operative Banks Convention’ (n 281). 
361 Groeneveld (n 358).  
362 This includes secured and unsecured bondholders, unsecured and secured depositors 
(including other banks), and the central bank.  
 Chapter Five 
Can Differences in Legal Form and Creditor 
Rank Hinder Cross-Border Bank Resolution? 
 
 
SUMMARY 
Could differences in legal form and creditor priority undermine cross-border bank 
resolution procedures? This chapter raises questions regarding whether a better 
understanding of bank legal forms – and the economic consequences of asset 
partitioning – could also provide some insights for making cross-border bank 
resolution more effective. According to the asset-partitioning framework, entity 
shielding is the essential feature of organizational law. Entity shielding has two 
important economic consequences: creditor rank and liquidation protection. Creditor 
rank is predetermined by organizational form and insolvency laws and can be 
changed through legislation or contract. The chapter analyzes the implementation of 
bank resolution and bail-ins across the EU and finds variations in the order of certain 
types of bank creditors in member countries, which could undermine the set of 
European resolution rules. Moreover, the geographical partitioning of assets that 
results from entity shielding can further create coordination problems and challenges 
for the effectiveness of single and multiple-point of entry bank resolution processes. 
 
KEYWORDS: Bank resolution, bank legal forms, entity shielding, creditor priority, 
internal asset partitioning, external asset partitioning, single point of entry (SPE), 
multiple point of entry resolution (MPE), BRRD. 
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‘Put briefly, financial institutions do not internalise the spill-overs of their behaviour to 
the financial system as a whole and to the real economy’.363 
   
Dirk Schoenmaker and Peter Wierts (2012) 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Both during and after the onslaught of the most recent financial crisis, States and 
financial supervisors have faced major challenges, including dealing with bank failure 
and financial distress while preventing disruptions to the overall financial system and the 
real economy.364 The agenda for revamping global finance has been dominated by 
objectives such as mitigating moral hazard, reducing the external cost of bank failures 
and putting an end to odious taxpayer funded bailout packages.365  
 
One particular concern that financial standard setting bodies and regulators have 
discussed is whether banks should be subject to regular insolvency rules (lex generalis) 
or if they require their own specific regimes (lex specialis).366 The prevailing view is that 
banks are different to other firms and should be subject to special bank insolvency or 
orderly resolution regimes in order to deal with their financial distress367 or potential 
                                                
363 Dirk Schoenmaker and Peter Wierts, ‘Macroprudential Policy: The Need for a Coherent Policy 
Framework’ (2011) DSF Policy Paper Series n 13, 4. 
364 Christos Hadjiemmanuil, ‘Special Resolution Regimes for Banking Organizations: Objectives 
and Limitations’ in Wolf-Georg Ringe and Peter M Huber (eds) Legal Challenges in the Global 
Financial Crisis: Bail-outs, the Euro and Regulation (Hart Publishing 2014). 
365 Emilios Avgouleas and Charles Goodhart, ‘Critical Reflections on Bank Bail-ins’ (2015) 1 
Journal of Financial Regulation 2-29. 
366 See Eva Hüpkes, ‘Insolvency – Why a Special Regime for Banks’ (2003) IMF 3 Current 
Developments in Monetary and Financial Law. See also ER Morrison, ‘Is the Bankruptcy Code 
an Adequate Mechanism for Resolving the Distress of Systemically Important Institutions?’ 
(2010) 82 Temple Law Review 449.  
367 Financial distress is defined here as ‘a bank that is facing difficulties in continuing its usual 
activities because of lack of funding or lack of capital’. See Mathias Dewatripont and Xavier 
Freixas, ‘Bank Resolution: Lessons from the Crisis’ in M Dewatripont and X Freixas (eds), The 
Crisis Aftermath: New Regulatory Paradigms (London, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
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failure and to stop bailouts.368 However, legal and coordination challenges exist across 
jurisdictions that threaten to hinder the effectiveness of cross-border bank resolution.  
 
Bank resolution procedures can be defined as ‘any public intervention that is intended to 
restore the bank’s normal business conditions or to liquidate it, thus restoring normal 
conditions for all other banks’.369 Several jurisdictions, including the United States370 
(US), the Netherlands371, Germany372 and the United Kingdom373 (UK), have 
                                                
2012) 106 available online <http://voxeu.org/sites/default/files/file/Crisis_Aftermath.pdf> 
accessed 6 December 2016.  
368 John Armour considers that: ‘a strong case exists for the application of special procedures to 
mitigate the transmission of financial shocks’. While referring to resolution, Armour has stated 
that the ‘critical assumption’ of the ‘specialness of banks, which provides the justification for 
their prudential regulation, also dominates their post-failure treatment and determines its 
objectives’. See John Armour, ‘Making Bank Resolution Credible’ in Niamh Moloney, Eilís 
Ferran and Jennifer Payne (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (OUP 2015) 428. 
See also Hadjiemmanuil (n 364).   
369 Dewatripont and Freixas (n 367) 106. 
370 Both John Armour and Christos Hadjiemmanuil agree that the US pioneered in the 
development of special bank insolvency rules. According to Hadjiemmanuil, the US approach to 
bank resolution dates back to the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, which led to the enactment 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (the ‘FDICIA’). The US 
regime predates the 2007-08 financial crisis, thus J Armour refers to it as a ‘first generation’ 
resolution mechanism (as opposed to post-crisis or ‘second generation’ reforms). Moreover, the 
Dodd Frank Act 2010 further implemented strategies for dealing with the resolution of 
systemically important banks. See Hadjiemmanuil (n 364); Armour (n 368). 
371 Intervention Act (Interventiewet) Act of 24 May 2012 to amend the Act on Financial 
Supervision and the Bankruptcy Act as well as a number of other Acts in connection with the 
introduction of supplementary powers to intervene in financial institutions in financial trouble 
(Act on Special Measures for Financial Institutions) (Wet van 24 mei 2012 tot wijziging van de 
Wet op het financieel toezicht en de Faillissementswet, alsmede enige andere wetten in verband 
met de introductie van aanvullende bevoegdheden tot interventie bij financiële ondernemingen in 
problemen) (Wet bijzondere maatregelen financiële ondernemingen), Stb. 2012, 241. Cited from 
Matthias Haentjens and Lynette Janssen, ‘New National Solutions for Bank Failures: Game-
changing in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands?’ (2015) 1 Journal of Financial Regulation 
294.  
372 Gesetz zur Restrukturierung und geordneten Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten, zur Errichtung 
eines Restrukturierungsfonds für Kreditinstitute und zur Verlängerung der Verjährungsfrist der 
aktienrechtlichen Organhaftung (Restrukturierungsgesetz) vom 9. Dezember 2010, BGBl. 2010, 
I, 1900.   
373 The UK’s SRR was established through the Banking Act 2009. The Financial Services 
(Banking Reform) Act 2013 added bail-in as a resolution tool in the UK. Moreover, the following 
instruments have also been implemented: The Bank Recovery and Resolution Order 2014; The 
Bank Recovery and Resolution (No 2) Order 2014; The Banks and Buildings Societies (Depositor 
Preference and Priorities) Order 2014; The Building Societies (Bail-in) Order 2014; The Banking 
Act 2009 (Restriction of Special Bail-in Provision, etc) Order 2014; The Banking Act 2009 
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implemented specialized bank resolution regimes (or ‘SRRs’).374 SRRs can include a 
combination of both pre-established judicial insolvency proceedings – as well as 
administrative legal rules used to deal with insolvent or distressed banks. 
 
In the European Union (EU), member States have had to reform their national practices 
in accordance to the Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive375 (hereinafter, 
‘BRRD’) and the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation376 (SRM) that applies to the 
Eurozone Countries – and constitutes a pillar of the ‘Banking Union’. Several 
international financial standard setting bodies377, including the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB)378, the Basel Committee (BCBS)379 and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
                                                
(Mandatory Compensation Arrangements Following Bail-in) Regulations 2014. See HM 
Treasury, ‘Transposition of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive: A Response to the 
Consultation’ (March 2015) para 1.3. 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417789/transposi
tion_of_BRRD_consultation_response.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016.  
374 See Gustaf Sjöberg, ‘Banking Special Resolution Regimes as a Governance Tool’ in Wolf-
Georg Ringe and Peter M Huber (eds) Legal Challenges in the Global Financial Crisis: Bail-
outs, the Euro and Regulation (Hart Publishing 2014). 
375 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment 
firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 
2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and 
Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, OJ L 173/190. EU Member States had to make the BRRD operational by 1st January 
2015.  
376 Regulation (EU) No 806/ 2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 
establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and 
certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single 
Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/ 2010, OJ L 225; and Agreement on 
the transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund of 14 May 2014 
(8457/ 14).   
377 For a general overview of international initiatives see Matthias Haentjens, ‘Bank Recovery 
and Resolution: An Overview of International Initiatives’ (2014) 3 International Insolvency Law 
Review 255. 
378 Financial Stability Board (FSB) ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial 
Institutions’ (October 2011) <http://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_111104cc.pdf?page_moved=1> accessed 6 December 2016.  
379 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Report and Recommendations of the Cross-Border 
Bank Resolution Group (March 2010).  
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and the World Bank380 have also promoted and recommended in their publications that 
countries establish orderly bank resolution procedures. 
 
The need for special bank insolvency rules seems paradoxical, considering that in some 
languages the word ‘bankruptcy’ itself has its etymological roots in the Italian phrase 
‘banca rotta’ – which literary refers to the ancient practice of breaking moneychangers’ 
tables or benches (banca) once they stopped honoring their payments.381 Before the 
widespread advent of SRRs, bank insolvency was typically dealt either by applying 
ordinary commercial reorganization and winding up procedures382, or through ad hoc 
(public and private) measures used by bank regulators (eg convoy rescues383, mergers and 
acquisitions, bailout packages, nationalization, emergency liquidity assistance, etc).384  
 
This chapter argues that differences in bank legal forms should be taken into 
consideration both for the design of SRRs as well as during bank resolution procedures. 
The chapter argues that legal form can be relevant because of three important factors: (A) 
legal forms establish different ownership structures (eg which stakeholders own a bank); 
(B) ownership structure determines a bank’s capital structure or loss absorbing capacity 
(discussed under chapter 4); and (C) the entity shielding that results from organizational 
form determines banks’ absolute creditor priority and liquidation protection.  
 
Ownership and capital structures vary across corporate and non-corporate banks. 
Moreover, creditor priority also changes – and can further diverge across jurisdictions. 
The latter can create coordination problems and potential legal uncertainty for the cross-
border resolution of some banks in the EU. Moreover, if not taken into account, it could 
                                                
380 International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, ‘An Overview of the Legal, 
Institutional and Regulatory Framework for Bank Insolvency’ (17 April 2009).   
381 Matthias Haentjens and Pierre de Gioia-Carabellese, European Banking and Financial Law 
(Taylor and Francis 2015) ch 7.1. In Spanish, bancarrota or even quiebra (literally meaning 
‘fracture’ or ‘breakage’), banqueroute (French), Bankrott (German), etc.   
382 ibid ch 7.1. 
383 Takeo Hoshi, ‘Financial Regulation: Lessons from the Recent Financial Crises’ (2011) 49 (1) 
Journal of Economic Literature 120. See also Takeo Hoshi, ‘The Convoy System for Insolvent 
Banks: How it Worked and Why it Failed in the 1990s’ (2002) 14(2) Japan and the World 
Economy 155.  
384 See Hadjiemmanuil (n 364).  
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also hinder the effectiveness of resolution strategies and bring forth litigation should 
resolution authorities and courts attempt to change bank creditor priority.    
 
Bank resolution tools include: resolution funds, investor bail-ins, asset transfers – and 
they are typically used in combination with other crisis management tools, like deposit 
protection insurance schemes and lender of last resort functions.385 Moreover, domestic 
insolvency laws, which configure the creditor loss-bearing order, also tend to differ 
across national lines. Regulators and supervisors can also decide to change (improve or 
worsen) the position of certain bank creditors through special legislation, as has recently 
happened in several European countries.386   
 
The combination of the aforementioned factors calls for several questions. Should legal 
form be taken into consideration when dealing with bank resolution? Does resolution 
play out differently across bank legal forms? And more importantly, could ‘entity 
shielding’ (creditor rank and liquidation protection) work against different types of 
resolution strategies, hindering their proposed objectives and reducing their 
effectiveness?  
 
This chapter explores if and how the way that banks are legally organized and their 
different incentive structures interacts with some of the aforementioned resolution tools 
and strategies. Special focus is given to the interplay between the entity shielding that 
results from legal forms and organizational law, and bank resolution regimes and 
techniques – like investor bail-in and asset transfers to bridge banks. The chapter extends 
and applies the asset-partitioning framework (introduced and described in chapter 3) to 
the context of resolution rules, legal forms and loss apportionment across bank creditors. 
The applied framework is used to help explain the potential perils of having divergent 
creditor ranks across jurisdiction and could also help mind organizational features in 
order to make resolution processes more effective. The discussion focuses on cross-
border resolution in the EU in order to better illustrate some of the tensions between legal 
                                                
385 See generally Rosa M Lastra, International Financial and Monetary Law (2 edn OUP 2015) 
ch 4. 
386 See s 4.3 below.  
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form and resolution. However, some of the ideas can be generalized to other jurisdictions 
as well.  
 
The rest of the chapter is divided into four additional sections. Section 2 revisits the 
economic rationale for orderly bank resolution and briefly explains why banks require 
special insolvency rules and how these rules differ from regular insolvency procedures. 
Section 3 restates the asset-partitioning framework, and introduces recent extensions 
regarding distinctions between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ partitions, and the economic 
consequences for banking groups comprised of different legal entities. Section 4 
discusses the linkage between legal forms and bank resolution. In particular, it identifies 
how national insolvency rules and legal forms interact with the loss apportionment 
system promoted by some resolution tools, like bank bail-in. Moreover, it describes the 
interface between legal form and the single point of entry (‘SPE’) and the multiple point 
of entry (‘MPE’) resolution techniques. Section 5 concludes.  
2. DO BANKS NEED SPECIAL INSOLVENCY RULES? 
 
Is bank insolvency very different from the bankruptcy of other firms? If so, how? This 
section discusses the economic rationale commonly identified as justifying the existence 
of bank SRRs. The first subsection focuses on the sources of market failure that underpin 
the need for SRRs. The second subsection describes some of the differences between 
SSRs and ordinary insolvency procedures.  
 
2.1. The Economic Rationale for Bank Resolution   
 
Financial crises generated by bank failures have been associated to several economic 
problems. The sources of market failure that are commonly cited include: negative 
externalities, moral hazard and the preservation of financial stability and critical functions 
(public goods problems). In turn, these economic problems are discussed.  
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2.1.1. The External Costs of Bank Failures 
 
 
Financial crises and bank failures are often socially costly.387 Trying to salvage – or 
conversely – keeping a zombie bank alive, is also costly. Banks, their owners, managers 
and creditors are often portrayed as reaping the private benefits of their activities while 
externalizing the costs of bank failure to taxpayers and society. Moreover, the insolvency 
of credit institutions can often spillover to other financial entities and to the real 
economy, creating financial instability, threatening critical functions, stifling economic 
growth and distressing public finances.388 Financial contagion can spread and transmit 
these external costs across different institutions and countries.  
 
According to one estimate by researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, the US 
experienced an output loss somewhere between ‘$6 trillion to $14 trillion’ during the 
2007-2009 period.389 According to the IMF’s calculations, the countries that were worst 
affected by the downturn lost between 4-6% of their GDP.390 On average, countries 
committed up to 25% of their GDPs on the provision of governmental guarantees, 
pledges and other forms of State aid.391 This estimate does not account for the costs to 
other jurisdictions.  
                                                
387 Charles Goodhart argues that bailouts need not always be costly to taxpayers, pointing as an 
example the case of the US financial rescues through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
– which actually were profitable for taxpayers. According to the US Treasury: “TARP’s bank 
programs earned significant positive returns for taxpayers. As of September 30, 2015, Treasury 
has recovered $275.0 billion through repayments and other income – $29.9 billion more than the 
$245.1 billion originally invested”. Available online 
<https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment-
programs/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 6 December 2016.   
388 Armour (n 368).  
389 David Luttrell, Tyler Atkinson and Harvey Rosenblum, ‘Assessing the Costs and 
Consequences of the 2007-09 Financial Crisis and its Aftermath’ (September 2013) 8 (7) Dallas 
Fed Economic Letters 1 
<https://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/eclett/2013/el1307.pdf> accessed 6 
December 2016.  
390 International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial 
Sector’ (June 2010) Final Report for the G-20, 4. 
391 ibid 4. According to the IMF estimates, crisis-related losses incurred by European banks 
between 2007 and 2010 are close to 1 trillion or 8% of the EU GDP. Between October 2008 and 
December 2012, the European Commission ‘approved 591.9 billion or 4.6% of EU 2012 GDP in 
state aid measures in the form of recapitalisation and asset relief measures’. See European 
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Accordingly, the potential harm arising from bank insolvency or distress has been 
considered as an important factor that justifies the need for SRRs.  
 
2.1.2. Bank Failure: Moral Hazard and ‘Too-big-to-fail’ 
 
 
Moral hazard and the ‘too-big-to’ set of problems are other 
underpinning factors that have justified the need for SRRs. As Gustaf 
Sjöberg has stated, ‘bailing out the owners and creditors of banks creates perverted 
incentives that increase the risk level in the financial system. To preserve financial 
stability and at the same time uphold (or create) market discipline (that is, to avoid moral 
hazard) is therefore of paramount importance’.392  
 
In the context of bank failure, moral hazard arises whenever owners, managers and 
creditors allow banks to take excessive risks pursuant to the perception that – in case that 
they run into financial difficulties – they will be bailed-out or will have some sort of 
preferential treatment by the government.393 In other words, banks and their constituents 
misbehave because they anticipate that they will be rescued or subject to ad hoc rules, 
either because they are considered too big, too interconnected or too systemically 
important to fail. Thus bank bailouts and regulatory forbearance are closely related to the 
moral hazard problem.394  
 
The ‘judgment proof-problem’, as described by Prof. Steven Shavell, is another 
manifestation of moral hazard that can affect banks and their stakeholders. The judgment 
proof problem consists of: ‘the possibility that injurers may not be able to pay in full for 
                                                
Commission, ‘Memo: EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD): Frequently Asked 
Questions’ <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-297_en.htm> accessed 6 December 
2016. 
392 Sjöberg (n 374). 
393 See Gary Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming 
(OUP 2012). 
394 Lastra (n 385).  
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the harm they cause’.395 The judgment-proof problem implies that failing banks – as 
financial ‘polluters396’ or ‘injurers’ – do not always have enough assets plus insurance to 
cover the full extent of the damages that their insolvency or financial distress can 
generate. Being ‘judgment-proof’ is a special case of moral hazard, slightly different 
from – but still related to – the ‘too-big-to’ set of problems (eg ‘too-big-to fail’, ‘too-big-
to-save’, etc.). A bank might have insufficient own funds to pay for the externalities or 
damages that its failure produces. It need not be a ‘big bank’, simply one with insufficient 
own funds to fully absorb its losses once they materialize.  
 
Combined with other tools, such as capital, liquidity and leverage standards, the existence 
of orderly resolution proceedings with the ability of apportioning losses to different bank 
stakeholders can help better align incentives and curb moral hazard.  
 
2.1.3. Financial Stability and Preserving Critical Functions 
 
Other important goals of SRRs are promoting financial stability and preserving critical 
bank functions – such as the correct functioning of payment systems and access to 
savings. These are generally considered to be global public goods.397  
 
The interbank system is also a conduit for the transmission of monetary policy.398 During 
a banking crisis, essential functions might be impaired. This means that depositors might 
be left without access to their deposits, payments might me delayed or suspended – 
causing additional disruptions to the economy. Thus SRRs can complement depositor 
                                                
395 Steven Shavell, ‘The Judgment Proof Problem’ (1986) International Review of Law and 
Economics, 45. See also Steven Shavell, ‘Minimum Asset Requirements and Compulsory 
Liability Insurance as Solutions to the Judgment-Proof Problem’ (2005) 36 (1) RAND Journal of 
Economics 63.   
396 Avgouleas and Goodhart (n 365).  
397 See Hüpkes (n 366). See also Joel P Trachtman, ‘The International Law of Financial Crisis: 
Spillovers, Subsidiarity, Fragmentation and Cooperation’ (2010) 13 Journal of International 
Economic Law 719, 721; Martin Wolf, ‘The World’s Hunger for Public Goods’ Financial Times 
(London, 24 January 2012) <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/517e31c8-45bd-11e1-93f1-
00144feabdc0.html> accessed 6 December 2016. 
398 Geoffrey Davies and Marc Dobler, ‘Bank Resolution and Safeguarding the Creditors Left 
Behind’ (2011) Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 213 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/qb110302.pdf>  
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protection insurance schemes in preserving financial stability, preventing bank runs and 
protecting depositors from losing their deposits.  
 
2.2. Differences Between Special Resolution Regimes and Regular 
Insolvency Rules  
 
SRRs are said to have several objectives that are different to the goals of regular 
insolvency rules. One social objective often cited by leading financial regulators and 
policymakers is to minimize the total cost of bank failure and mitigate negative 
externalities and spillover effects that can leave taxpayers and other stakeholders to foot 
the bill.399 Other objectives also include enhanced protection for depositors and ensuring 
the operational continuity and continuity of access400 to core banking services (like 
deposits, clearing, settlement and processing of payments, etc.) during times of financial 
distress.401  
 
According to Gustaf Sjöberg, bank resolution serves two specific purposes: first, 
establishing a legal framework and tools for dealing with bank failure; and secondly, 
promoting market discipline through deterrence in order to mitigate moral hazard and 
prevent bank crises altogether.402 On the other hand, Rosa Lastra considers that ‘[b]ank 
resolution regimes aim to preserve the stability of financial and payments systems while 
in some countries also minimizing the social costs of failure to taxpayers’.403  
 
                                                
399 See eg FSB ‘Key Attributes’ (n 378) 1, which state that their implementation: ‘should allow 
authorities to resolve financial institutions in an orderly manner without taxpayer exposure to loss 
from solvency support, while maintaining continuity of their vital economic functions’; See also 
BCBS, ‘Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group’ (n 379) 16.  
400 According to the UK’s Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), operational continuity refers to 
‘the arrangements that need to be made to ensure continuity of the critical shared services needed 
to facilitate a firm’s recovery actions, resolution, or post-resolution restructuring’. The PRA states 
that this is ‘different from the concept of continuity of access’ which in turn implies ‘continuity 
from the customers’ (in particular, depositors’) point of view (…)’. See DP1/14, 6  
401 See for example, BOE and PRA DP1/14. 
402 Sjöberg (n 374). 
403 Lastra (n 385).  
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These objectives are different to the objectives for regular insolvency rules, which 
generally aim to achieve ‘fair and predictable treatment of creditors and 
maximization of assets of the debtor in the interests of creditors’. 404 
The European Commission has considered that:  
 
In normal insolvency procedures, the primary objective is to maximise the value 
of assets of the failed firm in the interest of creditors. However, these may take 
many years, in particular for complex institutions leading to uncertainty with a 
knock on effect on confidence. In contrast, the primary objective of bank 
resolution is to respond in a rapid and decisive manner to a bank in financial 
distress to maintain financial stability and minimise losses for society, in 
particular in relation to taxpayers, while ensuring similar results to those of 
normal insolvency proceedings in terms of allocation of losses to shareholders 
and creditors.405 
 
Thus, as the BRRD states whenever liquidation under ‘under normal 
insolvency proceedings might jeopardise financial stability, interrupt the 
provision of critical functions, and affect the protection of depositors 
( …)  it is highly likely that there would be a public interest in 
placing the institution under resolution and applying resolution tools 
rather than resorting to normal insolvency proceedings’.406 
3. ASSET PARTITIONING AND BANK RESOLUTION 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, bank entity shielding is a consequence of having a stand-alone 
legal personality under organizational laws. Together with limited liability (also called 
‘owner shielding’ or ‘defensive asset partitioning’), entity shielding forms the ‘asset 
                                                
404 ibid.  
405 European Commission, ‘Memo: EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD): 
Frequently Asked Questions’ <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-297_en.htm> 
accessed 6 December 2016.  
406 BRRD recital 45. 
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partitioning’ framework.407 Bank entity shielding implies: ‘(…) the demarcation of a pool 
of [a bank’s] assets that are distinct from the assets owned, singly or jointly, by the 
[bank’s] owners’.408  
 
Two consequences stem from banks’ entity shielding: creditor priority and liquidation 
protection.409 As will further be explained in the subsequent section, these two 
consequences are relevant to resolution and crisis management in general, because they 
matter for how losses are apportioned across different types of bank creditors – both at 
the group and the entity levels. In turn, the asset-partitioning framework is further 
described and expanded. 
 
3.1. Creditor Rank and Liquidation Protection 
 
The creditor priority that results from a bank’s ‘entity shielding’ means that legal entities 
within a banking group are entitled to their own assets and have their distinct priority of 
creditors with varying hierarchies. In principle, the assets of each bank are preferentially 
‘pledged’ for that bank’s creditors – shielding such loss absorbing assets from the claims 
of the creditors of other group entities (including parent and sibling entities) as well as 
from the claims of the creditors of their owners, directors and managers.  
 
On the other hand, bank ‘liquidation protection’ implies that if a bank’s owners (ie 
investors, a holding or parent company, etc) or other group entities become insolvent, the 
owner’s personal creditors (or the personal creditors of other group entities) cannot force 
                                                
407 The framework is presented in Henry Hansmann, and R Kraakman, ‘The Essential Role of 
Organizational Law’ (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 387; Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, 
‘Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning’ (2000) 44 European Economic Review 807; Henry 
Hansmann, R Kraakman and Richard Squire, ‘Law and the Rise of the Firm’ (2006) 119 Harvard 
Law Review 1333. 
408 Paraphrasing Reinier Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law: a Comparative and 
Functional Approach (2nd edn, OUP 2009) 6. 
409 Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’ (n 407). 
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liquidation of the bank and its assets in order to satisfy their claims once the owner’s 
assets have been exhausted.410  
 
Both liquidation protection and creditor priority are relevant for cross-border resolution, 
as will be further explained in the next section. However, recent extensions to the asset 
partitioning framework merit further explanation, as they are useful for broadening the 
framework to analyze SRRs. 
 
3.2. Internal and External Asset Partitioning  
 
It is often neglected that – both domestic and international – commercial banks are 
organized using different type of legal forms and complex group structures that operate 
on a cross-border basis. Each entity within a group can have its own accounting records 
and they often transact with each other or provide intra-group guarantees to third 
parties.411 Moreover, each entity can be organized using a menu of organizational forms. 
As discussed so far in this thesis, it is common for banks and their groups to be legally 
setup as corporations, mutual societies, nonprofit associations, co-operatives, and other 
legal forms for arranging economic activity.  
 
The structure of many cross-border banks entails that asset partitioning can be replicated 
across other several legal entities within the group. Henry Hansmann and Richard Squire 
have recently proposed a distinction between internal and external partitions.412 Under 
this extension to the framework, external partitions refer to ‘the legal barrier dividing a 
corporation from its ultimate owners: its human and institutional equity holders’.413 On 
the other hand, internal partitions are legal barriers ‘within a corporate group’ (eg 
                                                
410 ibid.  
411 See Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi, and James Vickery, ‘A Structural View of U.S. Bank 
Holding Companies’ (2012) FRBNY Economic Policy Review. In the words of M Haentjens and 
P de Gioia-Carabellese: ‘a bank often is a complex organisation with myriad levels of operation’. 
Haentjens and de Gioia-Carabellese (n 381) 81. 
412 Henry Hansmann and Richard Squire, ‘External and Internal Asset Partitioning: Corporations 
and Their Subsidiaries’ in Jeffrey N Gordon and Wolf-Georg Ringe (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of Corporate Law and Governance (forthcoming OUP 2017). 
413 ibid. 
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between a parent corporation plus any corporations it wholly owns, directly or 
indirectly).414 The aforementioned authors argue that this distinction is useful for 
identifying the economic consequences that entity shielding can have for different 
creditors – and also for analyzing the catalogue of de-partitioning remedies available to 
them.  
 
A stylized example can help explain the distinction between external and internal 
partitions. Assuming that British Bank Holding Co. is a publicly traded bank holding 
company with three wholly owned subsidiaries – each one located in: Britain, Germany 
and Greece. External partition separates the assets of the British Bank Holding Co. from 
the assets of its shareholders (for the sake of argument, assume that they are a mix 
between pension funds, investment funds and individuals). On the other hand, internal 
partitions separate the assets of the British Bank Holding Co. from the assets of each 
independently instituted subsidiary.  
 
The aforementioned elements allow setting up the framework for describing how 
organizational form interacts with bank resolution strategies, discussed in the subsequent 
section.  
 
4. THE NEXUS BETWEEN BANK RESOLUTION AND 
LEGAL FORM  
 
When a ‘bank’ enters into financial distress or fails, it is in fact a legal entity – or even 
parts of a network or a complex cluster of different legal entities – that need to be 
resolved. As Richard Herring and Jacopo Carmassi have pointed out: ‘(…) the 
complexity of the corporate structures that most international financial conglomerates 
                                                
414 ibid. 
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have developed is itself a significant source of systemic risk. In the event of bankruptcy, 
hundreds of legal entities would need to be resolved’.415  
 
Organizational complexity could exacerbate moral hazard and undermine market 
discipline416 if banks and their stakeholders were somehow shielding their liability 
through convoluted legal cobwebs. Furthermore, complexity and the agglomeration of 
legal entities can also generate unintended consequences across borders, since some of 
these entities can operate in different jurisdictions. Each entity within a banking group 
can have its creditors who have an overall claim over their assets and it is not uncommon 
for entities to provide intra-group guarantees vis-à-vis different creditors.417  
 
Bank organizational forms have their own incentive structures, attributes and 
characteristics. Two of their most salient characteristics – ownership structure and legal 
personality (‘entity shielding’) – have economic consequences that have to do with 
residual risk (loss) bearing hierarchies and how losses are apportioned between different 
bank constituencies that can be located across jurisdictions.418 Thus, legal form is bound 
to be important during banks’ lives, but also during their deaths.  
 
4.1. Can Entity Shielding Facilitate Bank Resolution? 
 
One way that legal forms and entity shielding can interact in favor of orderly bank 
resolution is by creating different asset pools.419 Every legal entity in a banking group is 
entitled to its own property rights that it can use to conduct its activities. According to the 
asset partitioning framework, ‘[t]he symmetrical partition [limited liability and entity 
                                                
415 Richard Herring and Jacopo Carmassi, ‘The Corporate Structure of International Financial 
Conglomerates – Complexity and its Implications for Safety and Soundness’ in Allen N Berger, 
Philip Molyneux and John O S Wilson (eds), Oxford Handbook of Banking (OUP 2010) 197.  
416 ibid.  
417 Hansmann and Squire (n 412). 
418 Hansmann Kraakman (n 407). 
419 Hansmann and Squire (n 412).  
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shielding] between the company and its owners – [block] creditors in both directions – 
divides assets and liabilities into workable bundles’.420  
 
This feature can explain why many recent leading structural banking reforms have opted 
for the separation of certain banking activities into different legal entities. The United 
Kingdom’s ‘ring-fencing’ rules and the EU’s Liikanen reforms are notable examples of 
this recent trend.421 The UK’s Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) has even expressly 
indicated that ring-fencing deposit taking institutions through independent local 
subsidiaries aims to enhance ‘the resolvability of both groups and individual entities’.422 
Thus, entity shielding seems to generate some benefits in favor of resolvability by 
making banks bankruptcy remote.   
 
4.2. Creditor Priority Rights 
 
Absolute creditor priority has been called ‘bankruptcy’s most important and famous 
rule’.423 It establishes that the loss-bearing order agreed to outside of insolvency will be 
honored during bankruptcy. In other words, it means that losses will not be shifted from 
one group of creditors to another. Absolute creditor priority provides legal certainty to 
creditors, allowing them to price the risk that they take whenever extending credit based 
on the distribution rank during insolvency proceedings. In spite of creditor rank being 
pre-established by regular insolvency law and contract, a great deal of rent-seeking and 
‘priority-jumping’ can take place during bankruptcy.424 
 
                                                
420 ibid. 
421 Legal separation or ring-fencing is a common feature of the EU’s banking structural reforms, 
the UK’s ring-fencing rules, as well as the application of the Dodd-Frank Act’s ‘Final Volcker 
Rule’ to foreign banking organizations (FBOs). Chapter 6 focuses on banking structural reforms.  
422 Consultation Paper CP19/14 ss 1.17-1.22  
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/publications/cp/2014/cp1914.aspx> accessed 6 
December 2016.  
423 Mark Roe and Frederick Tung, ‘Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the 
Creditors’ Bargain’ (2013) 99 Virginia Law Review 1236. 
424 Roe and Tung (n 423) 1238.  
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As discussed before, absolute creditor rank is also preserved during bank resolution. 
However, rent-seeking and creditor rank can also occur. Resolution authorities and 
financial regulators may feel inclined to favor their local depositors and creditors (eg 
voters) over foreign depositors and creditors.  
 
Creating bank subsidiaries is another way to re-arrange creditor rank in a particular 
jurisdiction. Whenever a bank sets up a legally incorporated subsidiary – it shields that 
entity’s assets from other group creditors. Thus, creating legal entities has an effect on 
creditor rank and how assets are distributed in order to guarantee the claims of different 
creditors.  
 
4.3. National Insolvency Regimes and Creditor Rank  
 
Another important legal challenge is the linkage between the pan-European resolution 
rules, national insolvency laws and variations to bank creditor priority. Like 
organizational laws, insolvency regimes across EU Member States remain a domestic 
matter.425 Moreover, the BRRD leaves some leeway for countries to change the treatment 
or the priority rights of certain bank creditors during resolution through legislation. 
Germany and Italy provide two recent examples of how domestic legislation can 
rearrange bank creditor rank.  
 
Germany prepared a legislative proposal in order to align its regime for the resolution of 
credit institutions with the BRRD and the SRM. The then German ‘draft law’ contained 
provisions for the statutory subordination (during resolution) of certain unsecured debt 
instruments issued by banks. Such debt securities would be subordinated under the law 
(eg rank junior) to interbank deposits, corporate deposits, money market instruments and 
certain derivatives and derivative like instruments.426 What this meant in practical terms 
was a change in the loss-bearing pecking order with the objective of facilitating bail-in 
                                                
425 Haentjens and Janssen (n 371).  
426 Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 September 2016 on Bank Resolution 
(CON/2015/31). 
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during the course of a bank resolution. Thus the holders of the statutorily subordinated 
securities would bear losses before other aforementioned groups of bank creditors.  
 
The German Federal Ministry of Finance requested an opinion from the European Central 
Bank (ECB) on the German draft law. On 2 September 2015, the ECB issued its opinion 
stating that the German proposal was expected to ‘facilitate resolution and the 
implementation of the FSB’s forthcoming TLAC proposals’.427 In its opinion, the ECB 
added that: ‘statutory creditor hierarchy in bank insolvency proceedings is expected to 
enhance the implementation of the bail-in tool in resolution’.428  
 
As a result, losses in resolution would be allocated to holders of the cited subordinated 
debt instruments, ‘who would be bailed-in ahead of other senior unsecured creditors, thus 
fostering effective resolution action and reducing the need to have recourse to the 
resolution fund (…)’.429 In other words, the position of the holders of the subordinated 
securities was changed – for worse. This could potentially raise banks’ funding costs and 
dissuade investors from purchasing the subordinated instruments.430  
 
Italy provides another example of how creditor rank can be altered through national 
legislation. When implementing the BRRD, Italy made unsecured depositors ‘(deposits 
not covered by article 108 BRRD) senior to other unsecured debt of the bank’.431 This 
means that other (uninsured) depositors are to be paid in full before paying other types of 
unsecured bank creditors. Thus, from the perspective of these uninsured depositors, their 
creditor rank was improved – at the expense of lower ranking creditors, who were made 
worse off.  
 
                                                
427 ibid. 
428 ibid. 
429 ibid.  
430 Cleary Gottlieb, ‘Beyond Bail-in – German and Italian Proposals Affecting Bondholder 
Rights’ (21 September 2015) Alert Memorandum <http://textlab.io/doc/1505228/german-and-
italian-proposals-affecting-bondholder-rights> accessed on 6 December 2016.  
431 ibid. See also BRRD art 108. 
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These examples support the view that in spite of having a set of common resolution rules, 
creditor rank can still be rearranged through domestic legislation, contract (eg issuing 
subordinated debt) or as a matter of organizational laws. This results from the BRRD’s 
reliance on ‘normal insolvency procedures’ as supplementary rules to SRRs. Divergent 
approaches imply that the same type of bank creditor could rank differently (eg not pari 
passu) vis-à-vis banks’ asset partitions across member states. As Matthias Haentjens and 
Lynette Janssen have predicted the ‘common European rules will fail to eliminate some 
significant differences between national bank insolvency regimes’.432  
 
These differences in the treatment of creditors’ property rights can create challenges for 
resolving banks across national borders. As John Armour considers, the international 
scope of banking operations represents a challenge for coordinating solutions, because: 
 
Property laws cannot be waived extraterritorially. Consequently, unless 
every jurisdiction in which the banking organization operates has signed up 
to an equivalent resolution procedure and there is general agreement about 
how the costs of the process are to be shared, there is no guarantee that a 
coordinated outcome can, in fact, be achieved.433    
 
Consequently, the asset partitioning created by entity shielding could also generate 
coordination problems for resolving cross-border banks under the multiple point of entry 
resolution technique. In turn, these challenges are discussed.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
432 Haentjens and Janssen (n 371) 294, 297. Said authors add that ‘these differences will 
materialize most acutely when a large bank fails that has operations throughout the EU, especially 
if—as would be likely—those operations are located both in the UK and the Eurozone (where 
resolution measures are coordinated under SRM)’.  
433 Armour ‘Making Bank Resolution Credible’ (n 368).  
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4.4. Single and Multiple Point of Entry Resolution  
  
There are two main approaches to resolving a cross-border banking group. These are 
called single point of entry (SPE) and multiple point of entry resolution (MPE).434 SPE or 
‘top-down’ resolution strategies ‘involve a single resolution authority applying its powers 
to the top of a financial group’.435 In other words, it entails that one jurisdiction – 
typically a bank’s home country – takes care of the entire resolution process, regardless 
of where the assets and subsidiary entities are located.  
 
On the other hand, MPE resolution strategies involve ‘the application of resolution 
powers by two or more resolution authorities to multiple parts of the group (ideally 
simultaneously), including strategies in which a group is broken up into two or more 
separate parts’.436 MPE is the approach taken in Europe. One of the main critiques to 
MPE raised by Jeffrey N. Gordon and Wolf-Georg Ringe is that ‘it would empower 
several regulators in various jurisdictions and thus create coordination problems, 
frictions, and a race to grab assets for the purpose of protecting national creditors’.437 
These potential challenges and coordination problems can result from entity shielding 
(affirmative asset partitioning). Consequently, entity shielding also has its costs.  
 
Figure 8 presents a simplified example in order to explain how creditor rank and 
liquidation protection play out vis-à-vis SPE and MPE resolution strategies. Assuming 
that ‘British Bank Holding Company’ wholly owns and operates three incorporated 
banking subsidiaries across different countries: ‘British Bank Plc’, ‘Greek Bank’ and 
                                                
434 Financial Stability Board (FSB), ‘Guidance for Recovery and Resolution Planning: Making 
the Key Attributes Requirements Operational (November 2012) <http://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_121102.pdf?page_moved=1> accessed 6 December 2016.  
435 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Bank of England (BOE), ‘Resolving 
Globally Active, Systemically Important, Financial Institutions (10 December 2012) available 
online <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2012/nr156.pdf> last 
accessed 6 December 2016.  
436 FSB ‘Guidance for Recovery and Resolution Planning’ (n 434) 15.  
437 Jeffrey Gordon and W Georg Ringe, ‘Bank Resolution in Europe: the Unfinished Agenda of 
Structural Reform’ in Danny Busch & Guido Ferrarini (eds), The European Banking Union (OUP 
2015).  
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‘German Bank Limited’. Furthermore, assuming that both the British and the Greek 
subsidiaries become insolvent.  
 
Under a SPE resolution strategy, the British resolution authority (home country) would 
lead the resolution process at the holding company level. Thus, the Greek and German 
resolution authorities would not play a primary role in the process. Because of entity 
shielding, assets in the German bank are unavailable to satisfy potential shortfalls that 
could exist for repaying the creditors of the British and Greek banks. The British 
resolution authority could bail-in (or capitalize) any securities held by the parent 
company in order to recapitalize one of the subsidiaries. Moreover, creditors of both 
subsidiaries could try to ask a court to pierce through the corporate veil (eliminate limited 
liability) – but that would only allow them to bring claims against the British Bank 
Holding Company. Liquidation protection precludes the British resolution authority or 
the courts from forcing the liquidation of the German bank in order to cover shortfalls in 
other group entities.  
 
Under MPE resolution, the same scenario would play-out differently. Just like before, 
entity shielding creates asset partitions in each jurisdiction. Some asset pools could have 
higher loss absorbing capacity and liquidity (surpluses) than others (shortfalls). Thus, 
coordination is necessary in order to prevent any of the resolution authorities from 
grabbing more assets or liquidity than they strictly need in order to resolve a failed 
subsidiary within their jurisdiction.438 This situation can be exacerbated considering that 
often cross-border resolution proceedings can be inward looking – paying little or no 
attention to the actions of other resolution authorities.439 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
438 ibid.  
439 See Avgouleas and Goodhart (n 365). 
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Figure 8 
Entity Shielding and SPE and MPE Resolution Strategies 
 
4.5. Bank Bail-in 
Since the last financial crisis bank bail-in and contingent capital have emerged as 
resolution tools. It seems paradoxical that statutory bail-in is being treated as a novelty, 
when letting losses fall were the fall – according to the pre-established loss-bearing order 
enshrined in the law – has always been a common feature of corporate restructuring and 
insolvency regimes. In the opinion of E. Avgouleas and C. Goodhart, part of the 
moral hazard problem affecting banks stemmed from the fact that ‘(…) in the past banks’ 
subordinated debt did not provide any cover when bank liquidation was not an option, 
which meant that subordinated creditors were bailed out alongside senior creditors by 
British Bank Holding 
Company 
British Bank Plc Greek Bank German Bank Limited 
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taxpayers’.440 Consequently, bank creditors were often bailed-out leading to ‘creditor 
inertia’ and inadequate monitoring.441  
 
Bank bail-in refers to rules allocating losses to existing investors as an alternative to 
spreading losses amongst taxpayers. In an economic sense, bail-ins aim to internalize the 
negative spillovers of bank failure. However, it is not always the case that enough ‘bail-
inable’ funds are readily available to cover all the losses resulting from bank distress or 
failure. Consequently, bank bail-in is no panacea. When not enough investor funds are 
available publicly funded bailout packages could ensue. So it can be said that 
alternatively, bail-ins aim to reduce or minimize the amount of public money needed to 
bailout a failing or failed bank.  
 
Bail-in can work differently in corporate and non-corporate banks. Different classes of 
shareholders own corporate banks. As discussed in previous chapters, shareholders are 
residual owners (or residual risk bearers) and they provide banks with their highest lost 
absorbing capital – called Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital. This means that 
shareholders bear the full brunt of losses when they occur.  
 
Corporate bank bail-in implies writing down equity and other instruments that form part 
of banks’ going and gone concern regulatory capital. CET 1 capital is written down first, 
before additional Tier 1 (AT1) capital. Only when the latter are fully exhausted, can 
regulators trigger the conversion of CoCos or reduce other Tier 2 capital instruments, like 
subordinate bonds, in the hands of creditors.  
 
Many non-corporate banks lack shareholders – thus there are often no shares to write 
down. Non-corporate banks’ CET1 capital can be comprised of deposits, retained 
earnings and entities’ own funds that have been built-up through past earnings. In the 
case of co-operative and mutual banks, there is a conflation between owners and 
depositors. Therefore, some owners will be (at least partially insured) and will benefit 
                                                
440 Avgouleas and Goodhart (n 365) 4. 
441 ibid. 
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from the protection of their property rights, underwritten by deposit insurers. These bank 
owners get to ‘leap-frog from the back, to the front of the line’, shielding themselves 
from losses during bail-in. Moreover, the position of other uninsured depositors has also 
been enhanced in order for their credit to rank at least pari passu to other bank unsecured 
creditors. 
 
The aforementioned description depicts how bail-in and resolution tools can play out 
differently when it comes to corporate and non-corporate banks. Thus differences in the 
incentive structures that result from ownership and organizational form cannot be 
disregarded, because they can lead to different outcomes and can generate unintended 
consequences. 
5. CONCLUSIONS   
 
This chapter has considered the linkage between bank legal form, creditor rank, deposit 
protection insurance schemes and resolution regimes (SRRs). The main point that this 
chapter presents is that SRRs should take into account the differences in legal forms and 
creditor priority that exist across jurisdictions. Banks are not always shareholder-owned 
corporations. Non-corporate banks can be owned by insured depositors – or in other 
cases, can lack owners.  
 
The entity shielding that results from bank legal forms creates and establishes patterns of 
creditors rights regarding a bank’s assets. Creditor rank varies across organizational 
forms, because of differences in ownership structure. Consequently, loss apportionment 
in a corporate bank is bound to be different to how losses are absorbed by the 
stakeholders of non-corporate banks. 
 
The preceding analysis does not assume that legal form can make banks entirely failsafe. 
But it could – in the words of Thomas Huertas – provide some insights towards making 
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banks less likely and ‘safer to fail’.442 Or at least the analysis can help identify how 
certain discrepancies in legal form and domestic insolvency laws could generate 
challenges for cross-border resolutions and other crisis management tools, like deposit 
protection insurance and lender of last resort.  
 
The way that banks are legally organized is bound to be important during their lives – but 
also during their death. A better understanding of the ownership structure of legal forms 
and the intricacies of entity shielding could serve as bulwarks against bank failure.  
 
 
                                                
442 Thomas F Huertas, How Resolution Will Revolutionise Banking (Palgrave Macmillan 2014). 
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Chapter Six 
Bank Organizational Forms and Structural 
Reforms – Ring-Fencing and Asset Partitioning 
in the United Kingdom443 
 
SUMMARY 
A plethora of policy recommendations have been discussed as a response to the global 
Financial Crisis that reached its nadir in 2007-2008. The ring-fencing of deposit-taking 
functions in the United Kingdom (UK) is one of the structural reforms enacted through 
legislation in order to guarantee the continuous provision of core bank services and allow for 
the orderly resolution of retail banks. Similar bank structural reforms have either been 
adopted or are being proposed in the European Union (EU), the United States of America, 
Germany and France. However, it is still uncertain exactly how British ring-fenced bodies 
(RFBs) will be legally organized in the future. This chapter explores some of the legal and 
economic aspects that underpin the implementation of commercial bank ring-fencing in 
Britain. The chapter argues that through the prism of Corporate Law and Economics, ring-
fencing retail banking services through so-called ‘subsidiarization’ and ‘electrification’ can 
be construed as forms of asset partitioning. These measures aim to protect bank stakeholders 
and ultimately taxpayers against disruptions in the provision of core financial services as well 
as from having to incur the costs of bank failures. They could, however, also have unintended 
consequences, which can further be exacerbated by the effects of the UK’s impending exit 
from the EU. 
 
Keywords: Commercial Banking, Bank Ring-fencing, Ring-fenced Bodies, Vickers Report, 
Asset Partitioning. 
                                                
443 This chapter is largely based on a working paper titled ‘Bank Ring-Fencing and Asset 
Partitioning – Some Implications for the Legal Structure of Ring-Fenced Bodies in the United 
Kingdom’. The chapter has benefited from the comments and critiques of two anonymous 
referees from an academic journal. The title is a reference to H Hansmann and R Kraakman’s 
seminal article on organizational law as asset partitioning. An abridged and preliminary version 
of some of its ideas was originally presented in Klaus Heine and Enmanuel Cedeno-Brea, ‘The 
Legal Structure of Ring-Fenced Bodies in the United Kingdom: A Response to Consultation 
Paper CP19/14 on the Implementation of Ring-fencing: on Legal Structure, Governance and the 
continuity of Services and Facilities’, for the Prudential Regulatory Authority’s (PRA) Public 
Consultation CP19/14 (January 2015). 
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‘Everyone wants to ring-fence something, but they can’t agree on what’.444 
 
Perry Mehrling 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A number of regulatory reforms for banking have been proposed, discussed or adopted as 
a response to the global Financial Crisis that hit its critical point in 2007-08. The ring-
fencing of commercial banks445 is one of the structural reforms446 aimed at changing the 
way that banks and banking groups are legally organized and conduct their business.447 
Ring-fencing purports to reapportion certain banking activities into different legal 
entities.   
 
In the United Kingdom (UK), the ring-fencing of retail banking core activities became 
law in December 2013, when the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 that 
amended the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) received Royal 
Assent. The British ring-fencing model legally segregates certain ‘core banking 
activities’ perceived as being essential to the economy – such as deposit taking and 
lending to households and to small and medium enterprises – from other activities and 
assets considered as being riskier (or less essential), such as dealing in certain kinds of 
                                                
444 Perry Mehrling, ‘Ring-fencing Explained’ (The Money View, 3 October 2012) 
<http://www.perrymehrling.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Money-View-Archive.pdf> 
accessed 6 December 2016.  
445 This refers to entities within a banking group that typically receive retail deposits from the 
general public in order to on-lend the funds to third parties. Commercial banks are also referred to 
as ‘clearing banks’ in the UK, as ‘credit institutions’ under EU Law and as ‘depositary 
institutions’ in the USA.  
446 Sir John Vickers has considered structural reform as a subset of overall banking reform, which 
includes other broad elements like capital and liquidity regulation, corporate governance, 
remuneration and taxation, recovery and resolution, etc.  See John Vickers, ‘Some Economics of 
Banking Reform’ (2012) Economics Series Working Papers 632. See also Rosa M Lastra, 
International Financial and Monetary Law (2nd edn, OUP 2015) 142-146.  
447 In the past, ring-fencing has been proposed or implemented as a tool for several economic 
sectors, such as public utilities, insurance and investment banking. However, this chapter 
primarily focuses on the ring-fencing of commercial banks as currently being implemented in the 
UK. As a result, unless otherwise specified, all allusions to ‘ring-fencing’ refer to the ring-fencing 
of banks and banking groups in the UK.  
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securities (hereinafter referred to as ‘excluded activities’).448 The banks subject to ring-
fencing will have to partition their local retail activities through an adequately capitalized 
– and legally separate – ring-fenced body (‘RFB’). 
 
The UK’s ring-fencing model resulted from the main policy recommendations that were 
proposed in 2011 by the Independent Commission on Banking, chaired by Sir John 
Vickers (hereinafter, the ‘ICB’ or the ‘Vickers Commission’). The Vickers Commission 
had issued its final report (the ‘Vickers Report’) calling for a: ‘retail ring-fence (…) to 
isolate those banking activities where continuous provision of service is vital to the 
economy and to a bank’s customers in order to ensure, first, that this provision is not 
threatened as a result of activities which are incidental to it and, second, that such 
provision can be maintained in the event of the bank’s failure without government 
solvency support’.449 Ring-fencing purports to create a safe domain for core banking 
activities and services, by insulating these from the other activities perceived to stockpile 
systemic risk.   
 
The deadline for implementing ring-fencing in Britain is 1st January 2019.450 Ring-
fencing applies to the UK subsidiaries of corporate banks and banking groups that hold 
deposits in excess of GBP 25 billion. The separation of core activities from excluded 
activities would be achieved through a combination of ‘subsidiarization’ and 
‘electrification’. In this context, ‘subsidiarization’ implies compulsory rules requiring 
banks to setup their business using a local subsidiary incorporated in the UK (as opposed 
to relying on branches).  
 
On the other hand, the concept of ‘electrification’ remains legally unclear. According to 
the UK’s Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (PCBS), ‘electrification’ was 
                                                
448 Some authors, like Thomas Huertas and Douglas Elliott, challenge the assumption that 
traditional commercial banking is less risky than investment banking.  See Douglas J Elliott, ‘Ten 
Arguments Against Breaking Up the Big Banks’ in Andreas Dombret and Patrick S Kenadjian 
(eds), Too Big to Fail III: Structural Reform Proposals – Should We Break up the Banks? (De 
Gruyter 2015) 119. See also Thomas Huertas, How Resolution Will Revolutionise Banking 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 44.  
449 Independent Commission on Banking, ‘Final Report’ (London, 12 September 2011) 233. 
450 Crown dependencies are excluded.  
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intended as a deterrent ‘creating a very significant disincentive for banks to depart from 
the spirit of the ring-fence’.451 The PCBS warned that electrification would empower 
financial regulators to pursue complete structural separation if banks attempted 
bypassing, gaming or circumventing the ring-fencing measures.452 Subsequently, while 
ring-fencing has been dubbed ‘Glass-Steagall light’, ‘electrification’ is the threat of full-
blown ‘Glass-Steagall’ type segregation.  
 
Discussions on varying levels of functional separation of banking activities are neither 
novel nor have they been limited to the UK. The complete functional separation of 
commercial and investment banking was the salient feature of the Banking (Glass-
Steagall) Act of 1933 in the United States of America (USA).453 Moreover, in the 
aftermath of the 2007-2008 global Financial Crisis, similar – albeit partial – functional 
segregation policies have either been adopted or are currently being discussed for 
implementation in the European Union (EU) and other financial regulatory trend-setting 
jurisdictions such as the USA, Germany and France.  
 
In the EU, the European Commission established its own High-Level Expert Group as a 
response to the Vickers Report and the UK’s structural reforms. The team of experts was 
referred to as the ‘Liikanen Group’, because Mr. Erkki Liikanen, the Governor of the 
Finish Central Bank, chaired it. In October 2012, the Liikanen Group presented its final 
report (‘Liikanen Report’) on structural reforms for the EU banking sector, which 
amongst other recommendations, concluded the need to require the: ‘legal separation of 
certain particularly risky financial activities from deposit-taking banks within the banking 
                                                
451 See House of Lords/ House of Commons Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, 
First Report of Session 2012-2013, HL Paper 98/ HC 848 (21 December 2012) paras 153-158. 
The report also presents Sir John Vickers’ interpretation of ‘electrification’, who stated that: ‘If 
the industry turned out to be unreformable, and I am not so pessimistic as to think that, of course 
it is possible that total separation would turn out in due course to be the better step to take by 
creating full structural separation as a viable alternative’. 
452 ibid.  
453 See Sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933 48 Stat. 162 
(1933). Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
Section 16 was codified as 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh). Section 20 was codified as 12 U.S.C. §377. 
Section 21 was codified as 12 U.S.C. §378(a)(1). Section 32 was codified as 12 U.S.C. § 78. 
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group’.454 Although the Liikanen Report did not explicitly refer to this solution as ‘ring-
fencing’ – it was in its essence, exactly that.  
  
Acting on the recommendations of the Liikanen Report, on 29 January 2014 the 
European Commission adopted a proposal for a Regulation on Structural Measures 
Improving the Resilience of EU Credit Institutions (the ‘Commission’s proposed 
Regulation’).455 The Commission’s proposed Regulation on structural banking reform 
aims to prohibit credit institutions and other systemically important financial institutions 
(‘SIFIs’) from engaging in proprietary trading456 as well as legally separating other 
trading activities from the entity engaged in deposit-taking activities which are protected 
under depositor guarantee schemes. Thus, while the UK’s ring-fencing model aims to 
protect ‘deposits from traders’ losses’457, the EU Commission’s proposal purports to 
build the fence around the trading activities, so that negative externalities do not spillover 
to affect deposits.  
 
In June 2015, the EU Council ‘agreed its negotiating stance’ on the Commission’s 
proposed Regulation. In order to grandfather-in existing structural national regimes, the 
Council’s text includes two alternatives for implementing ring-fencing either ‘through 
                                                
454 High-level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector (‘Liikanen 
Group’), ‘Final Report’ (‘Liikanen Report’) (October 2012) iv 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-level_expert_group/report_en.pdf> accessed 
6 December 2016. 
455 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions, COM (2014) 043 (Jan. 29, 
2014) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014PC0043&from=EN> accessed 6 December 2016. 
456 Proprietary trading occurs when banks and financial institutions purchase or sale financial 
instruments, like derivates or units in investment funds, for their own account, rather than for the 
benefit of their clients. Financial institutions engage in proprietary trading in order to manage or 
hedge their own liquidity or financial needs – but also as a way to make additional profits. 
According to Stacy Goto Grant: ‘Regulators, however, are most concerned with what is 
colloquially referred to as “proprietary trading”, which involves speculative trading for the firm’s 
own account where trading is based on short-term price fluctuations in the financial markets as 
opposed to changes in the underlying value of the securities being traded’. See Stacy Goto Grant, 
‘International Financial Regulation through the G20: the Proprietary Trading Case Study’ (2013) 
45 Geo. J. Int'l L. 1217, 1221. See also United Kingdom Parliamentary Commission On Banking 
Standards, ‘Third Report’ (2012-2013) H.L. 138, 10 (U.IL). 
457 The Economist, Debts, Deficits and Dilemmas: A Crash Course on the Financial Crisis and its 
Aftermath (Profile Books 2014) 64.  
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national legislation requiring core retail activities to be ring-fenced, or through measures 
imposed by competent authorities in accordance with the regulation’.458 
 
The Liikanen Report also triggered significant structural reforms in Germany and 
France.459 Although not exactly identical, the French and German laws adopted the 
subisidiarization strategy with a different twist on the British model – and more in line 
with the Commission’s proposal. Instead of ring-fencing the deposit-taking unit, both 
legislations tackled structural segregation by building a fence or firewall around the legal 
entity conducting the trading activities.460 Thus, agreeing on the ‘ring-fence’ but legally 
segregating the trading unit instead of the deposit-taking entity. Moreover, while in the 
UK ring-fencing applies to deposit taking institutions with deposits over GBP 25 billion, 
the German and French structural measures are akin to the Commission’s proposed 
Regulation, insofar that they only apply to SIFIs.461    
 
In the USA, the ‘Volcker rule’ provision of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (‘Dodd-Frank Act’) set out to legally restrict 
proprietary trading from commercial banking. This means that banks face restrictions 
when dealing in securities for their own account, but can still intermediate on behalf of 
their clients. The Dodd-Frank Act also limits the ownership stake that commercial banks 
can take in pooled investment vehicles, such as private equity funds and hedge funds.462 
                                                
458 See Council of the European Union Press Release, 474/15 (19 June 2015) 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/06/19-restructuring-risky-banks-
council-agrees-negotiating-stances/> accessed on 6 December 2016.  
459 In France: LOI n° 2013-672 du 26 Juillet 2013 de séparation et de régulation des activités 
bancaires, J.O. n° 173 du 27 Juillet 2013, p.12530. Available online:  
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000027754539> accessed 6 
December 2016. In Germany : Gesetz zur Abschirmung von Risiken und zur Planung der 
Sanierung und Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten und Finanzgruppen v. 7.8.2013, BGBI. 2013. 
For a comprehensive comparative analysis of the structural banking reforms across the UK, the 
US, the EU, France and Germany, see Mathias Lehmann, ‘Volcker Rule, Ring-Fencing or 
Separation of Bank Activities – Comparison of Structural Reform Acts Around the World’ (2016) 
17 Journal of Banking Regulation 176. 
460 Lehmann (n 459). 
461 ibid.  
462 See § 619 of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L. 111–
203, which establishes prohibitions on proprietary trading and certain relationships with hedge 
funds and private equity funds. 
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In spite of this relatively recent reform, other similar measures in force in the USA can be 
traced back to the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.463  
 
Moreover, the Dodd-Frank Act also includes two additional banking structural measures: 
the ‘Swaps Push Out Rule’ and the ‘Foreign Banking Organization Rule’.464 The ‘Swaps 
Push Out Rule’ precludes granting US federal assistance to swap dealers or participants 
registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) or with the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). Swaps are derivatives and the rationale driving 
the rule is to cut any potential subsidy or governmental funding for these activities 
considered as being of a riskier nature.  
 
On the other hand, the ‘Foreign Banking Organization Rule’ entails that foreign banks 
with ‘US non-branch assets of $50 billion or more will be required to hold their US 
subsidiaries through a US intermediate holding company (IHC), which is subject to 
capital, capital planning, liquidity and stress testing requirements similar to those 
applicable to US bank holding companies (BHCs)’.465  
 
The fact that some of the leading financial standards-setting jurisdictions have taken 
important steps towards designing and implementing structural banking reforms 
underlines the perceived importance of the relation between banks’ legal structures and 
financial stability in the aftermath of the 2007-08 crisis.466 However, the Volcker and 
Liikanen models, and the UK, French and German legislations have been criticized as 
                                                
463 Winthrop N Brown, ‘With this Ring, I thee Fence: How Europe’s Ringfencing Proposal 
Compares with U.S. Ringfencing Measures’ (2014) 45 Georgetown Journal of International Law 
1029, 1032. 
464 See Financial Stability Board, ‘Structural Banking Reforms: Cross-border Consistencies and 
Global Financial Stability Implications – Report to G20 Leaders for the November 2014 
Summit’, (27 October 2014) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_141027.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016.  
465 ibid.  
466 ibid.  
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being ‘highly contentious’467, ‘duplicative’468, patchy; as well as ‘disjointed’, 
‘uncoordinated’ and sometimes ‘pointing towards different directions’.469   
 
Notwithstanding the on-going implementation of ring-fencing type policies around the 
world, some important questions remain regarding: (i) a comprehensive definition of 
what bank ring-fencing exactly is; (ii) how ring-fenced bodies (RFB) will be legally 
structured in the UK; and (iii) what could be some of ring-fencing’s unintended 
consequences.   
 
This chapter applies the ‘asset partitioning’ theoretical framework developed by 
organizational law and economics in order to examine bank ring-fencing policies in the 
UK. Although this is certainly not the only framework that can be used, it has been 
chosen because it proves to be useful to better understand UK-type ring-fencing and the 
consequences that it has on different bank stakeholders. The chapter evaluates the need 
for special statutory provisions regarding bank ring-fencing in lieu of the legal structures 
already available for organizing banking activities, through the laws on business 
organization (ie Corporate Law, Trusts Law, Contract Law). Moreover, some of ring-
fencing’s unintended consequences are discussed.  
 
The chapter is structured into four additional sections. Section 2 adopts a positive 
approach in order to examine the economic rationale that underpins the need for 
establishing RFBs. It summarizes part of the literature regarding bank ring-fencing with 
the objective of better understanding UK-style ring-fencing. Moreover, the economic 
problems that could justify ring-fencing regulation are discussed. Section 3 raises some 
questions regarding some aspects of bank ring-fencing as currently being implemented in 
the UK. The section discusses the so-called ‘sibling structure’ recommended by the 
                                                
467 House of Lords’ European Union Committee, ‘The Post-crisis EU Financial Regulatory 
Framework: Do the Pieces Fit?’ (2 February 2015) 89-90.  
468 ibid. 
469 Rosa M Lastra, ‘Memorandum submitted as written evidence to the House of Lords’ European 
Union Committee’ Written evidence (FRF0018) (6 October 2014) 
<http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-sub-a-
economic-and-financial-affairs-committee/review-of-the-eu-financial-regulatory-
framework/written/13542.html> accessed 6 December 2016.  
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Prudential Regulatory Authority (‘PRA’). Section 4 analyzes whether ring-fencing could 
have harmful unintended consequences for certain RFB stakeholders, like depositors and 
financial supervisors. Section 5 concludes.     
 
2. SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF BANK RING-FENCING  
 
What exactly do scholars and policymakers mean when they refer to ‘ring-fencing’? This 
section applies a positive economic analysis to bank ring-fencing and RFBs. The first 
subsection reviews part of the existing literature on bank ring-fencing with the aim of 
presenting a definition of what it means. The second subsection discusses the sources of 
market failure that have led to the proposal of bank ring-fencing as a structural solution 
for making banks safer. A third subsection applies the ‘asset partitioning’ framework of 
to RFBs.  
 
2.1. What is Bank Ring-Fencing? 
 
In spite of the rise of bank ‘ring-fencing’, and to a certain extent, of ‘subsidiarization’470, 
as catchphrases after the onslaught of the 2007-08 Financial Crisis, both concepts are said 
to be ‘inconsistently and often ill defined’.471 In an attempt to provide a functional 
definition of ring-fencing, Steven L. Schwarcz considers it as a ‘financial regulatory 
concept’ that ‘can best be understood as legally deconstructing a firm in order to more 
optimally reallocate and reduce risk’.472 According to this perspective, risk-allocation 
occurs: ‘by separating risky assets from the firm; by preventing the firm itself from 
engaging in risky activities or investing in risky assets; or by protecting the firm from 
affiliate and bankruptcy risks’.473 Said definition is rooted on a risk-based approach and 
                                                
470 Alison Lui, ‘Retail Ring-fencing of Banks and its Implications’ (2012) 13 Journal of Banking 
Regulation 336, 338.  
471 Steven L Schwarcz, ‘Ring-Fencing’ (2013) 87 Southern California Law Review 69. 
472 ibid. See also Steven L Schwarcz, ‘Banking and Financial Regulation’ in Francesco Parisi 
(ed), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics (OUP 2015).  
473 Schwarcz, ‘Ring-Fencing’ (n 471) 72-82.  
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primarily focuses on ring-fencing from the perspective of the RFB and the banking firm 
as nexus of contracts.474  
 
Another meaning, found in the literature in the years preceding the heightened use of 
‘ring-fencing’ as a catchphrase (before the ICB’s Report), describes it as: ‘different 
restrictions on intra-group cross-border transfers imposed by the host/home country 
regulators’.475 This conception mainly referred to limitations imposed by either host or 
home country regulators on the transfer of assets (or capital) from one entity within a 
banking group to another, located in a different jurisdiction. The justification for this 
view of ring-fencing was that during the last Financial Crisis, some regulators restricted 
banks from transferring assets/capital between entities within a group because of the 
perception that such transfers could potentially jeopardize the safety and soundness of 
their locally supervised financial institutions.  
 
In a similar tenor, K. D’Hulster and I. Okter-Robe present a conception of ring-fencing 
more related to what they refer to as regulatory ‘territorial approaches’ or ‘geographical 
ring-fencing’.476 According to said authors: ‘(T)his type of ring-fencing is imposed 
unilaterally by prudential supervisors with the objective of protecting the domestic assets 
of a bank so they can be seized and liquidated under local law in case of failure of the 
whole, or other entities of, the banking group’.477 By doing this, these authors posit that: 
‘the interests of domestic stakeholders such as taxpayers, depositors, shareholders, 
creditors and deposit insurers, are better protected in times of stress as the effects of 
cross-border contagion would be limited’.478 This type of ring-fencing is typically applied 
by host state supervisors looking to minimize and contain the local impact of bank 
                                                
474 ibid 82.  
475 Eugenio Cerutti, Anna Ilyana et al., ‘Bankers Without Borders? Implications of Ring-Fencing 
for European Cross-Border Banks’ in Peter Backé, Ernest Gnan and Philipp Hartmann (eds), 
Contagion and Spillovers: New Insights from the Crisis (Larcier 2010), 167. Available online: 
<https://www.suerf.org/docx/s_765d5fb115a9f6a3e0b23b80a5b2e4c4_2807_suerf.pdf> accessed 
6 December 2016. 
476 See Katia D’Hulster and Inci Okter-Robe, ‘Ring-fencing Cross-Border Banks: An Effective 
Supervisory Response?’ (2015) 16 Journal of Banking Regulation 169.  
477 ibid.  
478 ibid.  
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failure. In the academic literature, it is also referred to by the use of terms that often carry 
a negative connotation, such as: ‘fragmentation’, ‘protectionism479’, ‘balkanization’ and 
‘home bias’.480  
 
The definition of the type of ring-fencing that is being implemented in the UK, which is 
proposed by this study, builds on the referenced conceptualizations by characterizing it as 
a compulsory form of asset partitioning combined with the geographical and functional 
reapportionment of activities across different legal entities. Thus, it underlines UK-type 
ring-fencing’s two main characteristics: (1) geographical asset partitioning; (2) achieved 
through subsidiarization.481 
 
This approach is consistent with the risk-allocation, functional and the geographical 
dimensions of ring-fencing ubiquitous in the literature. The contribution of this definition 
is rooted on the patterns of property rights created by organizational law. This means that 
the law creates and/or rearranges existing patterns of property (and loss bearing) rights. 
However, before delving into the intricacies of this proposed definition, it is useful to 
review the economic rationale behind the implementation of ring-fencing.  
 
2.2. The Economic Rationale for Ring-fencing Banks 
 
Several models for structural banking reform have been proposed and adopted around the 
world as a response to the 2007-08 Financial Crisis.482 It is important to note that 
                                                
479 See Roland Beck et al., ‘The Side Effects of National Financial Sector Policies: Framing the 
Debate on Financial Protectionism’ (2015) ECB Occasional Paper n 166. 
480 K. D’Hulster has developed a measure to rank so-called ‘territorial bias’ in prudential banking 
regulation and supervision in 22 European Union (EU) and non-EU countries with financial 
systems predominantly owned by foreign banks. See Katia D’Hulster, ‘Ring-Fencing Cross-
Border Banks: How is it Done and How Important is it?’ (2014). Available at SSRN: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2384905> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2384905> accessed 6 
December  2016. 
481 Rosa Lastra considers that: ‘Functional separability (via ring-fencing) and geographical 
separability (via adequate rules on cross border resolution (…) should ensure a safer banking 
system’. Lastra, International Financial and Monetary Law (n 446) 143.  
482 See generally Financial Stability Board, ‘Structural Banking Reforms’ (n 464). 
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structural reforms are not envisaged as a standalone panacea for revamping global 
banking, but are rather designed for their use in conjunction with other tools within the 
framework of a wider and multi-pronged set of reforms.  
 
As is the case with the rationale for financial regulation, the economic basis behind bank 
structural reforms has been justified on the correction of market failures. Some of the 
economic problems that bank structural reforms aim to tackle include: (i) negative 
externalities and spill-over effects; (ii) the public good nature of financial stability and 
global payments systems; (iii) the moral hazard that affects large, complex financial 
institutions; and (iv) the threats of bank runs and the time inconsistencies exhibited by 
regulators (and politicians).  
 
2.2.1. Negative Externalities and Spill-over Effects  
 
As stated by D. Llewellyn, banks generate negative externalities when ‘the social costs of 
[their activities] (…) exceed private costs and such potential social costs are not 
incorporated in the decision making of the firm’.483 This entails that banks often take 
risks and make business decisions without necessarily taking into account the negative 
(or positive) unintended consequences that their actions could have on the financial 
system, the real economy, public finances and society as whole.  
 
Charles Goodhart and Rosa Lastra have pointed out that: ‘[t]he cross-border expansion of 
banks (via mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures or the establishment of branches and 
subsidiaries) and the effective supervision of institutions operating in various 
jurisdictions present numerous challenges for financial regulators and supervisors’.484  
Financial instability and systemic risk in one jurisdiction can spread to other countries 
                                                
483 David Llewellyn, ‘The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation’ (1999) FSA Occasional 
Paper 1, 13.  
484 Charles Goodhart and Rosa M Lastra, ‘Border Problems’ (2010) 13 Journal of International 
Economic Law.  
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through the channels of contagion or transmission conduits.485 The cross-border potential 
of these negative externalities can give rise to publicly funded bailouts and transfers from 
taxpayers in one jurisdiction to financial institutions – and their stakeholders – located 
elsewhere. Bank failure in one country can also have negative economic consequences 
across borders.  
 
Bank failures can imply direct and indirect social costs. The costs imposed by such 
failures can affect more than just a bank’s direct stakeholders. They can – and often do – 
spill-over to other financial institutions, public finances and also to the real economy, 
affecting financial and macroeconomic stability. According to the International Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF) estimates, the countries that were worst affected by the 2007-08 downturn 
lost between 4-6% of their Gross Domestic Products (GDP).486 On average, some 
countries committed up to 25% of their GDPs on the provision of governmental 
guarantees, pledges and other forms of state aid.487  
 
In the case of global banks and SIFIs, the negative consequences of their failure or 
distress can spread across borders, disturbing financial stability and the international 
payments system. The often-cited phrase attributed to Sir Mervyn King that ‘global banks 
are global in life but national in death’488 does little justice to the fact that bank failure or 
death can have a detrimental cross-border impact.489 Consequently, the externalities 
produced by global banks can also make them – to a certain extent – global in their death.  
 
                                                
485 Rosa M Lastra enumerates four of these transmission mechanisms, which include: ‘(1) the 
inter-bank, inter-institution, inter-instrument channel; (2) the payment systems channel; (3) the 
information channel; and (4) the psychological channel’. The psychological channel is further 
discussed with regards to bank runs under s 2.2.4 below. Rosa M Lastra, ‘Systemic Risk, SIFIs 
and Financial Stability’ (2011) 6 Capital Markets Law Journal 197, 202.  
486 International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial 
Sector’ (June 2010) Final Report for the G-20, 4.  
487 ibid. 
488 Financial Services Authority (FSA), ‘A Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis’ (March 
2009) Discussion paper 09/2, 55 <http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/Policy%20page/dp09_02.pdf> 
accessed 6 December 2016.  
489 Even though the quotation is largely construed as a critique to the fact that most bank 
resolution regimes at the time remained national in their nature.  
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In addition to containing the spread of systemic risk and contagion across borders as well 
as reducing the costs of governmental intervention, ring-fencing also purports to limit the 
negative spill-over effects between: (i) certain banking activities with different risk 
profiles; and (ii) contagion risks across entities within a financial group or conglomerate.  
 
In the first sense, ring-fencing purports to segregate assets as well as certain activities 
according to their risk profile by reallocating them into different legal entities. According 
to UK policymakers, the rationale behind this segregation is that certain core banking 
activities – considered as being essential to the economy – are comingled with other 
activities and assets (excluded activities). Governmental guarantees, like deposit 
protection insurance schemes and lender of last resort functions, are seen as providing an 
implicit subsidy to excluded activities. This can reduce the cost of failure for banks and 
some of their constituencies, and can encourage them to ‘undertake more risk than they 
otherwise would, which increases the likelihood of bank failure’.490 By unbundling and 
segregating activities into different legal entities, ring-fencing would purportedly 
eliminate the implicit subsidy extended to the set of riskier activities, while still 
protecting the so-called core activities and services of the banking system.  
 
Moreover, by adopting ring-fencing, regulators and policymakers aim to reduce the 
probability that intra-group contagion could affect local payments, ‘core services’ and 
taxpayers’ fiscal exposure – while at the same time, attempting to mitigate the negative 
externalities of failure through their internalization within a segregated legal entity. The 
segregation of activities into different legal entities aims to put a backstop on potential 
losses emanating from certain activities or business lines within a banking group (eg a 
trading unit), from spreading to a local deposit-taking entity in the UK.  
 
The rationale behind the aforementioned separation is to allow legal entities within a 
banking group (located in the UK or elsewhere) that are conducting riskier activities to 
fail or be resolved, without having to recur to the safety net provided by implicit 
                                                
490 Richard S Grossman, ‘Double Liability and Bank Risk Taking’ (2001) 33 Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 143.  
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governmental guarantees in the UK – or in the worst-case scenario – to a publicly funded 
bailout using British taxpayers’ monies. Schwarcz calls this making a firm ‘bankruptcy 
remote’.491 In the words of the PRA: ‘[t]his is intended to protect retail banking from 
risks unrelated to the provision of that service and ensure that banking groups which get 
into trouble can be resolved in an orderly manner, thereby avoiding taxpayer liability and 
ensuring the continuous provision of necessary retail banking services’.492 In this sense, 
the PRA has identified ring-fencing’s objectives as ‘ensuring the continuity of core 
[retail] services’ by: (i) promoting resilience through the limitation of spill-over shocks 
between entities within a group; and (ii) enhancing the resolvability of both groups and 
individual entities.493 
 
2.2.2. Moral Hazard and Large, Complex Systemically Important Banks 
 
Ending the ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF) and moral hazard problems that underpin large, 
complex financial institutions and Global SIFIs (G-SIFIs) is one of the main concerns in 
the ongoing agenda for revamping global finance.494 G-SIFIs and large banking groups 
are characterized by their size, complexity, their levels of interconnectedness, lack of 
substitutability and their global outreach.495 The sheer number of separate legal entities 
and the convoluted structures that some banks have can serve as a proxy to illustrate just 
how complex banks have become. For instance, the four largest US Bank Holding 
Companies each have more than 2,000 subsidiaries – two of them have more than 3,000 
subsidiaries.496 This increased legal complexity is not limited to US banks. Table 1 
presents information regarding the total numbers of companies and recorded 
                                                
491 Schwarcz, ‘Ringfencing’ (n 471) 5.  
492 Consultation Paper CP19/14 s 1.7. 
493 ibid ss 1.17-1.22.  
494 See Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, Letter to G20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors, ‘Financial Reforms – Finishing the Post-Crisis Agenda and Moving Forward’ (4 
February 2015) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-Chair-letter-to-
G20-February-2015.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016.  
495 See Financial Stability Board (FSB), ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for 
Financial Institutions’ (October 2014) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_141015.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016.  
496 Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi, and James Vickery, ‘A Structural View of U.S. Bank 
Holding Companies’ (July 2012) FRBNY Economic Policy Review 1.  
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subsidiaries497 for some selected global banking groups, listed according to their total 
assets. 
 
Table 8 
Number of Companies and Subsidiaries for Selected Financial Institutions 
(Source: Bankscope Database) 
 
BANK NAME 
 
 
TOTAL 
ASSETS 
IN 
MIL USD 
 
NO. OF COMPANIES 
IN CORPORATE 
GROUP 
NO. OF 
RECORDED 
SUBSIDIARIES 
HSBC Holdings Plc 2,634,139 1,988 2,463 
JPMorgan Chase & Co 2,573,126 2,023 5,275 
BNP Paribas 2,522,470 2,096 2,800 
Deutsche Bank AG 2,222,314 2,014 5,408 
Barclays Plc 2,161,178 1,647 2,949 
Crédit Agricole S.A. 2,119,532 1,163 636 
Bank of America  2,104,534 2,350 4,218 
JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA 2,074,952 2,023 537 
Citigroup Inc 1,842,530 1,230 1,108 
Wells Fargo & Company 1,687,155 2,574 4,093 
Société Générale 1,588,163 951 995 
Lloyds Banking Group Plc 1,394,977 1,630 56 
UBS AG 1,074,164 479 4,379 
BPCE SA 988,072 1,559 1,897 
Credit Suisse Group AG 931,569 424 3,497 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc 856,240 1,051 3,889 
Morgan Stanley 832,702 1,265 4,270 
Commerzbank AG 758,049 1,048 1,381 
UniCredit Bank AG 399,970 1,952 451 
Bank of New York Mellon  385,303 493 5,920 
 
                                                
497 Defined as ownership of more than 50.01%. 
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The ‘too-big-to’ set of problems can entail perceptions that some institutions are either: 
too-big-to-save (TBTS), too-interconnected-to-fail, too-complex-to-resolve or too-big-to-
prosecute. TBTF institutions thrive on the moral hazard generated by governmental 
subsidies and guarantees, which can prompt them to engage in excessive risk taking 
because of the perception that governments will bail them out in the event of their failure 
or financial distress.498 Although it is very difficult to measure, in the UK some empirical 
studies estimate the implicit subsidy to major banks to oscillate from around £6 billion to 
over £100 billion.499 What is more, the utter size of some of these TBTF institutions and 
the fiscal restrictions that their host/home countries can face entails that any potential 
governmental bailout could lack credibility or be outright unaffordable for some states. A 
grim reality may be that TBTF megabanks have only become bigger after the onslaught 
of the 2007-08 economic meltdown.500  
 
Ring-fencing also purports to reduce information asymmetries between banks and other 
stakeholders, such as creditors, depositors and supervisors, with respect to the opacity of 
certain activities and assets deemed to be riskier – or simply too difficult – to adequately 
monitor or supervise.501 The purported outcome would be that depositors are less likely to 
run on a RFB should other related group entities become financially distressed or 
insolvent. By ‘separating the wheat from the chaff’, British bank regulators and 
supervisors expect to rest assured in order to better focus on their oversight endeavors.  
 
 
 
                                                
498 Franklin Allen et al., ‘Moral Hazard and Government Guarantees in the Banking Industry’ 
(2015) 1 Journal of Financial Regulation 1.   
499 See Joseph Noss and Rhiannon Sowerbutts, ‘The Implicit Subsidy of Banks’ (2012) Bank of 
England Financial Stability Paper n 15. See also Bank of England, ‘Financial Stability Report’ 
(December 2010).  
500James Barth et al., ‘Just How Big Is the Too Big to Fail Problem?’ (2012) Journal of Banking 
Regulation 265.  
501 For example, derivatives and some off-balance sheet operations. See Anat Admati, ‘Financial 
Regulation Reform: Politics, Implementation and Alternatives’ (2013) 18 N.C. Banking Inst. 
Special Edition 72.  
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2.2.3. The Payments System and Financial Stability as Global Public Goods 
 
The 2007-08 global economic crisis exposed many of the frailties of the international 
monetary and financial system. Financial market integration and cross border 
interconnection have accentuated the need to preserve so-called ‘global public goods’, 
such as the worldwide payments systems, global economic growth and financial 
stability.502 Interestingly enough, the mirror concepts of financial and payment system 
instability can be construed as global ‘public bads’. As economic theory points out, 
public goods are non-rival and non-excludable in their consumption. This means that 
consumption of the payments systems and financial stability belong to every nation, their 
‘benefits are available to all States, and one State’s consumption does not reduce their 
availability to others’.503  
 
The public good problem surrounding financial stability is also connected to the 
aforementioned problems of negative and positive externalities. If one country invests a 
lot in financial stability and supervision, others states may still benefit from those efforts 
without having to contribute at all. Moreover, any country – regardless of whether it 
invests or not in financial stability – can still import financial instability stemming from 
another jurisdiction.  
 
The transnational nature of these global public goods comes from the fact that their 
enjoyment and upholding is no longer confined within national borders.504 However, 
similar to other public good problems, their existence can generate underinvestment, 
collective action and free-riding problems.505 This is the rationale for having States and 
international bodies –like the Financial Stability Board (FSB) – undertaking the goals of 
                                                
502 Joel P Trachtman, ‘The International Law of Financial Crisis: Spillovers, Subsidiarity, 
Fragmentation and Cooperation’ (2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 719, 721. See 
also Martin Wolf, ‘The World’s Hunger for Public Goods’ Financial Times (London, 24 January 
2012) < http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/517e31c8-45bd-11e1-93f1-00144feabdc0.html> accessed 
6 December 2016.  
503 Trachtman (n 502) 721. 
504 Dirk Schoenmaker, ‘A New Financial Stability Framework for Europe’ (2008) 13 The 
Financial Regulator.  
505 See Lastra, International Financial and Monetary Law (n 446) 129.  
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preserving some of these global public goods by making sure that investing resources for 
achieving financial stability is the concern of every jurisdiction. 
 
Ring-fencing has been presented as a potential solution for attaining the provision of 
public goods, like financial stability and core services continuity, locally in any 
jurisdiction. However, if other countries do not implement similar ring-fencing measures, 
the efforts could be undermined, as the import/export of negative externalities, such as 
systemic risk, across jurisdictions is not necessarily curtailed. Consequently, unless 
different countries adopt coordinated rules, contagion cannot be mitigated on a cross-
border level.506   
 
2.2.4. Time Inconsistency and Bank Runs 
 
Bank supervisors, investors and customers do not always behave in a consistent manner. 
Foremost, banking regulators and supervisors – and to a certain extent, also politicians – 
often vow to put an end to the moral hazard produced by TBTF financial institutions. 
They do so by promising not to bail out financial institutions with public money should 
they enter into economic distress or come closer to failure because of undercapitalization 
or managerial malfeasance. However, during critical moments of financial distress, 
governments and independent monetary authorities can renege on their pledge and 
bailout financial institutions with taxpayers’ funds in order to prevent the wider economic 
(and political) costs of failure.  
 
Ring-fencing could purportedly ameliorate this time inconsistency problem, in the sense 
that the legal separation serves as a signal that differentiates between core and excluded 
activities. Should a RFB require a bailout, taxpayers and other stakeholders could rest 
assured that only core services – and not other excluded activities or assets – are rescued. 
                                                
506 One could argue that ring-fencing resembles a form of vaccination: it can only help protect the 
local jurisdiction implementing it. However, it does not necessarily stop the spread of contagion 
elsewhere. Moreover, the different approaches employed so far seem to be different concoctions 
that could have varying consequences and effects. Consequently, unlike vaccines, if all countries 
scramble to ring-fence different entities the resulting fragmentation could make all jurisdictions 
worse off.  
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This could support existing governmental guarantees aimed at curtailing bank runs.507 
The segregation could also make it clear to the public whenever an entity that is not a 
core institution or RFB is salvaged. This could ultimately impose a political constraint on 
regulators while serving as an odyssean pre-commitment mechanism for them to ‘tie 
themselves to the mast’ in order to withstand the proclivity to bail-out entities that are not 
RFBs.  
 
While the purported benefits of ring-fencing for tackling the time inconsistency problem 
and bank runs might hold true for the case of British depositors, it might not be the case 
across borders. For example, the heterogeneity of different policies adopted throughout 
EU states, such as Germany and France, could undermine the signaling benefits to 
European consumers that structural policies seek to achieve. Moreover, they can also 
hinder the objective of having a strong Banking Union.508 In France and Germany, ring-
fenced bodies are trading units – instead of deposit-taking entities like in the UK. This 
means that different activities are segregated in these countries. Sending contradicting 
signals can create confusion regarding which entities are segregated or protected in each 
jurisdiction across the EU Single Market. Consequently, the benefits that ring-fencing 
could provide against potential bank runs could be compromised.509  
 
                                                
507 The seminal article by Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig states that: ‘[d]uring a bank run, 
depositors rush to withdraw their deposits because they expect the bank to fail’. In turn, this panic 
can become a self-fulfilling prophecy because of fractional-reserve banking. This entails that ‘the 
sudden withdrawals can force the bank to liquidate many of its assets at a loss and to fail’. See 
Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig, ‘Bank Runs, Deposit Protection Insurance and Liquidity’ 
(1983) 91 Journal of Political Economy 401-419, 401.  
508The Banking Union is the name of the Eurozone’s latest regulatory framework reform with 
common rules for banks in all 28 Member States. The Single Rulebook, the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) are the cornerstones of the 
reform. See also n 176. At the time of writing, a majority of UK voters had decided on a 
referendum celebrated on 23 June 2016 in favor of the UK leaving the EU. However, it is still 
uncertain how the UK’s exit from the EU will be implemented.   
509 In order to tackle some of the information asymmetries between depositor/consumers and non-
ringfenced bodies (‘NRFBs’) the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has published a 
consultation paper (CP15/23) titled ‘Ring-fencing: Disclosures to consumers by non-ring-fenced 
bodies’ (July 2015) <www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/consultation-papers/cp15-23> 
accessed 6 December 2016. NRFBs are defined as: ‘(…) a deposit-taker that is not an RFB, or a 
deposit-taker that has been exempted from ring-fencing. For example, a deposit-taker that is not 
an RFB but is part of a corporate group that contains a RFB’. 
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Finally, ring-fencing could be ineffective to prevent bank runs when governmental 
guarantees are either not credible, limited, or are simply unfeasible. This would be the 
case of states that cannot afford to salvage failing too-big-to-save (TBTS) financial 
institutions. Time inconsistency could also undermine the effectiveness of the so-called 
‘electrification’ of the fence, which threatens to completely breakup banks should they 
try to circumvent the firewall measures.   
 
2.2.5. Summing-up 
 
As discussed in this subsection, bank ring-fencing in the UK has been proposed as a 
structural solution – which employed in conjunction with other measures – could be used 
to tackle some of the cited economic problems experienced during the 2007-08 financial 
crisis. However, segregating particular activities into different entities also draws out 
some additional economic concerns. 
 
Ring-fencing also raises some legal questions. Foremost, there is a choice on the legal 
form used to actually establish the ring-fenced subsidiary. There are patterns of property 
rights (loss bearing) that are modified whenever different legal entities – such as 
subsidiaries – are created. In addition, there is a concern that UK ring-fencing rules might 
be inconsistent with the EU’s principle of freedom of establishment. Moreover, the 
Corporate Law and Economics literature points out to asset partitioning as one of the 
most relevant attributes of certain legal organizational forms. In turn, the following 
subsection discusses whether ring-fencing is a form of asset partitioning, as well as some 
of the consequences that result from such an interpretation.  
 
2.3. Bank Ring-fencing as a Form of Asset Partitioning  
 
When further examined through the prism of Corporate Law and Economics, the ring-
fencing of core banking activities though subsidiarization that is currently being 
implemented in the UK evokes the theory of organizational law as asset partitioning 
 190 
presented by Hansmann, Kraakman et al.510 This is because the creation of a RFB as a 
subsidiary within a group structure potentially entails that: (i) the legal personalities of 
the holding entity, its RFB, and other group entities would be different; and (ii) that some 
degrees of limited liability could also be in place in order to protect the parent entity, its 
owners and other group entities from the obligations and liabilities of the RFB.511 Thus, 
subsidiarization rearranges or modifies the existing patterns of bank creditors’ (loss 
bearing) rights.  
 
The academic literature identifies two types of asset partitioning, namely (a) limited 
liability (known as ‘defensive asset partitioning’ or ‘owner shielding’) and (b) 
‘affirmative asset partitioning’ (also known as ‘entity shielding’).512 Both entity shielding 
and owner shielding are two sides of the same coin. Limited liability protects an entity’s 
owners from the claims of the entity’s creditors. ‘Entity shielding’ protects a firm’s 
property from its owners and from the owners’ creditors. Different organizational forms 
can have varying levels or degrees of these two forms of asset partitioning (oscillating 
from weak to complete).513 In turn, the features of both forms of asset partitioning are 
discussed with greater detail. 
 
2.3.1. Defensive Asset Partitioning: The Limited Liability of RFBs  
 
The establishment of ring-fenced banks as subsidiaries within banking groups could 
entail the possibility that RFBs be endowed with limited liability. Limited liability is a 
salient feature of some organizational forms, such as (public and private) business 
corporations (joint stock companies) and limited liability companies (LLCs). In essence, 
these are the type of entities that ring-fencing rules will apply to in the UK – since there 
                                                
510 See generally Henry Hansmann, and R Kraakman, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’ 
(2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 387; Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘Organizational Law 
as Asset Partitioning’ (2000) 44 European Economic Review 807; Henry Hansmann, R 
Kraakman and Richard Squire, ‘Law and the Rise of the Firm’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 
1333. 
511 The degree of limited liability (ie strong/weak) will be contingent upon the type of legal 
structure used in order to incorporate the RFB (ie if it is a corporation, a trust, etc.). 
512 See Henry Hansmann, and R Kraakman, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’ (n 510).  
513 ibid. 
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is a carve-out provision that excludes co-operative banks, credit unions and building 
societies.  
 
From an economic perspective, limited liability creates an asset partition that works to 
protect the property of the owners of a legal entity against claims brought by the entity’s 
creditors. Limited liability puts a floor under the losses that a firm’s owner can 
experience during a downturn.514 Limitedly liable owners can externalize their downside 
risks to other stakeholders – specially, involuntary ones.515 If RFBs are structured using 
an organizational form with limited liability – which is likely to be the case – then the 
depositors and other creditors of the RFB do not, in principle, have a legal claim against 
the beneficial owners of the entity (eg against its holding organization) nor against other 
legal entities within a banking group’s structure. This means that while regulators could 
have the faculty to bail-in equity holders and some types of bank creditors (including 
depositors), they would not necessarily have the prerogative to compel these stakeholders 
to inject additional funds into a RFB, should it become insolvent. In order to be able to 
execute claims against the direct owners of a RFB endowed with limited liability, 
regulators would need to pierce through one or several corporate veils of protection.  
 
When limited liability is coupled with freely transferable shares, investors can diversify 
their portfolios.516 Limited liability can purportedly lower a RFB’s cost of capital and 
allow it to raise funds. According to the literature, limited liability should have a greater 
effect on an entity’s involuntary creditors (ie tort victims) because voluntary creditors can 
‘incorporate the risk of non-payment into the contract price’.517 This could be the case for 
certain bank creditors that have enough clout to enable them to negotiate with RFBs on a 
level playing field. However, in their dealings with RFBs, most retail depositors (as a 
                                                
514 It could be argued that de facto limited liability exists with regards to the ownership interests 
of the owners of a mutual association.  
515 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, ‘Limited Liability and the Corporation’ (1985) 52 
University of Chicago Law Review 89. 
516 ibid. 
517 ibid. 
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class of unsecured bank creditors518) presumably contract with banks by adhering to 
boilerplate terms, conditions, and market commissions, fees and interest rates.  
 
2.3.2. Affirmative Asset Partitioning: The Legal Personality of RFBs  
 
Having an independent legal personality means that a RFB (ie a corporation, a limited 
liability company, etc.) is a subject of law entitled to exercise rights and undertake 
obligations. Subsidiaries are typically standalone bodies corporate, which means that they 
have an independent legal personality as well as their own capital and limited liability. 
Bank branches, on the other hand, do not necessarily have a separate legal personality of 
their own and enjoy limited liability on a consolidated basis (eg they share the limited 
liability of their parent entities).519   
 
From an economic perspective, having an independent legal personality means that an 
organization can own property and undertake its own obligations (enter into contracts). In 
the case of a RFB, it also means that the property that it owns is different to the property 
owned by its holding company and its ultimate beneficial owners. As a corollary to this, 
the assets of a RFB are – in principle – unavailable to its direct or ultimate beneficial 
owners, to the creditors of its parent organization or to the creditors of its ultimate 
beneficial owners. This is referred to as ‘liquidation protection’ in the literature.520 This 
entails that, to a certain degree, the property of the RFB is shielded from appropriation 
by: (i) the parent organization, (ii) the parent organization’s ultimate beneficial owners; 
(iii) other legal entities within the group structure; and (iv) the creditors of (i), (ii) and 
(iii).  
 
                                                
518 Depositors will be amongst the voluntary, unsecured creditors of a RFB. Moreover, RFBs will 
have additional secured, unsecured, voluntary and involuntary creditors. Deposit insurers – and 
ultimately, taxpayers – could also potentially become involuntary and unsecured creditors of a 
RFB in the case that it is rescued with public funds. 
519 See Giovanni Dell’Ariccia and Robert Marquez, ‘Risk and the corporate structure of banks’ 
(2010) 65 Journal of Finance 1075.  
520 See Hansmann et al. ‘Law and the Rise of the Firm’ (n 510). 
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In turn, the assets of a RFB are segregated for the benefit of its own creditors, including 
its depositors – and ultimately, local taxpayers – should the threat of a bailout loom. This 
means that subsidiarization effectively modifies patterns of creditors’ (or loss-bearing) 
rights. Moreover, having an independent legal personality also means that the corporate 
governance structure of a RFB can – and should be different – to the governance of its 
parent organization and related group entities.521  
 
2.3.3. Why is Asset Partitioning Relevant for RFBs? 
 
The fundamental difference between entity shielding (legal personality) and owner 
shielding (limited liability) is that: ‘entity shielding protects the assets of the firm from 
the creditors of the firm’s owners, while limited liability protects the assets of the firm’s 
owners from the claims of the firm’s creditors’.522  For the particular case of RFBs in the 
UK, this means that entity shielding reshuffles creditors’ rights over part of a banking 
group’s consolidated balance sheet. Entity shielding (eg having an independent legal 
personality) would protect the RFB’s property from the claims of the creditors of its 
owners (ie creditors of the holding organization) as well as from the claims of the 
creditors of other group entities.  
 
Conversely, the ownership shielding provided by limited liability would protect the assets 
of the holding organization (the owners of a RFB) and the property of other group entities 
from the claims of a RFB’s creditors. Thus, owner shielding is the mirror concept of 
entity shielding. Both forms of asset partitioning serve to establish the ring-fence. In this 
sense, asset partitioning works as a form of ‘double-glazing’.523 Because banking groups 
are characterized by multiple standalone subsidiaries, asset partitioning can be replicated 
throughout a group’s structure.    
                                                
521 The PRA’s proposed draft Rulebook for RFBs established detailed rules regarding the 
composition of a RFBs board in relation to directors serving or holding appointments in other 
entities of a RFB’s group. See Bank of England & Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), ‘The 
implementation of ring-fencing: consultation on legal structure, governance and the continuity of 
services and facilities’, Consultation Paper CP19/14, October 2014, Appendix 4.  
522 Reinier Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law: a Comparative and Functional 
Approach (2nd edn, OUP 2009) 10.  
523 I am grateful to Tobias Hlobil for this illustration.  
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Figure 9 
 Subsidiarization as Asset Partitioning 
Figure 9 tries to depict how ring-fencing through asset partitioning works. A RFB 
subsidiary setup using an organizational form endowed with limited liability (eg a 
corporation) precludes the creditors of a RFB from pursuing the assets of its parent 
company – and also shields the property of its ultimate beneficial owners. Limited 
liability works as a shield that protects the parent entity, its investors (and also other 
entities within a banking group), from the claims of the RFB’s creditors. Such creditors 
could potentially include a deposit insurer and taxpayers. Consequently, in the event that 
a RFB fails, its creditors cannot expect the RFB’s parent company (nor the beneficial 
owners of the parent company or other group entities located abroad) to inject capital or 
provide liquidity to the failing subsidiary in order to prevent its failure.  
 
This means that limited liability protects the holding company’s property (and the 
property of other group entities) from the creditors of the RFB. However, certain types of 
RFB creditors – namely depositors – can further benefit from the deposit protection 
granted in the UK, thus reducing the extent of their potential losses.  
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Figure 9 also helps illustrate the entity shielding created by establishing RFBs through 
subsidiarization. RFBs would be endowed with a separate and independent legal 
personality from that of their parent companies (and their ultimate beneficial owners). As 
a result, the capital and assets (property rights) of a RFB would be protected from the 
claims of its parent company’s creditors. Unless a RFB is liquidated, the creditors of its 
owners do not have access to the RFB’s assets in order to satisfy their claims against the 
entity’s owners. Entity shielding reinforces the idea that ring-fencing through 
subsidiarization purports to protect deposits and core retail functions locally by 
rearranging existing patterns of creditors’ rights through the RFB.  
 
The economic consequences of ring-fencing as asset partitioning are important for RFBs 
because such regulatory provisions essentially modify the patterns of creditors’ – or in 
reverse order, loss-bearing – rights established in the law. In other words, ring-fencing 
changes creditor hierarchy. This means that it can favor or prioritize some creditors 
(bondholders, depositors, other banks, the central bank and ultimately domestic 
taxpayers) at the expense of others (creditors located abroad). Thus, ring-fencing 
reapportions parts of a bank’s consolidated balance sheet. To a certain extent, deposit 
protection insurance schemes also achieve this creditor reshuffle through legal 
subrogation by deposit insurers.  
 
In addition, strong entity shielding and strong owner shielding could be construed as 
having their own costs and benefits vis-à-vis ring-fencing’s policy objectives. In 
particular, ring-fencing’s objectives as declared by the PRA, include assuring the 
continuity of services by enhancing both the resolvability and the resilience of RFBs.  
 
The explanation for the aforementioned idea is that on the one hand, a strong form of 
entity shielding for the ring-fenced subsidiaries would reduce the implicit contingent 
public sector guarantees for the country implementing ring-fencing, in the case that any 
RFB requires a public bailout. The enhanced guarantee results from the geographical 
segregation and the pledge of a RFB’s assets for the benefit of local creditors. Entity 
shielding also facilitates opportunities for implementing states and regulators to 
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expropriate capital locally if needed.524 Ring-fencing can also enhance resolvability by 
making RFBs ‘bankruptcy remote’. These benefits underline the geographical dimension 
of asset partitioning through subsidiarization. Consequently, entity shielding seems to be 
aligned with some of ring-fencing’s stated objectives.  
 
On the other hand, a strong or complete form of limited liability (owner shielding) would 
entail that a RFB’s owners could be affected by moral hazard and reduced incentives for 
adequately monitoring the ring-fenced entity (this is discussed in greater detail under 
Section 4 below). What is more, it could mean that in the event that a RFB is 
undercapitalized, enters into financial distress or becomes insolvent, 
regulators/governments cannot legally coerce a bank holding organization (or the RFB’s 
ultimate beneficial owners or other ‘sibling’ entities) to inject fresh funds into the 
subsidiary with the aim to prevent it from failing. While the firewall created by entity 
shielding has the benefit of protecting assets and capital from going outside of the fence, 
the costs of limited liability can make it more difficult to bring in new capital when 
needed.  
 
This ‘double-glazing’ feature is central to the concept of ring-fencing and the benefits 
resulting from asset partitioning. Entity and owner shielding can certainly have 
counteracting effects. Thus, asset partitioning can work as a double-edged sword. The 
problem is exacerbated when considering that asset partitioning is replicated in all 
subsidiaries throughout a banking group’s structure. Particularly, in the presence of many 
different legal entities operating across borders.  
 
In order to be able to reduce the aforementioned counteracting effects, financial 
regulators can calibrate the desired levels of asset partitioning. In this sense, both limited 
liability (owner shielding) and entity shielding can be decreased or augmented depending 
on the desired policy outcomes.  
 
                                                
524 See Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (n 519).   
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Entity shielding can be increased by restricting intra-group flow of funds (capital, 
liquidity, profits, leverage) between entities in a banking group. For example, dividends 
and other forms of compensation payouts can be restricted. Moreover, regulators can 
impose strict capital, liquidity and leverage requirements across ring-fenced local 
subsidiaries. Conversely, these measures can also be relaxed, weakening the level of 
entity shielding.  
 
There are a variety of tools for adjusting limited liability levels. Measures that can reduce 
limited liability can range from bail-in measures and corporate veil piercing, to special 
extended liability regimes. Some of these current and historical measures are briefly 
discussed in turn.  
 
Thomas Huertas defines bank bail-in as writing-down or converting liabilities into 
equity.525 But bank bail-in measures can encounter several limitations.526 Primarily, bail-
in applies vis-à-vis existing liabilities and residual claimants. This means that liabilities, 
liquidity and loss absorbing capital have to be enough to keep an entity going during 
times of financial distress and in order to avoid a publicly funded bailout.  
 
Corporate veil piercing can also encounter some practical problems. Bank ownership can 
be widely dispersed, making it prohibitively expensive or simply unfeasible for deposit 
insurers or regulators to claim additional funds. Moreover, investors can also be 
insolvent. This is referred to as the judgment proof problem in the Law and Economics 
literature.527 An additional potential mechanism that regulators could consider is 
                                                
525 Thomas F Huertas, Safe to Fail: How Resolution Will Revolutionise Banking (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2014) 92.  
526 ibid 93. According to Huertas in order for bail-in ‘to work effectively within the time frame 
relevant for preservation of continuity, a number of conditions have to hold: (i) the resolution 
authority has to have the statutory authority to implement bail-in immediately; (ii) bail-in has to 
respect creditor hierarchy; (iii) bail-in of investor instruments should be sufficient to recapitalise 
the bank; (iv) bail-in of investor instruments should not trigger cross-default clauses’.  
527 Parties are judgment proof when they are ‘unable to pay fully the amount for which they have 
been found legally liable’ by a court of law. See Steven Shavell, ‘The Judgment Proof Problem’ 
(1986) 6 International Review of Law and Economics 45. See also Steven Shavell, ‘Minimum 
Asset Requirements and Compulsory Liability Insurance as Solutions to the Judgment-proof 
Problem’ (2005) 36 RAND Journal of Economics 63. 
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corporate veil piercing combined with something called ‘reverse piercing of the corporate 
veil’.528 This is essentially ‘piercing entity shielding’, and is often seen from the 
perspective of an entities’ owners. Veil piercing and ‘reverse veil piercing’ are mirror 
concepts of each other, in the same way that entity shielding and owner shielding are 
mirror concepts of each other. 
 
How would this potential solution work? While current liability calibration measures 
allow regulators to bail-in a RFB’s holding company in the event of the failure or distress 
of the RFB, reverse veil piercing would also grant regulators the authority to seek 
additional assets and capital from other group entities (eg an investment bank or another 
affiliate entity located abroad), as a way to mitigate potential capital shortfalls, residual 
losses or ‘judgment proof’ problems affecting a RFB and its direct holding company. 
This can imply, for example, appropriating assets or restricting dividend policies in other 
group entities in order to recapitalize a RFB in distress or reimburse funds paid out by 
deposit insurers. This solution would be a mixture of strong entity shielding for the RFB, 
combined with weak owner shielding and weak entity shielding for the RFB’s parent 
company and for other group affiliate entities. It is essentially breaking through layers of 
double-glazing, throughout a banking group’s organizational structure.   
 
The aforementioned proposal implies relaxing limited liability to a certain extent. Similar 
solutions for banking regulation have existed in the past. One notable example was the 
‘double limited liability’ that existed in US from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth 
century.529 Under this extended-liability regime, bank owners could stand to lose up to 
double their original investment. This meant that bank shareholders could not only lose 
the amount that they invested, but in the event of bank failure, they were also personally 
liable for an additional amount up to the par value of their original shareholding. Bank 
                                                
528 Michael J Gaertner, ‘Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should Corporation Owners Have It 
Both Ways? (1989) 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 667, 
<http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss3/6> accessed 6 December 2016. 
529 See Grossman (n 490). See also Jonathan Macey and G Miller, ‘Double Liability of Bank 
Shareholders: History and Implications’ 27 Wake Forest Law Review 31. For a recent discussion 
of so-called ‘de-partitioning remedies’ see H Hansmann and R Squire, ‘External and Internal 
Asset Partitioning: Corporations and Their Subsidiaries’ in Jeffrey N Gordon and Wolf-Georg 
Ringe (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance (forthcoming OUP 2017). 
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extended liability regimes were eventually replaced by deposit guarantee schemes. 
Although extended liability regimes might be futile for global banks with dispersed 
ownership, they could provide some insights for designing policies aimed at tackling the 
economic problems that bank limited liability generates.  
 
Another policy that could serve to buttress ring-fencing in the UK is requiring RFB 
holding companies to act as a ‘source of strength’ to their ring-fenced subsidiaries. In the 
US, the ‘source of strength’ of bank holding companies is interpreted to mean: ‘[t]he 
ability of a company that directly or indirectly owns or controls an insured depository 
institution to provide financial assistance to such insured depository institution in the 
event of the financial distress of the insured depository institution’.530 This would entail 
that in addition to the adoption of the ‘sibling structure’ both RFBs and their holding 
companies should be adequately capitalized, subjected to liquidity and leverage ratios, 
and that regulators could use the assets of parent companies – and other group entities – 
in order to bail-in ring-fenced subsidiaries.531 
 
To sum up, while ring-fencing could be an effective measure for preventing capital 
flights between distressed or fragile entities within a banking group, it could also 
undermine resolvability by making it more difficult to bail-in or require a RFB’s holding 
company to inject fresh capital to an undercapitalized or failing subsidiary.532 As a result, 
these considerations regarding asset partitioning can be useful for calibrating the 
effectiveness of ring-fencing through subsidiarization as will be further explained under 
Section 3. 
                                                
530 As originally established in § 225.28 of the US Bank Holding Company Act of 1957 and 
Regulation Y. 
531 This is currently not the case for certain banking holding companies. For example, HSBC 
Holdings plc’s 2014 Annual Accounts state that while: ‘HSBC Holdings, the holding company of 
the Group, is the primary source of equity capital for its subsidiaries and provides non-equity 
capital to them when necessary’ it ‘does not provide core funding to any banking subsidiary, nor 
is it a lender of last resort and does not carry out any banking business in its own right’. See 
‘HSBC Holdings plc Annual Reports and Accounts 2014’ 
<http://www.annualreports.com/Company/hsbc-holdings-plc> accessed 6 December 2016. 
532 It could be argued that reputational risk aversion could provide incentives for a banking group 
(wishing to continue conducting business as a going concern) to capitalize a failing RFB without 
necessarily having the legal obligation to do so. This argument has been made by Lui (n 470) 
341.  
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2.3.4. Why Did Bank Ring-Fencing Require Special Legislation? 
 
Much like the contributions of Corporate Law and Trusts Law, the ring-fencing of 
commercial banks seeks to establish patterns of creditors’ – and other stakeholders’ –
property rights (loss bearing) that would either be impossible or prohibitively expensive 
to create via contract. The asset partitioning created by ring-fencing would benefit certain 
classes of domestic bank creditors and stakeholders: namely, depositors, deposit insurers 
– and most importantly – taxpayers. While depositors are typically existing and voluntary 
bank creditors, the taxpayers that effectively end up providing funds to salvage banks in 
distress are only potential – and often involuntary, bank creditors. Thus, ring-fencing 
reapportions and pledges the assets of the RFB for the benefit of local taxpayers – but 
also benefits the continuous functioning of bank core activities and the payments system 
in general.  
 
In addition, ring-fencing could meet its regulatory objectives by minimizing the negative 
externalities produced by bank failure at the lowest transaction cost amongst competing 
organizational structures. This means that ring-fencing should ideally be the cheapest 
cost-avoiding organizational structure for segregating core bank activities from excluded 
activities. This functional segregation also entails that taxpayers are not underwriting 
riskier activities and assets via deposit protection insurance schemes and other forms of 
governmental guarantees.  
 
One of the benefits that ring-fencing would purportedly provide is the reduction of the 
monitoring costs for bank creditors and other stakeholders – namely, depositors, 
supervisors and taxpayers – regarding the risk appetite of banks. Ring-fencing segregates 
core functions from other excluded activities. The rationale is that the monitoring costs of 
depositors and supervisors would be reduced since their main oversight would shift to the 
RFB. This is expected to make supervision less murky and failure less costly – but 
mostly for financial supervisors and countries implementing the measures. Consequently, 
ring-fencing could raise supervisory and failure costs for regulators located abroad.  
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Moreover, ring-fencing could also lower the cost of credit for the RFB, in a different 
manner to the way that limited liability does. This would work in a similar way to the 
enhanced creditworthiness that securitization and covered-bond structures provide.533 By 
segregating assets and activities into a separate pool with a different pattern of creditors’ 
rights, financial conglomerates may benefit from distinct credit ratings across units. A 
lower perceived risk profile for RFBs could entail cheaper funding vis-à-vis other legal 
entities within a banking group.534  
 
In sum, regulatory ring-fencing could be the most cost-effective organizational solution 
for pledging assets for the benefit of depositors and other bank stakeholders in the event 
of insolvency, as well as for minimizing and containing the external costs of bank failure. 
Ring-fencing through subsidiarization as a form of asset partitioning has been statutorily 
designed to protect depositors – a special category of bank creditors – and also other 
stakeholders such as deposit insurers and taxpayers, from having to incur the insolvency 
costs of failing financial institutions.  
 
It can be argued that – like limited liability – ring-fencing could also be established 
contractually by RFBs, on a case-by-case basis. However, contractually agreed ring-
fencing would not be effective vis-à-vis involuntary creditors (eg taxpayers). Moreover, it 
would not imply an obligation for banks to voluntarily adopt the ring-fence. The creditors 
of the RFB could also negotiate and agree a special status for their claims.  
 
As a result, effective ring-fencing with universal effects (erga omnes) is best established 
through special legislation. Moreover, establishing ring-fencing via legislation as the 
default regime reduces the mounting transaction costs that would result from having to 
include ring-fencing clauses in all of a RFB’s contractual dealings with third parties. In 
                                                
533 Claire Hill, ‘Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons’ (1996) 74 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 4.  
534 Of course, this is an empirical issue that ultimately will depend on the quality of the 
partitioned assets. See also John Armour et al., Principles of Financial Regulation (OUP 2016) 
516-17.  
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addition to the legal and commercial uncertainty and costs that would result from having 
contractual ring-fencing provisions struck down by a court of law. Consequently, it seems 
efficient to create ring-fencing through special legislation instead of by means of 
contract.  
 
3. SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF RING-FENCING IN THE UK 
 
The UK’s ring-fencing reforms were complemented by the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (Excluded Activities and Prohibitions) Order 2014 No. 2080 and the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Ring-fenced Bodies and Core Activities) 
Order 2014 No. 1960 (the ‘Orders’). The Orders establish that as a default rule, RFBs are 
precluded from the activity of dealing in investments acting as principals, unless 
authorized (also known as proprietary trading).  
 
The FSMA 2000 (as amended by the Financial Markets-Banking Reform- Act 2013) does 
not provide a definition for ‘ring-fencing’. The legislation focuses mainly on RFBs, 
which are defined as any: ‘UK institution which carries on one or more core activities 
(…)’.535 By ‘UK institution’ the Act means a ‘body corporate incorporated in the United 
Kingdom’, with the exception of mutual societies536 and UK institutions of a class 
excluded by order of the Treasury.537 While ‘core activities’ refer to the ‘the regulated 
activity of accepting deposits (whether carried on in the United Kingdom or 
elsewhere)’.538 Moreover, ‘core services’ are defined as: 
 
(a) Facilities for the accepting of deposits or other payments into an account which 
is provided in the course of carrying on the core activity of accepting deposits; 
(b) Facilities for withdrawing money or making payments from such an account; 
                                                
535 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 s 142A.  
536 Consultation Paper CP19/14 s 6.34 states that mutual societies include ‘building societies, 
friendly societies, industrial provident societies and EEA mutual societies’. See also FSMA s 
142(A).  
537 ibid paras (2) and (7). 
538 ibid s 142B.  
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(c) Overdraft facilities in connection with such an account.539 
 
In October 2014, the UK’s Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) published its 
Consultation Paper CP19/14 titled: ‘The Implementation of Ring-Fencing: Consultation 
on Legal Structure, Governance and the Continuity Of Services and Facilities’ 
(hereinafter, ‘Consultation Paper’ or ‘CP19/14’).540 In May 2015, presented its ‘Policy 
Statement PS10/15 on the implementation of ring-fencing: legal structure, governance 
and the continuity of services and facilities’ (henceforth, the ‘Policy Statement PS10/15’) 
providing feedback on CP19/14 and restating the rules and supervisory statements related 
to bank ring-fencing.541 The PRA’s Policy Statement PS10/15 sets out the PRA’s 
expected outcomes regarding bank ring-fencing policy in the UK. The key aspects of the 
ring-fencing policies presented in the document relate to: (i) the legal structure of 
banking groups, (ii) their governance; and (iii) the continuity of services and facilities.  
 
 
                                                
539 ibid s 142C. 
540 According to the PRA, CP19/14 was ‘one of four papers published on 6 October 2014 as part 
of its wider resolution and resilience agenda’ for banks in the UK. The other papers published on 
the same date are: PRA Consultation Paper CP20/14, ‘Depositor Protection’, October 2014; PRA 
Consultation Paper CP21/14, ‘Policyholder protection’, October 2014; and PRA Discussion 
Paper DP1/14, ‘Ensuring operational continuity in resolution’, October 2014. All the 
aforementioned documents are available online at: 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/publications/cp/default.aspx> accessed 6 December 
2016. A response to Consultation CP19/14 was presented using some of the ideas developed in 
this paper. See Klaus Heine and Enmanuel Cedeno-Brea, ‘The Legal Structure of Ring-Fenced 
Bodies in the United Kingdom - A Response to Consultation Paper CP19/14 on the 
Implementation of Ring-fencing: on Legal Structure, Governance and the continuity of Services 
and Facilities’ (2015) <http://hdl.handle.net/1765/77569> accessed 6 December 2016.  
541 Moreover, the PRA has also published Consultation Paper CP33/15 (September 2015), which 
described the PRA’s proposed approach to ring-fencing transfer schemes, as well as Consultation 
Paper CP37/15 on ‘The implementation of ring-fencing: prudential requirements, intragroup 
arrangements and use of financial market infrastructures’ (October 2015). The PRA has stated 
that it intends to ‘publish final versions of the rules and supervisory statements consulted on in 
the first and second ring-fencing consultations during the first half of 2016’. See Policy Statement 
PS10/15 para 16. The UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has also published a consultation 
paper (CP15/23) titled ‘Ring-fencing: Disclosures to consumers by non-ring-fenced bodies’ (July 
2015) <www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/consultation-papers/cp15-23> accessed 6 December 
2016.  
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3.1. How Does the PRA Expect RFBs to be Legally Structured? 
 
The Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 and its complementary Orders do not 
prescribe any compulsory formulas for legally structuring RFBs. The PRA’s Consultation 
Paper, which states its proposed ring-fencing policy, does not stipulate specific rules 
either. Instead, the PRA set out its ‘expectations for the legal ownership of RFBs and the 
entities which RFBs can own’.542 The PRA does not delve into the granularities of 
different legal structures that could be used for ring-fencing deposits. This means that the 
PRA does not expressly dictate what legal form RFBs should adopt. In this sense, 
organizational laws provide an array of different legal forms that are readily available for 
the structuring of ring-fenced subsidiaries within a banking group. Existing 
organizational forms include: limited liability companies, public limited companies, 
general and limited liability partnerships, mutual structures and trusts and special purpose 
securitization vehicles. 
 
Instead, the PRA states that: ‘RFBs and entities that can conduct excluded or prohibited 
activities are expected to be structured as separate clusters of subsidiaries beneath a UK 
holding company’.543 In the CP19/14, this is referred to as the adoption of a ‘sibling 
structure’ (see Figure 10).544  
 
 
                                                
542 Consultation Paper CP19/14 s 2.1 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/publications/cp/2014/cp1914.aspx> accessed 6 
December 2016.  
543 ibid s 2.6.  
544 Sir John Vickers has called this a convergence towards ‘structured universal banking’, also 
currently underway in the US. See John Vickers, ‘Banking reform in Britain and Europe’ (2013) 
Paper presented at the Rethinking Macro Policy II: First Steps and Early Lessons Conference 
Hosted by the International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, 8.  
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Figure 10  
Stylized 'Sibling Structure' of a Banking Group Containing a RFB 
 
 
 
The adoption of a sibling structure according to the PRA’s expectation entails that RFBs 
should not take ownership interests in entities conducting excluded activities (ie engaged 
in proprietary trading). Enabling this could possibly defeat the purpose of ring-fencing 
core activities by allowing banks to circumvent regulations by transferring prohibited 
activities to a controlled subsidiary (as depicted in Figure 11.).545 The threat of complete 
segregation (‘electrification’) also aims to deter potential deviations from the strict 
firewall. Moreover, the PRA expects that RFBs should not be the subsidiary of an entity 
that conducts prohibited or excluded activities (see Figure 12).546 The adoption of the 
sibling structure is also consistent with Article 13(3) of the Commission’s proposed 
                                                
545 Consultation Paper CP19/14 paras 2.7-2.9. In the French and German laws, proprietary trading 
and investments in hedge funds and other risky pooled vehicles – rather than deposits – are 
segregated into subsidiaries. Such ring-fenced entities cannot perform so-called core activities 
like deposit-taking. cf Lehmann (n 459) 9.  
546 According to the PRA, the rationale for this is that ‘operating as a subsidiary of such an entity 
[conducting excluded activities] could threaten an RFB’s ability to make independent decisions. 
For example, it may face pressure from the parent to take actions not in its interests’. See 
Consultation Paper CP19/14 paras 2.7-2.9.  
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structural Regulation, which require that ‘the [banking] group must be organized into 
homogeneous functional subgroups constituted on the one side by core credit institutions 
and on the other trading entities’.547 
 
 
Figure 11  
Discouraged Structure I: RFB with Ownership Interests in a Nonbank Financial 
Institution Conducting Prohibited Activities 
 
 
 
                                                
547 art 13(3) of the EU proposed Regulation states that: ‘The EU parent shall ensure that a group 
containing core credit institutions and trading entities shall be structured so that on a sub-
consolidated basis two distinct sub-groups are created, only one of which contains core credit 
institutions’. COM (2014) 043 (29 January 2014).  
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Figure 12  
Discouraged Structure II: RFB as a Subsidiary of a Nonbank Financial Institution 
Conducting Prohibited Activities 
 
  
 
The Consultation Paper suggests that the PRA does not intend to prescribe that banks and 
banking groups adopt a particular legal structure. This approach allows for some leeway 
regarding the legal arrangements that each banking group would undertake for setting-up 
their RFB in the UK. Banking groups would have to make a choice regarding the optimal 
legal form that their ring-fenced subsidiary will take.   
 
Moreover, it cannot be assumed that RFBs will necessarily adopt the corporate form. 
While the corporate form is the dominant structure in commercial banking worldwide – it 
is certainly not the only organizational form available for structuring RFBs within a 
banking group. As discussed before, there is a gamut of organizational forms that can be 
used for setting up RFBs. This means that while ‘a bank incorporated in France may look 
very different from one incorporated in Germany’548 or one incorporated in the UK, 
RFBs in Britain are also likely to be organized differently. However, it is likely that most 
RFBs will be setup using the corporate form given that the ring-fencing measures only 
apply to corporate banks.  
                                                
548 Lehmann (n 459) 10.  
UK Bank 
Holding 
Company 
Nonbank 
Entity A 
(excluded 
activities)  
RFB/ 
Commercial 
Bank 
Nonbank 
Entity B 
Nonbank 
Entity C 
 208 
 
3.2.  Is Ring-Fencing Consistent with EU Law? 
 
One particular concern raised against the UK’s ring-fencing model is that it could run 
counter to the principle of freedom of establishment under EU Law and the existing 
passporting provisions within the European Economic Area (EEA).549 The rationale 
behind this concern is that the British ring-fencing model forces certain banks to 
reorganize their retail business through the incorporation of a UK subsidiary. This 
eliminates the possibility of organizing banks as branches and imposes organizational 
form through the establishment of domestic subsidiaries. At the time of writing, the UK 
was still a member of the EU – in spite of the fact that a majority of British voters 
favored the UK leaving the EU through a referendum celebrated on 23 June 2016.  
 
The principle of freedom of establishment is set out in article 49 (ex Article 43 TEC) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Said Article declares that:  
 
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of 
another Member State shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also 
apply to restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries 
by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any 
Member State.  
 
Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue 
activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage 
undertakings, in particular companies or firms within the meaning of the 
                                                
549 Lui (n 470) 341-342. For a comprehensive discussion on freedom of establishment vis-à-vis 
bank branches and subsidiaries see also Almudena de la Mata Muñoz, ‘The Future of Cross-
Border Banking after the Crisis: Facing the Challenges through Regulation and Supervision’ 
(2010) 11 European Business Organization Law Review 575. 
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second paragraph of Article 54550, under the conditions laid down for its 
own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is 
effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital. 
 
Freedom of establishment is one of the fundamental principles that underpin the EU 
single market. The principle is directly applicable legislation in EU member States. As A. 
De la Mata explains, in the context of banking freedom of establishment means that 
banks: ‘established according to the legislation of one Member State and whose company 
premises, central administration or main centre of activity is within the EU, have the right 
to operate in other EU Member States through a branch, subsidiary or agency’. 551 Several 
decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) restate the scope of this principle.552 
 
The potential discrepancies between freedom of establishment and the ring-fencing 
policies adopted in the UK, Germany and France, prompted the European Commission to 
include a special carve out in its proposed structural Regulation in order to accommodate 
and grandfather-in existing structural models into conformity with projected EU rules. 
Article 21 of the Commission’s proposal Regulation included ‘provisions to allow credit 
institutions subject to national primary legislation at least equivalent to the EU proposal 
to derogate from the structural separation requirement’.553 While this might serve as a 
justification to argue that national ring-fencing provisions are not inconsistent with the 
TFEU, the existing national arrangements remain patchy and diverse in their approach. 
                                                
550 TFEU art 54 defines companies or firms as: ‘companies or firms constituted under civil or 
commercial law, including cooperative societies, and other legal persons governed by public or 
private law, save for those which are non-profit-making’. 
551 De la Mata (n 549) 590.  
552 See Case C-307/97 Compagnie de Saint-Gobain v. Finanzamt Aachen Innenstadt, para.35; 
Case C-141/99 Algemene Maatschappij voor Investering en Dienstverlening NV (AMID) v. 
Belgische Staat, para 20; and Case C-471/04 Finanzamt Offenbach am Main-Land v. Keller 
Holding GmbH, para 29. 
553 House of Lords’ European Union Committee (n 467) 89. See also art 21 of the Commission’s 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on structural measures 
improving the resilience of EU credit institutions. Said provision is said to allow: ‘for a possible 
derogation from the separation requirements in Chapter III [of the proposal Regulation] for credit 
institutions being covered by national legislation having an equivalent effect as the provisions of 
Chapter III of the proposal’ Commission’s Proposal s 3.3.4.10.   
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Moreover, the European Court of Justice can still be asked to adjudge on the legality of 
ring-fencing provisions.  
 
The resulting panorama could fulfill the EU Commission’s dismal concerns that: 
‘[w]ithout a Union-wide approach banks will be forced to adapt their structure and 
operation along national boundaries, thereby making them even more complex and 
increasing fragmentation’554 as well as undermining the objectives of the Banking Union.  
Moreover, in the aftermath of the UK’s so-called ‘Brexit’ referendum and its impending 
exit from the EU, the resulting landscape can be even more complex than originally 
expected.  
 
4. POLICY ANALYSIS: SOME UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES OF RING-FENCING POLICIES   
 
Could bank ring-fencing exacerbate – rather than reduce – some of the economic 
problems that it intends to tackle? This section uses economic analysis to describe and 
evaluate the potential unintended consequences that ring-fencing could generate. The 
existing model for RFB could complicate, rather than simplify, supervision. Moreover, 
ring-fencing as currently being adopted could exacerbate moral hazard for certain bank 
stakeholders, as well as increase coordination problems between host/home country 
regulators and supervisors across borders.  
 
4.1. Increased Complexity of Banks’ Legal Structures 
 
Segregating bank activities into several legal entities can add a layer of complexity to 
supervisory tasks.555 Global banking groups already exhibit convoluted and multilayered 
                                                
554 Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions, 4-5.  
555 Lehmann (n 459) 4.  
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organizational and legal structures. Several different bank subsidiaries are often 
incorporated and operate across borders.556  
 
Adding additional entities into the mix could augment – rather than reduce – supervisory 
hurdles and information asymmetries. This argument challenges the idea presented in the 
Vickers Report that: ‘removing the complexity of some wholesale/investment banking 
would make it easier for ring-fenced banks to be managed, monitored and supervised’.557 
According to the ICB’s view, the simplification process would also purportedly enhance 
resolvability. However, by increasing the number of supervisees through subsidiarization, 
supervisory oversight could be diffused, becoming ineffective when and where it matters 
the most. Alas, outside of the fence. Consequently, opportunities for malfeasance, 
excessive risk-taking and human error could proliferate.  
 
4.2. Capital and Liquidity Problems   
 
The Financial Stability Board has stated that: ‘[s]ome jurisdictions have concerns that 
structural banking reforms may potentially “trap” liquidity or capital in domestic silos, 
complicating the crisis management of globally active banks’.558As has been described, 
ring-fencing can have an impact on the capital and liquidity buffers held by banking 
groups. Prohibitions or restrictions to intra-group transfers can include limiting dividend 
distributions or having compulsory profit allocations. In particular, it can affect banks’ 
subsidiaries operating in different countries. Leonardo Gambacorta and Adrian van Rixtel 
have argued that: ‘ring-fencing and subsidiarization may constrain the allocation of 
capital and liquidity within a globally operating banking group’559 adding that: ‘[t]hese 
restrictions would add to the supervisory responses in several countries that aim to 
                                                
556 The chart included as an appendix to this thesis aims to illustrate this complexity by depicting 
the stylized organizational structure of HSBC Holdings plc. 
557 Vickers Report 46.  
558 Financial Stability Board ‘Structural Banking Reforms’ (n 464) 13.  
559 Leonardo Gambacorta and Adrian van Rixtel, ‘Structural Bank Regulation Initiatives: 
Approaches and Implications’ (2103) BIS Working Papers n 412.  
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increase the self-sufficiency of foreign subsidiaries by tightening local liquidity and/or 
capital requirements’.560  
 
Ring-fencing could create some distortions whenever stress tests are performed assuming 
that capital and liquidity located abroad can be used on a consolidated basis. Eugenio 
Cerutti and Christian Schimieder argue that an unconsolidated view taking into account 
different ring-fencing levels can provide a better picture for understanding the risks faced 
by international banks.561 During times of crisis, depending on the ring-fencing levels, 
some units could suffer capital and liquidity shortfalls while others might have surpluses 
or at least enough to cover threshold conditions. The referenced authors argue that: ‘(…) 
not only is the size of a banking group’s capital buffers relevant but also that the 
geographical location of those buffers within the banking group matter’.562 Consequently, 
ring-fencing could have the undesirable effect of increasing banks’ capital needs.  
 
4.3. Moral Hazard for Certain Bank Stakeholders 
 
The type of ring-fencing being implemented in the UK is aimed at protecting domestic 
depositors from losing access to their deposits and payments services in the event of bank 
insolvency or distress, while guaranteeing the continuity of operations of RFBs. 
Depositors in Britain – and in many other jurisdictions – are protected by deposit 
protection insurance schemes.563 As discussed before, it is often argued in the economic 
literature that deposit protection insurance can be a source of moral hazard for depositors, 
since it can reduce their incentives to monitor banks’ activities.564 It is an inevitable 
question whether ring-fencing – as form of asset partitioning – combined with deposit 
                                                
560 ibid. 
561 See Eugenio Cerutti and Christian Schmieder, ‘Ring fencing and Consolidated Banks’ Stress 
Tests’ (2014) 11 Journal of Financial Stability 1. 
562 Eugenio Cerutti and Christian Schmieder, ‘Ringfencing and Consolidated Bank Stress Tests’ 
(Vox, 13 April 2013) available online: <http://www.voxeu.org/article/ringfencing-and-
consolidated-bank-stress-tests> accessed 6 December 2016.  
563 The Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) is the statutory compensation program 
for depositors in the UK established in the FSMA 2000.   
564 See Franklin Allen et al. (n 498) 1–21.  
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protection is duplicative. What’s more, it could also exacerbate moral hazard by reducing 
the efforts of different bank stakeholders, such as investors, depositors and financial 
supervisors. 
 
4.3.1. Could Ring-fencing generate Moral Hazard for Investors and Depositors? 
 
Because bank equity holders benefit from limited liability (owner shielding), and have a 
limited downside-risk, they might have reduced incentives to monitor a bank’s activities. 
Consequently, banks’ investors could have reduced incentives to effectively monitor 
RFBs. Moreover, the increased levels of depositor protection via ring-fencing could also 
generate moral hazard, thus further reducing the incentives to oversee bank activities 
observantly. Consequently, a trade-off could exist between increased moral hazard for the 
unsecured creditors of RFBs – in particular – depositors, and the monitoring and funding 
costs reductions that ring-fencing could provide, as previously discussed.  
 
4.3.2. Could Ring-fencing generate Moral Hazard and Coordination Problems 
for Bank Supervisors? 
 
As Prof. Viral Acharya has stated, ring-fencing measures are ‘no panacea’.565 They could 
also pose some challenges to bank regulators and supervisors. Some of the 
inconveniences that ring-fencing can generate for supervisors and regulators include: 
moral hazard, overconfidence, negative interstate externalities and heightened 
coordination problems.  
 
Ring-fencing coupled with deposit protection insurance schemes can potentially generate 
moral hazard and biases for bank regulators. Regulators and supervisors could become 
overconfident by trusting that – thanks to a combination of ring-fencing and deposit 
protection insurance schemes – depositors are less likely to lose their money and 
taxpayers would not need to bailout RFBs in the event of failure. In other words, the 
                                                
565 Viral Acharya ‘Ring-Fencing is good, But no Panacea’ (Vox, 25 October 2011) 
<http://www.voxeu.org/article/ring-fencing-good-no-panacea> accessed 6 December 2016.  
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danger that the existing safeguards provided by the revamped financial safety net and 
crisis management framework could de-incentivize financial regulators from adequately 
supervising activities and services that fall outside of banks’ ‘safe’ domain.  This could 
lead to a decrease in the socially desirable oversight levels. Ring-fencing could also give 
supervisors an illusion of having greater control over RFBs, motivating them to 
concentrate more efforts in the oversight of ring-fenced entities, while losing sight of 
other entities within a banking group that operate outside of the fence.  
 
As learned from the Lehman Brothers collapse in 2008, the failure or distress of 
systemically important nonbank financial institutions (NBFI) can also be a source for 
financial contagion leading to public sector bailouts.566 Excluded activities can find their 
way into the domain of less regulated NBFI’s. Systemic risks can also build-up in the less 
regulated shadow banking sector.567 The Bank of England has recognized this by stating 
that: ‘[f]urther work is needed to evaluate the post-crisis reform agenda in a systemic 
context, taking due account of the emergence of new stability risks, including from the 
non-bank sector’.568 Separating the ‘wheat from the chaff’ does not mean that the ‘chaff’ 
will necessarily take care of itself. Consequently, moral hazard, supervisory 
overconfidence or excessive attention to RFBs (while neglecting other nonbank entities) 
can also lead to undesirable results and unintended consequences.   
 
The moral hazard problem affecting regulators and supervisors can also be linked to cross 
border coordination and burden sharing problems between supervisors in different 
jurisdictions.569 In particular, coordination problems can arise when the country that 
                                                
566 R Lastra, International Financial and Monetary Stability (n 446) 129.  
567 The Financial Stability Board (FSB) defines shadow banking as ‘credit intermediation 
involving entities and activities (fully or partially) outside the regular banking system’. Financial 
Stability Board (FSB),  ‘Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation 
Recommendations of the Financial Stability Board’ (27 October 2011). See also Lehmann (n 
459) 3.  
568 Bank of England, ‘One Bank Research Agenda: Discussion Paper’ (February 2015) 10. 
569 See Charles Goodhart and Rosa Lastra, ‘Border Problems’ (2010) 13 Journal of International 
Economic Law 705, 714. On burden sharing see Charles Goodhart and Dirk Schoenmaker, 
‘Fiscal Burden Sharing in Cross-Border Banking Crises’ (2009) 5 International Journal of Central 
Banking 141; Iman van Lelyveld and Marco Spaltro, ‘Coordinating Bank Failure Costs and 
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adopts deposit ring-fencing is the home country of important financial groups that 
conduct activities abroad. Katharina Pistor has characterized this problem as the ‘Host’s 
Dilemma’.570 The problem occurs because the ‘division of labour between home and host 
country regulators strongly favours Home over Host’.571 If both home and host countries 
lack unity of interests with regards to the adequate supervision of a cross-border banking 
group, than supervisory blind spots and coordination problems can arise. Such problems 
can be directly linked to harmful spillover effects and the provision of global ‘public 
bads’, such as financial instability – largely affecting ‘host countries [exposed] to risks 
emanating from activities of these foreign financial groups’.572  
 
Ring-fencing can also produce negative externalities across borders. Building on the 
definition of interstate externalities presented by Richard Revesz in the context of 
pollution, a similar problem occurs with regards to ring-fencing because the country that 
ring-fences its banks reshuffles creditors’ rights in order to favor local creditors and 
taxpayers – but doing so at the expense of creditors abroad.573 At the same time, the 
jurisdiction that imposes the ring-fence obtains the ‘jobs and fiscal benefits of the 
economic activity that generates the externality, without suffering the full costs of the 
activity’.574 
 
                                                
Financial Stability’ (2011) DNB Working Paper b 306; Dirk. Schoenmaker, ‘Burden Sharing: 
From Theory To Practice’ (2010) Revue D’economie Financière.  
570 Katharina Pistor, ‘Host’s Dilemma Rethinking EU Banking Regulation in Light of the Global 
Crisis’ in Festschrift for Klaus J. Hopt’s 70th birthday on 24 August 2010: Corporations, Market 
and Responsibility, 2339-2365.  
571 ibid 2340. According to Pistor, this allocation results from the ‘Principles for the Supervision 
of Banks’ Foreign Establishments’ (May 1983) (also know as the ‘Basel Concordat’). 
572 ibid.  
573 Roland Beck et al. argue that: ‘however, implemented unilaterally ex post as a crisis resolution 
tool, some [geographical ring-fencing measures] measures may have negative side effects on 
financial integration. In these situations, there may be conflicts between national and global 
financial stability, especially when national authorities have an incentive to ring-fence a failing 
banking group’s assets to support domestic creditors at the expense of their foreign counterparts’. 
Roland Beck et al., ‘The Side Effects of National Financial Sector Policies: Framing the Debate 
on Financial Protectionism’ (2015) ECB Occasional Paper n 166, 20.   
574 Richard L Revesz, ‘Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities’ (1996) 144 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 2341, 2343.  
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The case of the UK – a global banking powerhouse – can further illustrate the ‘Host’s 
Dilemma’ and the cross-border externality problem that underpin bank ring-fencing. The 
UK’s banking system has the potential to export externalities abroad. The Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) currently lists four British institutions as Global Systemically 
Important Banks (G-SIBs). These national champions include: Barclays, HSBC, Royal 
Bank of Scotland and Standard Chartered.575 Out of these, HSBC – the second largest 
bank in the world in terms of assets, and the largest in Europe – is listed as requiring an 
additional higher loss absorbing capital buffer equal to 2.0% of risk-weighted assets.576 
Moreover, it is expected that only around 9% of HSBC’s consolidated risk weighted 
assets would fall inside the fence.577 On the other hand, Standard Chartered Bank, another 
British champion abroad, might not be even greatly affected by the measures since it does 
not conduct retail activities in the UK. Because British G-SIBs have an international 
outreach, their financial distress or failure has the potential to spread financial instability 
across borders.  
 
If home states like the UK, reduce the consolidated oversight of their banking groups in 
order to concentrate on supervising their local RFBs and to limit implicit governmental 
contingent liabilities, then host country supervisors to such large and complex 
organizations could experience heightened coordination problems, asymmetric 
information problems (supervisory blind spots) and potential negative externalities 
domestically. Moreover, host country regulators to British G-SIBs could feel inclined to 
engage in a race-to-the-top by adopting similar – or even counteracting578 ring-fencing 
measures – in an attempt to protect their own local stakeholders and limit the import of 
                                                
575 Financial Stability Board (FSB), ‘2016 list of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs)’ 
(21 November 2015) <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016-list-of-global-systemically-
important-banks-G-SIBs.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016.  
576 This higher loss absorbency requirement has to be met with ‘Common Equity Tier 1 capital as 
defined by the Basel III framework’. 2.0% is the required level of additional common equity loss 
absorbency as a percentage of risk-weighted assets that will apply to HSBC, with phase-in 
starting from January 2016. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Global 
systemically important banks: updated assessment methodology and the higher loss absorbency 
requirement’ (July 2013) 12 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs255.pdf> accessed 6 December 2016.  
577 Emma Dunkley and Caroline Binham, ‘Banks Hail Concession on Ringfencing’ Financial 
Times (London, 15 October 2015) <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c76faf72-734c-11e5-bdb1-
e6e4767162cc.html#axzz3rXB9dqdO> accessed 6 December 2016.  
578 Roland Beck et al. (n 573) 24. 
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negative externalities from abroad. This duplicity raises compliance costs.579 Moreover, it 
would also tantamount to a new ‘dilemma of British banking’580 – but this time around, 
not for depositors and taxpayers in the UK. But rather for host country regulators, 
depositors and deposit insurers abroad, that would have to deal with the systemic 
challenges posed by British banks operating in their jurisdiction.  
 
In sum, the aforementioned problems can also be understood using Dirk Schoenmaker’s 
‘financial trilemma’ framework, which states that: ‘financial stability, financial 
integration and national financial policies are incompatible’.581According to this view, 
policymakers can attain two goals, but not all three. Consequently, one of the 
aforementioned policy objectives has to give. When seen through this perspective, ring-
fencing –and other structural banking reforms – seem to favor financial stability and 
national financial policies at the expense of greater financial integration.  
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
Bank ring-fencing is one of several structural reforms that have been proposed or 
implemented around the world as a response to the 2007-08 global Financial Crisis. In 
the UK, ring-fencing is being implemented in order to protect domestic depositors, make 
banks more resolvable and prevent the fiscal costs of future bank failures. The British 
ring-fencing model separates deposit-taking and payment services from trading activities 
deemed as being as having a riskier profile. The legal segregation will be structured by 
                                                
579 Compliance costs would include private and social costs for both home and host countries. 
Social costs include those of adopting ring-fencing measures and the costs of maintaining deposit 
insurance schemes and lower growth (calculated to oscillate between £1bn and £3bn for the UK 
alone). Private costs include operational or implementation charges and annual fees for banks. 
For the UK’s banking industry, the per annum fee has been calculated to amount to £4bn-£7bn 
according to the Vickers Commission. See Sharlene Goff, ‘Just the Facts: the Vickers Report’, 
Financial Times (London, 12 September 2011) <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7321c692-dd16-
11e0-b4f2-00144feabdc0.html> accessed 6 December 2016.   
580 The ‘dilemma of British banking’ as coined by the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
George Osborne, asked how Britain could: ‘remain a successful global centre of finance without 
asking taxpayers to bear unacceptable risks or putting the broader economy at risk’. The mandate 
of the Vickers Commission and the objective of its subsequent report were to solve this dilemma.  
581 Dirk Schoenmaker, ‘The Financial Trilemma’ (2011) 111 Economics Letters 57–59. 
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requiring banks to set up their RFBs as locally incorporated and independently 
capitalized subsidiaries. The PRA also expects RFBs to be organized as separate clusters 
within banking groups, following the so-called ‘sibling structure’.   
 
The British ring-fencing model is neither novel nor particularly unique. Similar – albeit 
not identical – structural reforms have existed at least since the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act 
in the USA. Moreover, in the onslaught of the Financial Crisis, other financial trend-
setting jurisdictions have adopted similar structural measures. This includes the Volcker 
Rule in the USA, the Liikanen recommendations in the EU, and the French and German 
laws that reapportion SIFI trading units into separate legal entities.  
 
Ring-fencing has become a catch-phrase in the aftermath of the 2007-08 economic 
malaise. However, commentators argue that it is often poorly defined. When examined 
through the prism of organizational law and economics, British type ring-fencing can be 
construed as a regulatory form of asset partitioning combined with the geographical and 
functional allocation of activities across different legal entities. This approach is 
consistent with both the risk-allocation, the functional and the geographical definitions of 
ring-fencing that are ubiquitous in the legal and the economic academic literature.  
 
Ring-fencing through ‘subsidiarization’ combines the economic attributes of asset 
partitioning, namely: (1) limited liability (owner shielding); and (2) entity shielding. Both 
owner and entity shielding are two sides of the same coin. While entity shielding could 
work in favor of protecting local creditors (depositors, taxpayers) in the event of 
insolvency, limited liability places a floor on the downside risks that banks’ investors 
face. Moreover, limited liability can generate moral hazard for investors. The moral 
hazard problem extends to depositors in the case of banks that benefit from deposit 
protection insurance. This entails that different bank stakeholders – such as shareholders 
and depositors – may experience reduced incentives for adequately monitoring banks’ 
activities. Consequently, owner shielding and entity shielding could have counteracting 
effects vis-à-vis ring-fencing’s proposed objectives.  
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Proponents of separating core retail banking activities from excluded activities and assets 
do not consider ring-fencing to be an all-powerful solution for ending moral hazard and 
the persistent too-big-to-fail (TBTF) problematic in contemporary banking. In particular, 
this study has presented arguments stating that ring-fencing could exacerbate economic 
problems for certain bank interest groups – including regulators and depositors. 
Particularly, the UK’s ring-fencing measures can create a type of ‘Host’s Dilemma’ for 
financial regulators in countries where British banks carry out their business.   
 
It has also been discussed that the plethora of different – and often conflicting – structural 
approaches that are currently being implemented across jurisdictions could undermine the 
benefits intended for RFBs in the UK. Diverging measures in the EU can also undermine 
the Banking Union, increase compliance costs for member countries and credit 
institutions operating in the Single Market, and create supervisory blind spots that could 
stockpile – rather than mitigate – systemic risk.  
 
Moreover, the existence of uncoordinated and divergent bank structural reforms (Vickers, 
Volcker rule and Liikanen type ring-fencing) could be problematic. During cross-border 
resolution asset partitioning could shield-off banks’ foreign assets from both home and 
host country supervisors.  
 
Financial institutions could be incentivized to go ‘forum shopping’, leading to regulatory 
arbitrage. Where and how high the fence should be remain highly contested. This 
discussion is reminiscent of the ‘boundary problems’ of financial regulation identified by 
Charles Goodhart and Rosa Lastra, who stated that: ‘(…) whenever a fence or boundary 
is established, there is an incentive for institutions to place themselves or part of their 
business inside or outside the boundary depending on what appears to be more 
advantageous or beneficial to them’.582 It is both difficult to decide where draw the line 
and to prevent regulated entities from circumventing it to their advantage.  
 
                                                
582 Goodhart and Lastra ‘Border Problems’ (n 484). See also Lastra, International Financial and 
Monetary Law (n 446) 144.  
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A final critique that could be raised to the way that ring-fencing has been implemented in 
the UK is that it has not delved into the granularities of legal structures for establishing 
RFBs. The Vickers Commission (ICB) originally set out to determine which activities 
should fall within the fence, as well as how strong the separation should be. In the jargon 
of the Vickers Report, these questions relate to the ‘location’ and the ‘height’ of the 
fence. However, apart from the adoption of the so-called ‘sibling structure’, questions of 
legal structure – akin to the materials used to construct the fence – were not addressed in 
great detail in the implementing norms.583 Consequently, the matter goes further than 
simply asking whether subsidiaries or branches are preferred for establishing cross-border 
banks. In this sense, structural reforms should go one step further and ask which are the 
desired legal organizational forms (eg corporation, mutual societies, mutual funds) for 
organizing banking activities.  
 
                                                
583 Although in its Final Report, the Vickers Commission did provide some general models for 
achieving the level of operation segregation that it recommended. cf Vickers Report (n 449) 67-
68. See also Timothy Edmonds, ‘The Independent Commission on Banking: The Vickers Report 
and the Parliamentary Commission on banking standards’ (30 December 2014) House of 
Commons Library Standard Note, 9 
<http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/SN06171/the-
independent-commission-on-banking-the-vickers-report-the-parliamentary-commission-on-
banking-standards> accessed 6 December 2016.  
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions – the Legal Organization of Banks 
Matters for Financial Regulation 
 
‘They looked from a certain point of view, from a certain paradigm, and missed 
everything that was important’. 
 
Gary Gorton584 
 
1. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This dissertation set out to answer if and how the way that commercial banks are legally 
organized can provide some insights for revamping financial regulation after the 
onslaught of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. The thesis argues that banks’ legal and 
organizational details are often neglected or overlooked whenever designing financial 
regulations, such as: capital, liquidity and leverage rules, deposit protection insurance 
schemes, bank resolution regimes or so-called bank structural reforms.    
 
Commercial banks are legal entities. This means that across jurisdictions banks adopt 
specific legal structures. Moreover, it is commonplace for banks – especially 
international banks – to be comprised of groups of many different legal entities. Thus, the 
way that banks are legally organized cannot be trivial for financial regulation.  
 
Banks’ legal organization determines the ownership structure and the centralized 
contractual interaction node for different groups of stakeholders, including: owners, 
creditors, depositors, managers, financial regulators and supervisors and taxpayers. 
                                                
584 Gary B Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming (OUP 
2012).  
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Organizational forms also create bundles of property rights. Property rights generate 
incentives and interests for all groups of bank stakeholders. Thus, studying the different 
incentive structures of existing legal forms is important for the design of financial 
regulation.  
 
One of the main objectives of this thesis was to introduce banks’ legal organization into 
the analysis, given that is often sidelined – or even assumed that all banks are 
corporations. By leaving legal details out of the picture, one runs the risk of studying 
‘firms without organization’ – as Ronald Coase distinctively put it.585 In a ‘real-world 
setting’, one observes that across jurisdictions banks adopt a myriad of organizational 
forms. Commonplace legal forms include: (private and public) corporation, mutual 
associations, and co-operatives and commercial nonprofit entities.  
 
Chapter 2 introduced the concept of organizational forms that is central to this book. It 
explained how legal forms are different to other related ideas, like business models and 
banking licenses. Moreover, it also described how legal forms fit within the wider set of 
reforms that have been discussed and implemented in the wake of the 2007-08 financial 
crisis.  
 
Banks are not always corporations limited by shares. Chapter 3 discusses how banks are 
legally organized across some jurisdictions. The chapter describes that banks are typically 
set-up as investor owned firms, consumer owned co-operatives and also unowned 
entities. Thus, most contemporary banks are organized as either corporations, co-
operative and mutual associations or nonprofit entities. This legal configuration is 
important because of the incentives and interests that different bank stakeholders have 
under each type of organizational form. The chapter further compares the most salient 
ownership features of co-operative, mutual banks and nonprofit banks against the foil of 
the business corporation. The analysis presents how different bank legal structures 
generate distinctive incentives for their constituencies.  
 
                                                
585 Ronald H Coase, The Firm, The Market and the Law (University of Chicago Press 1988) 3. 
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Chapter 4 discussed the relationship between capital and liquidity standards and legal 
form. The chapter concludes that some of Basel III’s major components do not fully take 
into account the features of non-joint stock banks. This is particularly important because 
many non-joint stock banks do not issue shares or stocks. Shares are essential for a 
regulatory capital measure called ‘common equity tier 1’ capital (CET1) that is central to 
Basel III’s composition of regulatory capital. CET 1 is also important for measuring 
additional loss-absorbing cushions, like the capital conservation buffer, the counter 
cyclical capital buffer, the G-SIFI surcharge and the leverage ratio. International standard 
setting bodies – like the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board – should take 
organizational forms into account when designing and implementing capital and liquidity 
standards. Otherwise, there is a risk that implementation gaps, coordination problems and 
legal and commercial uncertainty could ensue.  
 
Chapter 5 focused on the nexus between bank legal form and resolution. The chapter 
analyzes how entity shielding (creditor priority and liquidation protection) interacts with 
bank resolution proceedings. Entity shielding can facilitate bank resolution by creating 
asset pools with their own creditor rank. However, this benefit comes at a cost, since 
entity shielding can also hinder cross-border resolution processes – creating challenges 
for multiple points of entry resolution strategies.   
 
The final chapter of the book discussed banking structural reforms in the United 
Kingdom. In the UK, regulators have implemented the functional separation of deposit-
taking activities from proprietary trading – considered by some as being of a riskier 
nature. This legal separation has been called ‘ring-fencing’ through subsidiarization. The 
chapter argues that ring-fencing through subsidiarization purports to achieve the 
partitioning of assets – something that has been widely studied in the organizational law 
and economic literature. However, ring-fencing has its own economic consequences, 
which are discussed with great detail in the chapter. Financial regulators should take such 
economic consequences into account when designing financial regulation.  
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2. WHAT HYPOTHESES COULD BE DRAWN FROM THIS 
THESIS 
 
What has been learned from this research project? What propositions can one draw from 
its conclusions? What hypotheses could further be observed or empirically tested in the 
future?  
 
Foremost, the cross-border comparative analysis of commercial bank legal forms 
undertaken in this project includes only a very small sample of jurisdictions. Future 
comparative studies could certainly be expanded in order to include more jurisdictions. In 
addition, future studies could challenge the conclusion that contemporary banks fall into 
one of three broad categories identified, namely: investor-owned corporate banks, 
consumer-owned co-operative and mutual banks, and ownerless commercial nonprofit 
banks.  
 
Another hypothesis that can be empirically tested is whether non-corporate banks exhibit 
higher capital and liquidity levels, and are less levered than corporate banks (or if the 
converse is true, or they are more or less the same). An analysis of the type of assets that 
corporate and non-corporate banks invest in could provide some indications regarding the 
amount of risk-taking that different types of banks are prone to engage in. Similar studies 
regarding bank business models have been recently undertaken. Such studies could 
control for legal form (eg using dummy variables for labeling corporate and non-
corporate banks) in order to see if these variables have any effect on the observed 
outcome.   
 
Moreover, if capital liquidity and leverage rules were to create an uneven playing field 
between corporate and non-corporate banks, or even affect each group differently, one 
could expect to see the sheer number of non-corporate banks to diminish. For example, 
some non-corporate banks could have an incentive to demutualize, transform into 
business corporations or outright sell their business to corporate banks. The domestic 
implementation of Basel III rules in certain jurisdictions could also serve as an event to 
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observe and test if corporate banks and non-corporate banks are affected differently by 
such rules (eg whether their capital, liquidity and leverage measures vary disparately, or 
if their asset or funding composition changes, etc.).  
 
The effect that asset partitioning has on bank resolution could also be observed or tested 
in the future. One way to observe this is simply by looking at the different outcomes that 
certain type of bank creditors (ranking pari passu) in one jurisdiction could face, when 
their creditor rank varies across the single market. The ensuing litigation that these 
differences could bring could also be further studied.  
 
Another hypothesis that can be tested is whether corporate and non-corporate banks fare 
differently during bank resolution. Put differently, one could look at resolution data in 
order to study if it is quicker (or lengthier), or more (or less) costly, to resolve a corporate 
bank than it is to resolve a co-operative bank, for example.  
 
The implementation of bank ring-fencing in the UK – now coupled with the expected exit 
of the UK from the EU, after the results of the referendum held on 23 June 2016, will 
also allow to observe some of the hypothesis discussed in the thesis. Will banks continue 
to see London as a leading global international financial center? Will international banks 
keep their European headquarters in The City – or will ring-fencing rules and the UK’s 
imminent ‘Brexit’ from the EU motivate banks to setup their headquarters in other 
European cities? While at the moment of writing, the UK’s exit procedure from the EU is 
still uncertain, 2019 is the year that ring-fencing is to become fully operational. One 
hypothesis is that combined with ring-fencing – Brexit could lead British and 
international banks based in London to resettle abroad.   
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3. SOME LIMITATIONS  
 
This study has argued that legal forms are an important – but certainly not the only – 
factor that should be taken into account for designing more effective financial regulation 
as a response to the 2007-08 global financial crisis. As Gary Gorton’s quote at the 
beginning of this conclusion suggests, when focusing on one particular point of view, one 
runs the risk of missing everything – or at least some things – that are important. As G. 
Calabresi and D. Melamed acknowledge, when working with frameworks or models 
these: ‘(…) can be mistaken for the total view of phenomena, like legal relationships, 
which are too complex to be painted in any one picture’.586 Consequently, some 
necessary caveats regarding the limitations of this contribution are in order.  
 
Foremost the study is entirely theoretical and descriptive. No formal empirical work has 
been done to support the claim that legal forms are important for capital and liquidity 
standards, resolution or banking structural reforms. The magnitude of this relevance has 
not been measured. From the outset, the objective has been to describe and explain the 
relationship and provide a starting point for a hypothesis that could be empirically tested 
in the future.  
 
Moreover, the study does not prescribe any grandiloquent policy solutions, like 
championing for the adoption of one legal form other another. The conclusions are far 
more modest. As Bülbul and her co-authors have concluded in one notable study: ‘[w]e 
simply do not know which type of bank and which structure of a financial system are 
better under different circumstances’.587  
 
Consequently, when faced against this uncertainty one feels inclined to agree with said 
authors that ‘preserving diversity’ should be a policy objective, since different legal 
                                                
586 Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review.  
587 Dilek Bülbül, Reinhard Schmidt and Ulrich Schüwer, ‘Caisses D’épargne et Banques 
Coopératives en Europe’ (2013) 111 Revue d'Economie Financière 159. 
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forms could fare better under different circumstances.588 This means preserving market 
pluralism, organizational variety, as well as providing a level playing for different types 
of banks. In the words of Groeneveld ‘(…)  it is important to acknowledge the benefits of 
organisational diversity for competition and, last but not least, stability in banking’.589 
More specifically, one cannot conclude that the prevalence of corporate banks over 
mutual, cooperative and commercial nonprofit banks is favorable or socially desirable. 
Thus, financial regulation should not aim to promote the convergence to a single type of 
organizational form.   
 
 
4. WIDER POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
Some of the ideas touched upon throughout the thesis could be extended to cover other 
related topics. These topics include the legal organization of non-bank financial 
institutions, the relationship between legal form and organizational complexity, and also 
an alternative view of the economic consequences of bank ‘ring-fencing’.   
 
The Legal Organization of Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
 
From the outset of the book, it has been explicitly stated that in order to make the thesis 
more manageable, the focus of the study has been limited to commercial banks. However, 
the analysis of legal forms could also be extended to other types of financial institutions, 
including: insurance companies, investment banks, hedge funds and private equity funds.  
 
                                                
588 ibid.  
589 Hans Groeneveld ‘A Snapshot of European Co-operative Banking’ (April 2016) 3  
<http://www.globalcube.net/clients/eacb/content/medias/publications/annual_reports/20160411_
HG_EACB_FINAL_Snapshot.pdf > accessed 6 December 2016. 
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Systemic risk and moral hazard concerns are not exclusive to commercial banks. During 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis, international insurer AIG was bailed-out by the US federal 
government for USD 180 billion because of its systemic importance. The Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) now publishes a list of global systemically important insurers (‘G-
SIIs’) that are regarded as ‘too-big-to-fail’. 590  
 
Moreover, it is also common for some insurance companies worldwide – and particularly 
in the US – to be legally organized as mutual societies or other non-corporate legal forms. 
This includes the curious case of ‘reciprocal inter-insurance exchanges’, which are 
unincorporated contractual networks that widely operate without the need of centralized 
legal entity. Thus, an analysis of the role and features that result from organizational form 
is also warranted for insurers.  
 
The same can be said of investment banks. Historically, it was commonplace for 
investment banks to be organized as employee owned partnerships, where partners were 
unlimitedly liable. Gradually, investment banks have experienced a ‘run towards limited 
liability’ and ‘complete asset partitioning’ typically achieved through the corporate form. 
Moreover, investment banks and securities brokers can also be systemically important – 
as was evidenced during the 2008 financial crisis with the failures of Lehman Brothers 
and Bear Stearns. This prompted legal changes for investment banks Goldman Sachs (aka 
‘the partnership’) and Morgan Stanley, which transformed into bank holding companies 
under the supervision of the US federal oversight.  
 
The so-called ‘shadow banking’ sector has also generated concerns in the wake of the 
financial crisis. Shadow banks are not a specific type of institution (ie one will not find a 
building with a ‘shadow bank’ sign on the entrance) but rather ‘entities or market 
activities’. These unregulated entities or activities can take on different legal structures. 
Thus an analysis of the ‘law in shadow banking’ could also shed some light on what 
financial supervisors should be on the lookout for.  
                                                
590 See FSB, ‘2015 update of list of global systemically important insurers (G-SIIs)’ (3 November 
2015) <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-communication-G-SIIs-Final-version.pdf> 
accessed 6 December 2016.  
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Consequently, legal forms prove to be important for commercial banking –but are also 
bound be important for other areas of financial intermediation. The same type of analysis 
could be extended to other market participants, such as securities exchanges and central 
counterparty clearing houses. 
 
Legal Structure and Regulatory Compliance  
 
Another related factor that could be further explored is the ‘too-big-to-manage / too-big-
to-supervise’ problem that stems from having cross-border banks with complex legal 
structures (ie with a large number of subsidiaries). The sheer number of different legal 
entities that some banking conglomerates have can represent a challenge for both 
managers and supervisors.  
 
On one hand, managers and board members could have difficulties making sure that their 
multiple subsidiaries comply with the existing domestic and international legal and tax 
rules in every jurisdiction where they operate. In many cases, a centralized approach 
raises credibility issues. A ‘decentralized’ governance structure can also lead to divergent 
approaches and standards being taken across different regions. This is also problematic – 
since a lack of global standards towards anti-money laundering (AML), counter terrorist 
finance (CTF) and sanctions compliance – for example – could allow criminals to game 
big banks. 
 
The same challenges would also apply to both home and host country supervisors. 
Consolidated supervision can become muddled when dealing with cross border 
operations and asymmetric information. Full disclosure is no panacea either, if in turn, 
supervisors are inundated with organizational information that they cannot completely 
process. Additional complexity layers can arise whenever bank subsidiaries are 
incorporated in jurisdictions that provide secrecy regarding ultimate beneficial 
ownership.  
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Thus, questions regarding how complex the legal structure of banks should be – ie how 
many subsidiaries they should have and where should these subsidiaries be incorporated 
– also merit future analysis.  
 
The Political Economy of Banking Structural Reforms    
 
A political economy perspective of bank ring-fencing and other structural banking 
reforms raises some interesting questions regarding the tensions between preserving 
global financial stability and preventing the political costs of bank failures and bailouts.  
 
Through the lens of political economy, UK style bank ring-fencing could be interpreted 
as a tool aimed at protecting British depositors – and ultimately, taxpayers – from having 
to foot the bill of bank failures. Notwithstanding, countries like the UK will still expect 
their national banking champions to remain competitive abroad. The interplay between 
domestic and cross-border goals can ultimately create tension between the UK, acting in 
its home country capacity, and host countries to British banks. These tensions can be 
expected to augment in the face of the UK’s exit from the EU. 
 
As a response to these tensions, host countries to British banks could have the incentive 
to issue counteracting regulation or even ring-fence the assets and capital of foreign 
banks. In times of financial distress or when bank resolution is triggered, ring-fencing 
could lead to coordination problems that could undermine cross-border financial stability. 
If all countries were to follow the UK and would ring-fence their domestic deposits this 
could ultimately impinge on the benefits of the ‘single-point of entry’ (SPE) bank 
resolution approach, as each host supervisor would scramble to get a hold of local assets 
in order to protect domestic depositors – and ultimately in order to avoid taxpayer fueled 
bailouts – in their jurisdiction. These issues certainly merit additional analysis.  
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APPENDIX  
Simplified Organizational Structure of HSBC Holdings Plc. 
(Source: HSBC Holdings plc 2015 Annual Reports and Accounts591) 
 
 
 
                                                
591 As of 31st December 2015. Does not include all intermediate holding companies and 
subsidiaries. Unless otherwise specified, companies are wholly owned. See ‘HSBC Holdings plc 
Annual Reports and Accounts 2015’, 474 <http://www.hsbc.com/investor-relations> accessed 6 
December 2016.  
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SUMMARY  
 
Do the different ways that commercial banks are legally organized matter for the design 
of financial regulation? It is often assumed that most commercial banks are setup as 
investor owned business corporations. However, this is not always the case. In many 
jurisdictions, banks are legally organized using a plethora of organizational forms, which 
include: co-operatives, mutual associations and even nonprofit entities. Thus, some of the 
distinctive legal attributes and features of these non-corporate banks are not regulated by 
corporate law – but rather by specialized statutes (e.g. co-operative law, the law of 
nonprofit entities, etc.). Moreover, many banks are comprised of groups of many 
different legal entities. 
 
Given such divergences in the legal attributes and the regulation of existing bank 
organizational forms, important questions arise. Does banking regulation take such 
organizational differences into account? And if not, what are the consequences of failing 
to take heed to such differences? This thesis attempts to answer some of these and other 
closely related questions, such as: what are the predominant legal forms used for 
organizing commercial banking activities in major jurisdictions today? What economic 
features make a co-operative bank different to a corporate bank, or different to a mutual 
bank? What is the relationship between bank capital, liquidity and leverage standards, 
and organizational forms? Do international standard setting bodies, like the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), 
take into account non-corporate banks when they design, propose and implement capital 
and liquidity standards?  
 
The study argues and concludes that bank legal forms matter for financial regulation. The 
study focuses on three specific instances were the interplay between legal forms and 
financial regulation is found to be significantly important. These are: (1) capital, liquidity 
and leverage standards (chapter four), (2) bank resolution and crisis management (chapter 
five) and (3) for the ongoing design and implementation of banking structural reforms in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis (chapter six). 
 
The legal structure of banks is important because each type of organizational form entails 
a ‘package’ of economic attributes and a hierarchy of both creditors’ and owners’ rights 
(property rights). The economic features inherent to different legal forms interact with the 
incentives created by financial regulations, such as capital and liquidity requirements, 
deposit protection insurance schemes and bank resolution regimes. In order for financial 
regulation to be effective, it should acknowledge the incentives and the rules that the law 
allocates to different bank stakeholders through organizational forms. 
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SAMENVATTING  
 
Zijn de verschillende manieren waarop commerciële banken juridisch georganiseerd zijn 
van belang voor het ontwerp van de financiële regelgeving? Vaak wordt verondersteld 
dat de meeste commerciële banken zijn opgezet als bedrijven, in het bezit van 
investeerders. Maar dat is niet altijd het geval. In veel rechtsgebieden kennen banken een 
enorm aantal verschillende organisatievormen, waaronder coöperaties, onderlinge 
maatschappijen en zelfs instellingen zonder winstoogmerk. Sommige onderscheidende 
juridische eigenschappen en kenmerken van deze niet-vennootschappelijke banken 
worden derhalve niet geregeld door het vennootschapsrecht maar door speciale wetten 
(bijv. het coöperatief recht, het recht van instellingen zonder winstoogmerk, enz.). 
Bovendien bestaan veel banken uit groepen die zijn samengesteld uit een groot aantal 
verschillende rechtspersonen. 
 
Gezien deze verschillen tussen banken in de juridische eigenschappen en de regelgeving 
van bestaande organisatievormen, dienen zich belangrijke vragen aan. Houdt de 
bankregelgeving rekening met die organisatieverschillen? En zo niet, wat zijn dan de 
gevolgen van het feit dat er geen acht wordt geslagen op die verschillen? In dit 
proefschrift wordt getracht enkele van deze en hiermee nauw samenhangende vragen te 
beantwoorden, zoals: wat zijn op dit moment de meest voorkomende rechtsvormen voor 
de organisatie van commerciële bankactiviteiten in de belangrijkste rechtsgebieden? 
Welke economische kenmerken maken een coöperatieve bank anders dan een 
vennootschappelijke bank, of anders dan een onderlinge bank? Wat is de relatie tussen de 
normen voor vermogen, liquiditeit en leverage-ratio enerzijds en organisatievormen 
anderzijds? Houden internationale standaardiseringsinstellingen, zoals de Bazel-
commissie voor Bankentoezicht (BCBS) en de Raad voor Financiële Stabiliteit (FSB), 
rekening met niet-vennootschappelijke banken bij het ontwerpen, voorstellen en invoeren 
van vermogens- en liquiditeitsnormen?  
 
In deze studie wordt betoogd en geconcludeerd dat rechtsvormen van banken van belang 
zijn voor de financiële regelgeving. De studie richt zich op drie specifieke voorbeelden 
waar de wisselwerking tussen rechtsvorm en financiële regelgeving van significant 
belang blijkt te zijn. Dit zijn: (1) vermogens-, liquiditeits- en leverage-rationormen 
(hoofdstuk 4), (2) bankresolutie en crisismanagement (hoofdstuk 5) en (3) het verder 
ontwerpen en invoeren van structurele hervormingen in het bankwezen in de nasleep van 
de financiële crisis (hoofdstuk 6). 
 
De rechtsvorm van banken is van belang omdat elke soort organisatievorm een 'pakket' 
van economische eigenschappen met zich meebrengt en een rangorde aan rechten van 
zowel crediteuren als eigenaren (eigendomsrechten). De economische kenmerken die 
inherent zijn aan verschillende rechtsvormen staan in wisselwerking met de stimulansen 
die gecreëerd worden door financiële regelgeving, zoals vermogens- en 
liquiditeitsvereisten, depositobeschermingsregelingen en bankresolutieregelingen. Wil 
financiële regelgeving effectief zijn, dan moet zij de stimulansen en de regels erkennen 
die de wet via organisatievormen toewijst aan de stakeholders van verschillende banken. 
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